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On 24 Sep, 07:25, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > > CTM has enough physical commitment to keep a whole > > bunch of phsycalists happy. In fact i can;t see many > > Ai research types being happy at retaining CTM only if phsycical > > realism is abandoned. But then it is a moot point > > since the MGA and Olympia arguments are contestable. > > Could you refer to a contestation of MGA. Could you explain how it differs from Maudlin?. In SANE04 you say "That result has been found independently by me and Tim Maudlin (Marchal 1988, Maudlin 1989). Maudlin�s argumentation provides more information" > >> Also you attach qualia to it, or you said that qualia can be attached > >> to it. But if CTM is correct, such qualia can be attached > >> accidentally, so it does need some essential properties. > > > I don't follow > > I was just asking how you attach contingent qualia to propertyless > primary matter. The same way I attach contingent physcial properties. > >> Then you cannot be physicalist either, because everything can be > >> derived from Schrodinger equation + initial condition (or vaccuum). > > > No, the SE is not logically necessary. > > This is not relevant. Yes it is,because following from physical necessity is not the same as logical tautology. Logically, the governign equation of the universe could have been different, so "the governing equation of the universe is the SE" contains shannon information and so does such a physical universe. >And also, the axioms of arithmetic are not > logically necessary either. > > > Have you an exampel fo a theorem which is provably > > true, and which is not derived analytcially from axioms? > > ? "Provable" means "derivable from axioms". Be it in arithmetic or in > QM. Exactly. GIT does not suggest there is unproveable truth,only truths unproveable with a given system. > > subjective indeterminacy is no more than subjective information. > > Exactly. > > >> All this dodges my question: do you agree that once you say yes to > >> the > >> doctor, your many '3-you' appear, in the third person sense, in the > >> execution of the UD? > > > I have answers that a million times. Since I don't agree that there > > is either a material or an immaterial UD, i do not believe I am > > running on a UD > > No. If you contest MGA you can say that your 1-I is not running on a > UD. (but I am still waithing that contestation). > But here I was not talking on the 1-you, but on the 3-yous. If there is no UD, neither is runnign on it. > Also you contradict yourself. You did accept that 7 (and thus the UD) > exists mathematically, and that is all I need to say that your 3-you > is runned (in the math sense) in the UD. I never accpeted they exist Platonically. To say they exist mathematically is just to say that certain statements are true with a formal game. > I have to ask you if you understand the difference between the 1-you > and the 3-you? That there is a difference depends on your metaphsyics. > >> The UD will generate all > >> the computations generating that state. > > > A non-existent UD generates nothing. > > UD exists mathematically and generates many mathematical things. Mathematical existence is a mere metaphor, not RITSIAR. > > The problem is not that the UD only generates zombies. The problem > > is that it does not exist. > > Do you agree that the UD exists in the same sense that the prime > numbers exists in arithmetic? Yes > I need no more. No, you need more because merely fictive of formal or metaphorical existence is not enough to generate my RITSIAR > >> The only way out would be to postulate a notion of primary matter, > >> and > >> to attach consciousness to it in a way which cannot be Turing > >> emulated. > > > That is false. All I have to do is reject the immaterial UD. (In > > particular > > I can accept PM and Turing Emulation so long as I reject Platonism > > and the immaterial UD). > > You cannot deny the existence of the UD in arithmetic, like you cannot > deny the existence of 13 in arithmetic. No. Instead I can assert that "in arithmetic" means in a fictive, conceptual world, not in a real ontological realm, > And the whole point of UDA > (with MGA) is that it entails that your primary matter is non Turing > emulable. > > > I don't think CTM solves the HP. I don't think CTM contradicts > > physcialism. > > I guess HP is the hard problem. I do think that CTM, once we get the > UDA-point does solve the HP problem, except for a remaining gap which > is meta-solve, in the sense that the presence of that gap is shown to > be necessary. But it also solve the HM problem, and that is unique and > unexpected. (The HM problem = the Hard Matter problem, the problem of > explaining where matter comes from). > > >> Physicisist cannot yet define computation (except in a sense > >> immaterial quantum computations). > > > I have absolutely no idea why you would say that. Physicists tend to > > have computers on their desks and tend to regard them as physical. > > Some physical process can easily be shown to implement mathematical > computation, but this does not give a physical definition of > computation, physics lack a criteria to say when a computation is not > implemented, as the Mallah-Putnam-Chalmers threads illustrated in the > list. How can anyon eelse have such a criterion when physics lacks it? > >> it is a notion dicovered by mathematicians. > > matehmaticians can discover numebrs, but they > > still need matterial things to writh them with, > > Sure. But this does not mean they need primitively material things. > > Peter, I think we are in a loop. You perpetually oscillate between > "non physical existence" and "non existence at all". You confuse 1-I > and 3-I. I haven';t seen a convincing reaosn why I need to make the distinction. Since I reject the existing UD, I doesn't matter whether I say it isn't generating teh 1-me or the 3-me. >You have still not explain how a propertyless primary matter > can have the property to implement contingent property, which is > needed if you want to use PM in the CTM frame. existence is not a property. > I have no clue about what your PM solves, both in the conceptual > problem of matter, and in the conceptual problem of consciousness. Answered many times 1) the WR problem 2) change and time 3) attachment point ofr qualia > To be sure I have no clue about what PM can be. But, despite this, > unless you find a flaw in UDA, if PM is whatever makes the UD 3-you > into zombie, then PM cannot be Turing emulable, and you can no more > say "yes" to the doctor, and CTM is false. As I have stated, my objection to the UDA is the ontological non- existence of the UD > It is a subtle and > difficult non trivial point explained in the UDA-8. I am not > pretending this is obvious. > Your answer "the UD does not exist" just don't work. Because you mean > "the UD does not exist physically", No, I mean it doesn't exist at all as I have said many times > and this is irrelevant by MGA which I don't accept. > and > arithmetical realism (needed to define the notion of digital > computation, and thus part of CTM). > > MGA, like any argument or proof in applied logic is of course > contestable. But then the game should consist in contesting it. Please > do. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---