On 24 Sep, 18:16, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote:
> 2009/9/24 Flammarion <peterdjo...@yahoo.com>:
> >> > You seem to be assuming a workign MGA
> >> Actually I'm only assuming my own argument contra the physical
> >> intelligibility of CTM,
> > I haven't seen you give an argument that CTM is incompatible
> > with phsycalism, only that CTM wouldn't give the seame
> > sort of answer to the HP if it gave an answer
> No, it's more damaging than that. I've argued, without any refutation
> AFAICS, that since CTM ex hypothesi makes no consistent appeal to
> physical causation, whatever sort of answer it could give to the HP
> couldn't be a consequence of any appeal to physical explanation in any
> standardly accepted sense.
It is by no means unversally accepted that
any physcial solution to the MBP must involve causation.
>If there's supposed to be some other
> relevant sense of physical explanation in this regard, AFAICS CTM
> remains demurely silent on the issue.
2) compatibility with physicalsim
3) pre-existing physicai accounts of comptuaiton
4) not requrie ing anythign non-phsycial
> > Hih?
> > You mean AR as Platonism is a posit of comp?
> > Is "comp" here Bruno's idea or the standard CTM?
> He says - and I agree - that they're no different in this respect, as
> a consequence of CTM's implicit dependency on AR.
That is jsut the confusion I was trying to unpick
> >> Labelling this "Platonism" can provide
> >> nothing further in the way of illumination, but I follow Popper in
> >> holding arguing about words to be futile, so I won't.
> > I have just explained why it does. Bruno keeps inssisting
> > that AR is only a statement about truth, but such a purely
> > episemological claim is not enough to whisk a ways the material
> > world and replace it with adn arithmetical Platonia.
> At this level of analysis, it is merely begging the question to assume
> that there is a material world to be whisked away.
Why isn;t it begging the quesiton to assume Platonism?
Didnt we agree that both were beign postied abductivley
in order to explore their consequences?
> I agree with you
> that there is a reality - RITSIAR - that is indubitable. The question
> of the link between this reality and a more general theory is however
> precisely what is in dispute amongst rival theories such as
> materialism and mathematical approaches like comp.
That does not imply that materialism is deplorably question-begging
> Of course one may
> feel there are grounds for holding one theory as stronger than the
> others - to regard it as the champion, if you like - but this does not
> justify giving it extra assistance in the ring, or allowing hitting
> under the belt.
Whatever. Bruno still does not have a disproof of materialism
without an assumption of Platonism. Perhaps I don't have
a disporrof of Platonism without an assumption of materialism.
But you are only accusing one of us of question-begging.
> As to ontology, no theory can lean on more than its explanatory power
> on the basis of certain premises.
I don't see the relevance of that comment. Ontology
is a subject matter. Onltologcial claims can be made
>I don't see much point in debating
> your use of 'Platonism' in this regard any more.
> > Uhhhh...no. I already know I am RITSIAR....
> I would never dispute this.
> > Whatever is postied as explaining my undoubted reality
> > has to be postied as real itself.
> No, I disagree
Uh-huh. You think the Purple Rose of Cairo scenario si plausible,
> I think that you're too quick to jump the gap
I think I am appealing to a well-established priinciple.
As Hume put it . you can't reach an evaluative conclusion
without makign evaluative assumptions. As I put it,
you can';t reach ontological conclusios without
making ontological assumptions.
> >> In developing third-person accounts of
> >> persons and states of affairs, we seek to explicate consistent
> >> nomological relations between the posited theoretical entities. But
> >> beyond this, the connection between RITSIAR and any third-person
> >> account remains a mystery in the face of any known explanatory
> >> strategy.
> >> It
> > What is "it"????
> "the connection between RITSIAR and any third-person account"
> >>does not seem susceptible to causal association with
> >> processes or events in any intelligible sense, nor does the posit of
> >> unsupported 'identities', between entities radically non-identical by
> >> any consistent standard, seem more effective than a whistle in the
> >> dark.
> > ?????????
> Does that mean you have a solution to proffer for the HP?
I don't think your outline of the problem makes much sense.
If we don't really know what anythign is (as you keep saying)
then we can't rule out an identity between the true natrue
of experience and the true nature of matter. You seem to have
allowed youseld, as sceptics and idealists often do, a
chink in the Veil of Perception
that is closed to others.
> >> Hence I think it may be missing the point to insist that any
> >> theoretical entity deployed for the purpose of a third-person account
> >> is itself RITSIAR; rather we should regard such accounts as successful
> >> insofar as they take us ever closer to the brink of the gap, on the
> >> other side of which RITSIAR can be glimpsed. IOW, RITSIAR invokes the
> >> Hard Question: how can that be me?
> > I think you have got the question of positing somehting
> > AS real in a theory confused with the question of
> > confirming a theory. A theory according to which
> > the real can spring from the unreal (as in
> > Woody Allens Purple Rose of Cairo) is a non-starter.
> No, it's not a confusion. I'm saying that to posit something as
> RITSIAR prior to such confirmation, or at least elucidation, is to put
> the cart before the horse.
Then no abductive arguemnt can possible work
since they all have to make the posit before exploring
>As to AR, you're hooked on your insistence
> that it is unreal.
That is an incoherent statement.
I do however maintatin that Bruno is
using the term ambiguously.
> If attaching a label makes it any more real for
> you, perhaps you could just repeat the word "platonism" to yourself
> whenever you see "AR", and then we would have no further need to
It's all about clarity. Popper was dead wrong on that, AFAIC
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