2009/9/24 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:

>> AFAICS nobody has been arguing that any metaphysical posit is an a
>> priori truth.  The claim that CTM entails the posit of AR is the
>> consequence of a reasoned argument.  The alternative is that CTM is
>> false on the posit of PM.
> You seem to be assuming a workign MGA

Actually I'm only assuming my own argument contra the physical
intelligibility of CTM, and my conclusion, like Maudlin's, was to
reject CTM.  But I'm prepared to grant Bruno's reversal of matter and
mathematics as a working hypothesis to retain the possibility of a
computational mind-body theory, to be justified abductively.

>>.If it
>> were to turn out somehow that the mind-body problem and the whole of
>> physics besides could be elucidated by the explanatory power of comp
>> on the basis of AR+UDA+CT etc then what could the posit of Platonism
>> add to this?
> Platonism=AR. To be precise, Platonism disambiguates AR as an
> ontological commitment and not just a commitment to mind-independent
> truth.

Well then we're in agreement.  AR as we have defined it is
unambiguously a posit of comp.  Labelling this "Platonism" can provide
nothing further in the way of illumination, but I follow Popper in
holding arguing about words to be futile, so I won't.

>> Of course how all this would connect with RITSIAR is
>> unlikely to be settled by such an approach; but this is either the HP,
>> which seems intractable on any purely processual basis (for those who
>> take it seriously) or else would already be explained (for those who
>> don't).
> You have answered your own question. Platonism says numbers, and
> therefore
> and immaterial UD are RITSIAR.

Ah, if you are proposing that, beyond theoretical and methodological
constraints, any metaphysical posit per se could disambiguate what is
RITSIAR, I must disagree.  In developing third-person accounts of
persons and states of affairs, we seek to explicate consistent
nomological relations between the posited theoretical entities.  But
beyond this, the connection between RITSIAR and any third-person
account remains a mystery in the face of any known explanatory
strategy. It does not seem susceptible to causal association with
processes or events in any intelligible sense, nor does the posit of
unsupported 'identities', between entities radically non-identical by
any consistent standard, seem more effective than a whistle in the

Hence I think it may be missing the point to insist that any
theoretical entity deployed for the purpose of a third-person account
is itself RITSIAR; rather we should regard such accounts as successful
insofar as they take us ever closer to the brink of the gap, on the
other side of which RITSIAR can be glimpsed.  IOW, RITSIAR invokes the
Hard Question: how can that be me?

> Otherwise you just have a statement about
> what a UD would do if one existed.

Yes, precisely.

>> He argues that the reversal of material and
>> mathematical primacy is a necessary posit for computational
>> supervenience - i.e. AR.  And he claims that the predictions of the
>> theory are empirically refutable, which means that its ultimate
>> justification is to be sought abductively.
>>  >Other
>> > peopel *could* argue that way, eg, Tegmark.
>> Do they in fact?
> eg Tegmark

Oh, you mean that Bruno's isn't the only such theory?  No, of course not.


> >

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