On 23 Sep 2009, at 18:48, Flammarion wrote:
>>
>
> He hasn';t made it clear that he is positing Platonism
> as having expalntory value. Half the time he denies he
> is positing Platonism at all.
> And when he seeks to justify it, he makes brief comments
> to the effect that is self-evident that 7 exists -- that is not
> an abductive argument.

This is because half the time you use platonism in the sense of  
arithmetical realism, and half the time you use it in a more general  
sense.
If you were using the carefully chosen vocabulary of the sane04 paper,  
and stick on it, that problem would never appear.


>
> I think Bruno has zero interest in AI,
> he is trying to argue towards Plotnistic
> mysticism.

My point is technical. Everett showed that the collapse is not needed,  
and I show that SWE *cannot* be needed.





>
> CTM has enough physical commitment to keep a whole
> bunch of phsycalists happy. In fact i can;t see many
> Ai research types being happy at retaining CTM only if phsycical
> realism is abandoned. But then it is a moot point
> since the MGA and Olympia arguments are contestable.

Could you refer to a contestation of MGA. In the list some have  
contest it because they feel the movie can be conscious, but then it  
is not conscious qua computatio. To make this clear I am explaining  
what is the comp-supervenience thesis. This forces me to explain the  
mathematical notion of computation, which is made possible by Church  
thesis.



>
>
>> In the case of PM, the 'primitive' aspect means only that fundamental
>> physical theory is taken to be the source of all other inference.

Do you agree with this? Physicalism is still possible without  
introducing a notion of primitive matter.



>> Also you attach qualia to it, or you said that qualia can be attached
>> to it. But if CTM is correct, such qualia can be attached
>> accidentally, so it does need some essential properties.
>
> I don't follow

I was just asking how you attach contingent qualia to propertyless  
primary matter.


>> Then you cannot be physicalist either, because everything can be
>> derived from Schrodinger equation + initial condition (or vaccuum).
>
> No, the SE is not logically necessary.

This is not relevant. And also, the axioms of arithmetic are not  
logically necessary either.

> Have you an exampel fo a theorem which is provably
> true, and which is not derived analytcially from axioms?

? "Provable" means "derivable from axioms". Be it in arithmetic or in  
QM.


>> But even this is not relevant, given that the information are  
>> relative
>> from the view of the observer (the 3-observer in the UD, which
>> emulates all theories).
>
> You are appealing to your theory to justify your theory.

Not at all. I am appealing to the elementary math, given that I was  
talking here on 3-notions. That UD runs all 3-observers, and their  
theories is elementary computer science.

> subjective indeterminacy is no more than subjective information.

Exactly.


>> All this dodges my question: do you agree that once you say yes to  
>> the
>> doctor, your many '3-you' appear, in the third person sense, in the
>> execution of the UD?
>
> I have answers that a million times. Since I don't agree that there
> is either a material or an immaterial UD, i do not believe I am
> running on a  UD

No. If you contest MGA you can say that your 1-I is not running on a  
UD. (but I am still waithing that contestation).
But here I was not talking on the 1-you, but on the 3-yous.

Also you contradict yourself. You did accept that 7 (and thus the UD)  
exists mathematically, and that is all I need to say that your 3-you  
is runned (in the math sense) in the UD.

I have to ask you if you understand the difference between the 1-you  
and the 3-you?


>> The UD will generate all
>> the computations generating that state.
>
> A non-existent UD generates nothing.


UD exists mathematically and generates many mathematical things.

> The problem is not that the UD only generates zombies. The problem
> is that it does not exist.

Do you agree that the UD exists in the same sense that the prime  
numbers exists in arithmetic? I need no more.


>> The only way out would be to postulate a notion of primary matter,  
>> and
>> to attach consciousness to it in a way which cannot be Turing
>> emulated.
>
> That is false. All I have to do is reject the immaterial UD. (In
> particular
> I can accept PM and Turing Emulation so long as I reject Platonism
> and the immaterial UD).

You cannot deny the existence of the UD in arithmetic, like you cannot  
deny the existence of 13 in arithmetic. And the whole point of UDA  
(with MGA) is that it entails that your primary matter is non Turing  
emulable.

> I don't think CTM solves the HP. I don't think CTM contradicts
> physcialism.

I guess HP is the hard problem. I do think that CTM, once we get the  
UDA-point does solve the HP problem, except for a remaining gap which  
is meta-solve, in the sense that the presence of that gap is shown to  
be necessary. But it also solve the HM problem, and that is unique and  
unexpected. (The HM problem = the Hard Matter problem, the problem of  
explaining where matter comes from).


>> Physicisist cannot yet define computation (except in a sense
>> immaterial quantum computations).
>
> I have absolutely no idea why you would say that. Physicists tend to
> have computers on their desks and tend to regard them as physical.

Some physical process can easily be shown to implement mathematical  
computation, but this does not give a physical definition of  
computation, physics lack a criteria to say when a computation is not  
implemented, as the Mallah-Putnam-Chalmers threads illustrated in the  
list.



>> it is a notion dicovered by mathematicians.

> matehmaticians can discover numebrs, but they
> still need matterial things to writh them with,

Sure. But this does not mean they need primitively material things.

Peter, I think we are in a loop. You perpetually oscillate between  
"non physical existence" and "non existence at all". You confuse 1-I  
and 3-I. You have still not explain how a propertyless primary matter  
can have the property to implement contingent property, which is  
needed if you want to use PM in the CTM frame.
I have no clue about what your PM solves, both in the conceptual  
problem of matter, and in the conceptual problem of consciousness.
To be sure I have no clue about what PM can be. But, despite this,  
unless you find a flaw in UDA,  if PM is whatever makes the UD 3-you  
into zombie, then PM cannot be Turing emulable, and you can no more  
say "yes" to the doctor, and CTM is false. It is a subtle and  
difficult non trivial point explained in the UDA-8. I am not  
pretending this is obvious.
Your answer "the UD does not exist" just don't work. Because you mean  
"the UD does not exist physically", and this is irrelevant by MGA and  
arithmetical realism (needed to define the notion of digital  
computation, and thus part of CTM).

MGA, like any argument or proof in applied logic is of course  
contestable. But then the game should consist in contesting it. Please  
do.

Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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