On 24 Sep 2009, at 10:35, Flammarion wrote:

> Platonism=AR. To be precise, Platonism disambiguates AR as an
> ontological commitment and not just a commitment to mind-independent
> truth.

So Platonism is different from AR.
comp (CTM) assumes AR, not platonism.
UDA uses AR, not Platonism. UDA uses only the commitment that the  
truth of the arithmetical theorem Ex(x = UD) is independent of me.



>
>>  Of course how all this would connect with RITSIAR is
>> unlikely to be settled by such an approach; but this is either the  
>> HP,
>> which seems intractable on any purely processual basis (for those who
>> take it seriously) or else would already be explained (for those who
>> don't).
>
> You have answered your own question. Platonism says numbers, and
> therefore
> and immaterial UD are RITSIAR. Otherwise you just have a statement
> about
> what a UD would do if one existed.


You never answered my repeated question: is the second "I" of RITSIAR  
the 1-I or the 3-I?
The 1-3 distinction is the key of both UDA1-7 and UDA-8 (MGA). The  
Hard Consciousness problem, which is really the usual "mind-body"  
problem is the 1-person/3-person relation problem. The 1-person is the  
subjective private non-communicable experience, but self-duplication  
provides a tool to talk about it. Have you ever read the read the paper?


> I have explained that several times. It clarifies the issue
> that AR needs to be an ontological commitment, not
> just a commitment to mathematical truth. Platonism
> is not an uncontroversial entailment of CTM or CT, hence
> "comp" is not the only premise needed. Hence the need
> to distinguish between comp, which embeds Platonism like
> a Trojan horse, and CTM which doesn't.


Where does comp uses platonism? I use only the idea that the truth of  
the propositions having the type "ExP(x)" are independent of me. And  
this only at step 8.



>> Could you refer to a contestation of MGA.
>
> Could you explain how it differs from Maudlin?. In SANE04 you say
> "That result has been found independently by me and Tim Maudlin
> (Marchal 1988, Maudlin 1989). Maudlin�s argumentation provides more
> information"



The result is the same, the proof are completely different. Russell  
Standish made an interesting critics of Maudlin's proof, which helped  
me to realize that MGA is simpler and less prone to possible critics  
based on special interpretation of quantum mechanics. The "more  
information" was a red herring, despite the intrinsic interest of that  
information.




> Yes it is,because following from physical necessity
> is not the same as logical tautology. Logically,
> the governign equation of the universe could
> have been different, so "the governing equation
> of the universe is the SE" contains shannon information
> and so does such a physical universe.


How do you distinguish the Shannon information of the SWE and the  
Shannon information of the axioms of elementary arithmetic?



> Exactly. GIT does not suggest there is unproveable
> truth,only truths unproveable with a given system.


I guess GIT = Gödel incompleteness Theorem.  I agree with you but  
don't see the relevance, given that the information made by internal  
observer appears within systems, and is relative.
There is 0 information produced in a self-duplicating systems, yet,  
from the points of view of the duplicated system, they get one bit of  
information.



> If there is no UD, neither is runnign on it.

If the sqrt(2) does not exist, I am the pope.


>> I have to ask you if you understand the difference between the 1-you
>> and the 3-you?
>
> That there is a difference depends on your metaphsyics.


Are you identifying your consciousness with your body? Well then you  
are no more in the CTM frame at all.



> Mathematical existence is a mere metaphor, not RITSIAR.

With your PM axioms, may be. My point is that I refer you to an  
argument that CTM + PM leads to an epistemological contradiction.



>> Do you agree that the UD exists in the same sense that the prime
>> numbers exists in arithmetic?
>
> Yes
>
>> I need no more.
>
> No, you need more because merely fictive of formal or metaphorical
> existence is not enough
> to generate my RITSIAR



Then by MGA you have to attribute some telepathy ability to the  
neurons. I agree that MGA is quite concise in the sane04 paper.  
Consult the list MGA thread. The best version are there.


>> You cannot deny the existence of the UD in arithmetic, like you  
>> cannot
>> deny the existence of 13 in arithmetic.
>
> No. Instead I can assert that "in arithmetic" means in a fictive,
> conceptual world, not in a real ontological realm,


Idem.



>> Some physical process can easily be shown to implement mathematical
>> computation, but this does not give a physical definition of
>> computation, physics lack a criteria to say when a computation is not
>> implemented, as the Mallah-Putnam-Chalmers threads illustrated in the
>> list.
>
> How can anyon eelse have such a criterion when
> physics lacks it?



Because physics may be not the fundamental science. In computability  
theory such criteria exists. They are non constructive, but this is no  
problem with arithmetical realism.



> I haven';t seen a convincing reaosn why I need to make the
> distinction. Since I reject the existing UD, I doesn't matter
> whether I say it isn't generating teh 1-me or the 3-me.


You have never study UDA, have you? The distinction between 1 and 3  
person is a key in the first seven step of UDA, and all your remarks  
that the UD does not physically exist does not apply there, given that  
UDA1-7 presuppose physical machines. UDA-7 assumes the existence of a  
physical UD, like the one implemented in 1991 (as described in all  
details in "Conscience et Mécanisme").

If you don't understand the 1-3 difference, we are back ten years in  
the past of this list. I doubt anyone have still a problem with that  
distinction, or with the first person indeterminacy.



>> You have still not explain how a propertyless primary matter
>> can have the property to implement contingent property, which is
>> needed if you want to use PM in the CTM frame.
>
> existence is not a property.

I agree. You don't answer to the question though.



>> I have no clue about what your PM solves, both in the conceptual
>> problem of matter, and in the conceptual problem of consciousness.
>
> Answered many times
> 1) the WR problem

QM solves the 3-WR problem without PM. But I show it does not solve  
the 1-WR rabbit problem. Does PM solve the comp (or CTM) 1-white  
rabbit problem. (of course not, by MGA: you need to put actual  
infinities in PM and in Matter).


> 2) change and time
> 3) attachment point ofr qualia


Could you refer to papers explaining this?


> As I have stated, my objection to the UDA is the ontological non-
> existence
> of the UD

No. MGA has been build to take purposefully that objection into  
account. UDA1-7 uses only a physical UD.
You can also forget MGA and use AUDA + occam razor, and see how comp  
and the universal self-introspective machine solve the HCP and HMP  
problem. HCP = hard consciousness problem. HMP = hard matter problem.
AUDA explains how "metaphorical" universal machine get correctly aware  
of matter.
HMP = how to explain matter or matter appearance without postulating  
it. Matter, and not Primary Matter which is something nobody has ever  
seen (for good reason, given that "seen" is a first person experience).


>> It is a subtle and
>> difficult non trivial point explained in the UDA-8. I am not
>> pretending this is obvious.
>> Your answer "the UD does not exist" just don't work. Because you mean
>> "the UD does not exist physically",
>
> No, I mean it doesn't exist at all as I have said many times


This contradicts your own saying when you agree that seven exists,  
albeit non ontologically. Thanks to MGA the argument works even if you  
believe that the existence of seven is metaphorical.
I have still no clues about what you don't understand in the proof,  
but I realize that you never mention anything in it, except that you  
are stuck in step0. But this seems to me due to your own persisting  
confusion between Platonism and Arithmetical Realism.


>> and this is irrelevant by MGA
>
> which I don't accept.

There is nothing to accept or not accept. You have to understand or  
not understand, or refute, that is to find a flaw. What do you think  
is wrong in MGA? And do you understand or not the UDA1-7 for which the  
entire "platonism/AR" discussion is not relevant. Do you agree in the  
reversal physics/machine-psychology-theology in case a concrete  
material physical (perhaps primary material if that makes sense)  
running UD exists? Then MGA shows that physical activity, or even more  
generally any picking of a universal system (physical or not) is a red  
herring. Comp implies the comp-supervenience where consciousness  
(first person) is attached to all (immaterial by definition)  
computations going through my state of mind.
Physical supervenience: mind is attached to one (physical) computation.
(and then AUDA shows that the comp-supervenience has observable  
consequence in the local observable 3-person reality)


Bruno





http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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