On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:22, 1Z wrote:
I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
I meant "in general".
I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things
I think both of those are hard to dispute.
But nobody believes that numbers are unreal. They believe that numbers
are not material but that is different.
You beg the question by identifying real with material, and by
assuming a primitive materiality. This is obstructive of thought,
only. Your critics of science reminds me on the critics on Einstein's
relativity by Bergson. I do appreciate Bergson, but his dialog with
Einstein was a dialog of deaf. A bit like Goethe critics of Newton.
Pseudo-philosophy, like pseudo-religion, are authoritative argument in
You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
with a merely formal statement of bivalence
I use bivalence but also "yes doctor".
But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
to a physical substitution
The whole point of the UDA+MGA is to show that YD (defined by a
physical substitution) does lead to the abandon of the physical as
primary. So you are just confirming that you are using the notion of
primary matter as a reason for not studying an argument. You should
better search an error in it.
Then after concluding, we can
take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other
things) from that.
Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can
that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it
just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth
all the emulation of all programs,
As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers'
If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
and indexical judgement of actuality.
Sure. But that's begging the question again and again.
You contradict your self,
No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence
Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
occam gives the ontological conclusion.
No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.
That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as
want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).
If it is testable, it is false.
Not enough WR's.
Intuitively you are right, but you have to take into account computer
science which shows that intuition here is of no use. It might be
possible that in fine mechanism leads to too much White Rabbits, but
that has not been proved yet. Again, that would not change the
reasoning, just the conclusion.
What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."
Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.
You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which
the notion of primary matter.
They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists.
Some does not. John A. Wheeler is open to the idea that physics
from something non physical (cf It from Bit).
And everyone else doesn't.
New paradigm takes time to be swallowed.
Anyway, to refer to a what people think is not an argument.
Then why is it refer to books?
Because (good) books contain (good) arguments.
You will not find any book on computers which mention the notion of
They don't mention pixie dust either. One cannot
conclude from that that anyone has a background
assumption that computers are made of pixie dust.
The point is that the notion of computer used in the proof is the
traditional mathematical notion.
There is no mathematical notion such that you can run a programme on
(Sigma_1) arithmetical reality do run all programs, in the
mathematical (non material, but real) sense. To make primitive matter
to instantiate consciousness, you will have to make consciousness and
matter non Turing emulable, and this is in a very special way. With
mechanism, neither consciousness nor matter are globally emulable.
Consciousness and matter is related to infinities of computations, and
they are observable once we look below our substitution level.
That is why I make those things precise through the MGA. But it
people to understand that we are immaterial before learning the MGA
stuff. I am immaterial with comp in the sense that I can in
chose a different body at all times, so I am not my body.
That is misleading for the usual reasons.
Klein on Maudlin?
No: "not dependent on a particular body" does not mean "capable of
existing with no body"
You still beg the question. The UDA+MGA shows that "not dependent on a
particular body" entails that your consciousness needs a relative body
only for manifesting itself with some reasonable relative
probabilities, and that eventually a body is made of the interference
of infinities of bodies emulations. I am not saying that this is true,
but that it follows from the mechanist assumption. Please study the
argument. All what you show is that the conclusion of the reasoning
contradicts your assumption that there is a need of primitive matter
for consciousness to exist.
If you argument can be resume into the statement that seven is not
real, then you are on the materialist eliminativist slope. Pushing
your logic a bit farer, you will tell us that consciousness is not
real. Indeed, that's the point of my usual opponents, and even Dennett
flirts with that idea.
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