2009/9/24 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
>> > You seem to be assuming a workign MGA
>> Actually I'm only assuming my own argument contra the physical
>> intelligibility of CTM,
> I haven't seen you give an argument that CTM is incompatible
> with phsycalism, only that CTM wouldn't give the seame
> sort of answer to the HP if it gave an answer
No, it's more damaging than that. I've argued, without any refutation
AFAICS, that since CTM ex hypothesi makes no consistent appeal to
physical causation, whatever sort of answer it could give to the HP
couldn't be a consequence of any appeal to physical explanation in any
standardly accepted sense. If there's supposed to be some other
relevant sense of physical explanation in this regard, AFAICS CTM
remains demurely silent on the issue. Consequently, like it or not,
it's stuck with computational supervenience or it's a dead duck.
> Which neither
> pshycialism nor CTM currently do.
>>and my conclusion, like Maudlin's, was to
>> reject CTM.
> ...in favour of physicalism?
> You mean AR as Platonism is a posit of comp?
> Is "comp" here Bruno's idea or the standard CTM?
He says - and I agree - that they're no different in this respect, as
a consequence of CTM's implicit dependency on AR.
>> Labelling this "Platonism" can provide
>> nothing further in the way of illumination, but I follow Popper in
>> holding arguing about words to be futile, so I won't.
> I have just explained why it does. Bruno keeps inssisting
> that AR is only a statement about truth, but such a purely
> episemological claim is not enough to whisk a ways the material
> world and replace it with adn arithmetical Platonia.
At this level of analysis, it is merely begging the question to assume
that there is a material world to be whisked away. I agree with you
that there is a reality - RITSIAR - that is indubitable. The question
of the link between this reality and a more general theory is however
precisely what is in dispute amongst rival theories such as
materialism and mathematical approaches like comp. Of course one may
feel there are grounds for holding one theory as stronger than the
others - to regard it as the champion, if you like - but this does not
justify giving it extra assistance in the ring, or allowing hitting
under the belt.
As to ontology, no theory can lean on more than its explanatory power
on the basis of certain premises. I don't see much point in debating
your use of 'Platonism' in this regard any more.
> Uhhhh...no. I already know I am RITSIAR....
I would never dispute this.
> Whatever is postied as explaining my undoubted reality
> has to be postied as real itself.
No, I disagree. I think that you're too quick to jump the gap
> Deciding between rival
> posits is another matter. I think you are much being much
> to "quick" to decide it is a hopeless mystery.
To say that it is mysterious is not to dismiss it as hopeless.
Perhaps being too quick to unsatisfactory solutions may cause a
genuine resolution to escape us for longer.
>> In developing third-person accounts of
>> persons and states of affairs, we seek to explicate consistent
>> nomological relations between the posited theoretical entities. But
>> beyond this, the connection between RITSIAR and any third-person
>> account remains a mystery in the face of any known explanatory
> What is "it"????
"the connection between RITSIAR and any third-person account"
>>does not seem susceptible to causal association with
>> processes or events in any intelligible sense, nor does the posit of
>> unsupported 'identities', between entities radically non-identical by
>> any consistent standard, seem more effective than a whistle in the
Does that mean you have a solution to proffer for the HP?
>> Hence I think it may be missing the point to insist that any
>> theoretical entity deployed for the purpose of a third-person account
>> is itself RITSIAR; rather we should regard such accounts as successful
>> insofar as they take us ever closer to the brink of the gap, on the
>> other side of which RITSIAR can be glimpsed. IOW, RITSIAR invokes the
>> Hard Question: how can that be me?
> I think you have got the question of positing somehting
> AS real in a theory confused with the question of
> confirming a theory. A theory according to which
> the real can spring from the unreal (as in
> Woody Allens Purple Rose of Cairo) is a non-starter.
No, it's not a confusion. I'm saying that to posit something as
RITSIAR prior to such confirmation, or at least elucidation, is to put
the cart before the horse. As to AR, you're hooked on your insistence
that it is unreal. If attaching a label makes it any more real for
you, perhaps you could just repeat the word "platonism" to yourself
whenever you see "AR", and then we would have no further need to
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