On 15 Feb 2011, at 18:16, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 15, 4:51 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 15 Feb 2011, at 16:23, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 15, 1:27 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 14 Feb 2011, at 20:05, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 14, 2:52 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 14 Feb 2011, at 13:35, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 14, 8:47 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
Do you believe that Goldbach conjecture is either true or
you agree with this, then you accept arithmetical realism,
enough for the comp consequences.,
Nope. Bivalence can be accepted as a formal rule and therefore
not as a claim that some set of objects either exist or don't.
That's my point.
Such a formal claim cannot support the conclusion that
I am an immaterial dreaming machine.
It entails it formally. Then you interpret it like you want, with
philosophy you want.
I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
I meant "in general".
which is a bit absurd at the start.
Could you define what you mean by "real"?
i can point to my own reality.
To your own consciousness. I grant that. But nothing else. Wake up!
Just be careful in case you do say "yes" to a
physically real doctor.
Do you believe that Church thesis makes sense? That is enough
that you believe in the 'arithmetical platonia'
Not at all.
OK. This means that you are using "arithmetical platonia" in a
which is not relevant for the reasoning.
If you accept CT, there should be no problem with the reasoning
I accept CT and reject Platonism,
and thus the reasoning does not go
To provide sense to CT, you need to be able to say that any
on any input x will stop or will not stop. So you have to accept
use of classical logic on numbers definable properties. That is
called Arithmetical realism.
That doesn't tell me anything about what I am.
Right. But then Comp is CT + "yes doctor", where "yes doctor" is a
memo for "it exists a level of description of my generalized body
that .... " (see the paper).
I am not a description. I for descriptions.
I am not a description too. Neither from the first nor the third
The difficulty of logic consists in the understanding of the
difference between a fact which might be true, like 1+1=2, and a
description of that fact, like "1+1=2". Modern tools makes it possible
to handle that difference in purely formal ways.
The difficulty in MGA consists in understanding the difference between
a computation (be it immaterial or material) and a description of a
computation (be it immaterial or material).
I prefer to use Platonism for theology. Platonism is the theology
which the physical reality is the shadow, or the border, or the
projection of something else.
In the context of phiosophy of mathematics, Platonism
is the claim that numbers have immaterial, non spatio temporal
I don't use that platonism, and given that I come up with a
related to the theological Platonism, I prefer to keep the
"arithmetical realism" vocabulary. It means that A v ~A for A
arithmetical. Sometimes I say that it means that (A v ~A) is true
independently of me, you, etc.
You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
with a merely formal statement of bivalence
I use bivalence but also "yes doctor". Then after concluding, we can
take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other
things) from that.
That use of Platonism come up in the
conclusion of the reasoning and is not assumed at the start.
. People needs to be
ultrafinitist to reject the arithmetical platonia.
No, they just need to be anti realist.
Nope. Finitists think 7 exists., anti realists think it doesn't.
Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by the
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can uderstand
that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it is
just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth contains
all the emulation of all programs,
As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers' configurations.
and this in relative proportion. AT
contains a natural "matrix", and we can test it because it has a non
trivial precise mathematical structure, related to the self-
referential points of view available to the universal numbers.
Personnaly I am a bit skeptical on set realism, because it is
define it, but for the numbers I have never met people who are
realist about them.
Oh come on. How can you say that after I just told
you 7 doesn't exist.
You contradict your self,
No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence
Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
occam gives the ontological conclusion.
No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.
That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as you
want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).
If it is testable, it is false.
unless you mean that seven is not made of
matter. In which case comp nothing exists.
What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."
Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.
You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which use
the notion of primary matter.
They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists.
Some does not. John A. Wheeler is open to the idea that physics emerge
from something non physical (cf It from Bit).
Anyway, to refer to a what people think is not an argument.
You will not find any book on computers which mention the notion of
They don't mention pixie dust either. One cannot
conclude from that that anyone has a background
assumption that computers are made of pixie dust.
The point is that the notion of computer used in the proof is the
traditional mathematical notion.
Except quantum computers.
Computers have been discovered by mathematicians before there were
approximated by terrestrial constructions.
Even to say "I am not arithmetical realist" is
enough to be an arithmetical realist
Probable, given your rather inappropriate sense of metaphysical
realism in mathematics.
I am not a realist about maths. You must be because you exist
and you think you are a number
I start from the assumption that I can survive through a digital
backup. So locally "I am a number", in that sense.
That's misleading. There is a difference between being tied
to no particular physical instance and being tied to no instance at
That is why I make those things precise through the MGA. But it helps
people to understand that we are immaterial before learning the MGA
stuff. I am immaterial with comp in the sense that I can in principle
chose a different body at all times, so I am not my body.
That is misleading for the usual reasons.
Klein on Maudlin? That has been already answered.
stage, matter might still seems necessary, and that is the case up to
the step seven of the reasoning, which nevertheless explain already
the reversal between physics and computer science, before the more
complex immateriality argument (MGA). Do you have a problem in
But this concerns
only my third person I (body), and I show that the first person
naturally associated (by its memories, or by the classical theory
knowledge) is not a number.
. A real anti-ariothmetical
realist cannot even spaeak about arithmetical realism. You need
an arithmetical realist to make sense of denying it.
Like the old canard that to deny God is to accept God? Naah.
A reasoning is valid, or not valid.
A true conclusion requires soundness as well as validity
In science we never know if our premisses and conclusions are
I can still resist the conclusion by *believing* Platonism
to be false, while believing comp to be true.
"platonism" is ambiguous.
I mean and have always meant mathematical Platonism
But you talk on a paper with a different terminology. You are
Any way, you can resist any conclusion in
science with some ad-hoc philosophy.
There is nothing unscientific in the attitude
the immaterial things don't exist.
Right, but irrelevant.
So you are not saying something
Ad without a minimal amount of arithmetical realism you cannot
A formalist can endorses anything with no ontological
realism whatsoever. All that is left without any ontological
realism is a formal axiom of bivalence
... which added to the theological bet "yes doctor" entails that
materialism, to explain matter, is not better than vitalism to
which is a thesis at the cross of epistemology and
mathematics. CT says a priori nothing about physical things. The
consequences in physics come from CT + "yes doctor".
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