On Feb 16, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:22, 1Z wrote:
> >>>>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number"
> >>>> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me
> >>>> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not
> >>>> real,
> >>> Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that?
> >> I meant "in general".
> > I don't need anything more than
> > 1) I am real
> > 2) Unreal things don't generate real things
> > I think both of those are hard to dispute.
> But nobody believes that numbers are unreal.

I do. Hartry Field does. Etc.

> They believe that numbers  
> are not material but that is different.
> You beg the question by identifying real with material, and by  
> assuming a primitive materiality.

You beg the question by assuming Platonism

>This is obstructive of thought,  
> only. Your critics of science reminds me on the critics on Einstein's  
> relativity by Bergson. I do appreciate Bergson, but his dialog with  
> Einstein was a dialog of deaf. A bit like Goethe critics of Newton.  
> Pseudo-philosophy, like pseudo-religion, are authoritative argument in  
> disguise.
> >>> You cannot come to conclusions about my existence
> >>> with a merely formal statement of bivalence
> >> I use bivalence but also "yes doctor".
> > But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing
> > to a physical substitution
> The whole point of the UDA+MGA is to show that YD (defined by a  
> physical substitution) does lead to the abandon of the physical as  
> primary.

The physical cant be abandoned unless there is something to
take its place. Hence you need Platonism

> So you are just confirming that you are using the notion of  
> primary matter as a reason for not studying an argument. You should  
> better search an error in it.
> >> Then after concluding, we can
> >> take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is
> >> explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other
> >> things) from that.
> >>>>>> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by  
> >>>>>> the
> >>>>>> fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft.
> >>>>> I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical
> >>>>> medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number
> >>>> It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being
> >>>> reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can  
> >>>> uderstand
> >>>> that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it  
> >>>> is
> >>>> just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth  
> >>>> contains
> >>>> all the emulation of all programs,
> >>> As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual
> >>> running programmes.
> >> Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers'  
> >> configurations.
> > If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make
> > and indexical judgement of actuality.
> Sure. But that's begging the question again and again.

The converse is also question begging.

> >>>>>>>> You contradict your self,
> >>>>>>> No I don't. How many times have I explained that
> >>>>>>> mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive
> >>>>>>> sense that doesn't imply real existence
> >>>>>> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes
> >>>>>> doctor +
> >>>>>> occam gives the ontological conclusion.
> >>>>> No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion.
> >>>> That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as  
> >>>> you
> >>>> want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the
> >>>> testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge).
> >>> If it is testable, it is false.
> >> Why?
> > Not enough WR's.
> Intuitively you are right, but you have to take into account computer  
> science which shows that intuition here is of no use. It might be  
> possible that in fine mechanism leads to too much White Rabbits, but  
> that has not been proved yet. Again, that would not change the  
> reasoning, just the conclusion.

WRs follow from any straightforward approach to measure.
The burden is on the multiversalists to avoid the objection.

> >>>>>>> What does "comp nothing exists" mean?
> >>>>>> Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists."
> >>>>> Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known
> >>>>> computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical.
> >>>> You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which  
> >>>> use
> >>>> the notion of primary matter.
> >>> They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists.
> >> Some does not. John A. Wheeler is open to the idea that physics  
> >> emerge
> >> from something non physical (cf It from Bit).
> > And everyone else doesn't.
> New paradigm takes time to be swallowed.

That is quite a climb-down from your original claim
that no physicist believes in matter.

> >> Anyway, to refer to a what people think is not an argument.
> > Then why is it refer to books?
> Because (good) books contain (good) arguments.

Oh, right, If  a physics text mentions matter, it is a Bad Book.

> >>>> You will not find any book on computers which mention the notion of
> >>>> matter.
> >>> They don't mention pixie dust either. One cannot
> >>> conclude from that that anyone has a background
> >>> assumption that computers are made of pixie dust.
> >> The point is that the notion of computer used in the proof is the
> >> traditional mathematical notion.
> > There is  no mathematical notion such that you can run a  programme on
> > it.
> (Sigma_1) arithmetical reality do run all programs, in the  
> mathematical (non material, but real)

ie Platonic!

> sense. To make primitive matter  
> to instantiate consciousness, you will have to make consciousness and  
> matter non Turing emulable,

I do not, as I have explained many times

> and this is in a very special way. With  
> mechanism, neither consciousness nor matter are globally emulable.  
> Consciousness and matter is related to infinities of computations, and  
> they are observable once we look below our substitution level.
> >>>> That is why I make those things precise through the MGA. But it  
> >>>> helps
> >>>> people to understand that we are immaterial before learning the MGA
> >>>> stuff. I am immaterial with comp in the sense that I can in  
> >>>> principle
> >>>> chose a different body at all times, so I am not my body.
> >>> That is misleading for the usual reasons.
> >> Klein on Maudlin?
> > No: "not dependent on a particular body" does not mean "capable of
> > existing with no body"
> You still beg the question. The UDA+MGA shows that "not dependent on a  
> particular body" entails that your consciousness needs a relative body  
> only for manifesting itself with some reasonable relative  
> probabilities, and that eventually a body is made of the interference  
> of infinities of bodies emulations. I am not saying that this is true,  
> but that it follows from the mechanist assumption.

Not from comp alone. You cannot eliminate matter without having
to replace it with

>Please study the  
> argument. All what you show is that the conclusion of the reasoning  
> contradicts your assumption that there is a need of primitive matter  
> for consciousness to exist.
> If you argument can be resume into the statement that seven is not  
> real, then you are on the materialist eliminativist slope. Pushing  
> your logic a bit farer, you will tell us that consciousness is not  
> real. Indeed, that's the point of my usual opponents, and even Dennett  
> flirts with that idea.
> Bruno
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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