On 16 Feb 2011, at 16:17, 1Z wrote:
On Feb 16, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:22, 1Z wrote:
I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
real,
Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
I meant "in general".
I don't need anything more than
1) I am real
2) Unreal things don't generate real things
I think both of those are hard to dispute.
But nobody believes that numbers are unreal.
I do. Hartry Field does. Etc.
Fair enough. Nobody except nominalist philosophers.
They believe that numbers
are not material but that is different.
You beg the question by identifying real with material, and by
assuming a primitive materiality.
You beg the question by assuming Platonism
I assume that arithmetical truth (actually the tiny effective part) is
true independently of observers. It is a common assumption, and I am
not saying it is true, just part of what is needed to make sense of
the term 'digital' in digital mechanism. All we nedd is that it makes
sense to say that ExP(x) or that ~ExP(x), with P decidable, so that we
can say that the (mathematica) run of a (mathematical) program stop,
or does not stop, and proceed to the consequences of Church thesis.
This is obstructive of thought,
only. Your critics of science reminds me on the critics on Einstein's
relativity by Bergson. I do appreciate Bergson, but his dialog with
Einstein was a dialog of deaf. A bit like Goethe critics of Newton.
Pseudo-philosophy, like pseudo-religion, are authoritative argument
in
disguise.
You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
with a merely formal statement of bivalence
I use bivalence but also "yes doctor".
But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
to a physical substitution
The whole point of the UDA+MGA is to show that YD (defined by a
physical substitution) does lead to the abandon of the physical as
primary.
The physical cant be abandoned unless there is something to
take its place. Hence you need Platonism
The physical is not abandoned. Just that if comp is correct it has to
be retrieved from self-reference logic.
So you are just confirming that you are using the notion of
primary matter as a reason for not studying an argument. You should
better search an error in it.
Then after concluding, we can
take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among
other
things) from that.
Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by
the
fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital
graft.
I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can
uderstand
that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it
is
just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth
contains
all the emulation of all programs,
As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
running programmes.
Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers'
configurations.
If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
and indexical judgement of actuality.
Sure. But that's begging the question again and again.
The converse is also question begging.
I don't see this. The ontology and the epistemology are clear enough.
Primary matter is not needed, unless there are too much WR, but that
is the point: the mind body problem is reduced into a problem of WRs.
You contradict your self,
No I don't. How many times have I explained that
mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
sense that doesn't imply real existence
Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
doctor +
occam gives the ontological conclusion.
No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.
That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as
you
want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).
If it is testable, it is false.
Why?
Not enough WR's.
Intuitively you are right, but you have to take into account computer
science which shows that intuition here is of no use. It might be
possible that in fine mechanism leads to too much White Rabbits, but
that has not been proved yet. Again, that would not change the
reasoning, just the conclusion.
WRs follow from any straightforward approach to measure.
It is nice that you have at least understood this. It is the main
contribution. But I doubt anyone can take you seriously with the idea
that the measure problem admit a straightforward approach, and AUDA
shows that it is not straightforward at all.
The burden is on the multiversalists to avoid the objection.
Gleason theorem and/or decoherence theory for the quantum multiverse.
Self-reference logics for the comp multidream.
What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."
Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is
physical.
You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which
use
the notion of primary matter.
They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists.
Some does not. John A. Wheeler is open to the idea that physics
emerge
from something non physical (cf It from Bit).
And everyone else doesn't.
New paradigm takes time to be swallowed.
That is quite a climb-down from your original claim
that no physicist believes in matter.
I never said that. I said that no physicist use the concept of
*primary* matter. On the contrary I took time to explain that we live
in an Aristotelian paradigm, based on the assumption, made by the
followers of Aristotle, that there is primary matter. But the only one
who have really used that concept are the catholic in their attempt to
explain how bread can be Christ corpus.
I certainly do believe in matter. I would not have worked so hard to
explain it, without assuming it, if I was believing that it does not
exist. But I am pretty sure now that if digital mechanism is true,
matter is not *primary*, but evolved from coherence dream conditions.
A good thing because nobody can explain what is primary matter, except
as a philosophical "don't ask" sort of answer.
Anyway, to refer to a what people think is not an argument.
Then why is it refer to books?
Because (good) books contain (good) arguments.
Oh, right, If a physics text mentions matter, it is a Bad Book.
I think that you are confusing matter and primary matter. Matter is on
the order of the acceptable facts. Primary matter is a metaphysical
notion defined by Aristotle, and reified by most his followers (and un-
reified in Plotinus' matter theory, which has a clean arithmetical
interpretation (indeed, the measure one for the arithmetical notion of
probability/credibility on relative computations).
You will not find any book on computers which mention the
notion of
matter.
They don't mention pixie dust either. One cannot
conclude from that that anyone has a background
assumption that computers are made of pixie dust.
The point is that the notion of computer used in the proof is the
traditional mathematical notion.
There is no mathematical notion such that you can run a
programme on
it.
(Sigma_1) arithmetical reality do run all programs, in the
mathematical (non material, but real)
ie Platonic!
Realist. To prove that (Sigma_1) arithmetical reality do run all
programs, all you need is the axiom of Robinson arithmetic, including
the excluded middle principle.
sense. To make primitive matter
to instantiate consciousness, you will have to make consciousness and
matter non Turing emulable,
I do not, as I have explained many times
You have to!
Or you have to find a flaw in the UDA+MGA reasoning.
and this is in a very special way. With
mechanism, neither consciousness nor matter are globally emulable.
Consciousness and matter is related to infinities of computations,
and
they are observable once we look below our substitution level.
That is why I make those things precise through the MGA. But it
helps
people to understand that we are immaterial before learning the
MGA
stuff. I am immaterial with comp in the sense that I can in
principle
chose a different body at all times, so I am not my body.
That is misleading for the usual reasons.
Klein on Maudlin?
No: "not dependent on a particular body" does not mean "capable of
existing with no body"
You still beg the question. The UDA+MGA shows that "not dependent
on a
particular body" entails that your consciousness needs a relative
body
only for manifesting itself with some reasonable relative
probabilities, and that eventually a body is made of the interference
of infinities of bodies emulations. I am not saying that this is
true,
but that it follows from the mechanist assumption.
Not from comp alone. You cannot eliminate matter without having
somethin
to replace it with
Matter is not eliminated. Primary matter is made into phlogistic or
ether like concept.
Peter, we are in a loop, I'm afraid. I suggest that we forget
momentarily that immateriality stuff, which is the last part of the
reasoning, and admittedly the most counterintuitive. Do you have any
problem with UDA1-7? We can come back on UDA-8 later. Do you see that
in any sufficiently big physical universe, physics is already reduced
to computer science? This might help you to proceed on the last step.
Let us say that a physical (primary if you want) universe is
sufficiently big if, by definition, it runs the UD forever.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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