On Feb 16, 8:46 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > On 15 Feb 2011, at 20:22, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > >>>>> I want to say "number aren't real, so I'm not really a number" > > >>>> All your talk about numbers which are not real seems to me > >>>> nonsensical. Also you seems to know what is real and what is not > >>>> real, > > >>> Sure. Horses are real and unicorns aren't. Didn't you know that? > > >> I meant "in general". > > > I don't need anything more than > > 1) I am real > > 2) Unreal things don't generate real things > > > I think both of those are hard to dispute. > > But nobody believes that numbers are unreal.
I do. Hartry Field does. Etc. > They believe that numbers > are not material but that is different. > You beg the question by identifying real with material, and by > assuming a primitive materiality. You beg the question by assuming Platonism >This is obstructive of thought, > only. Your critics of science reminds me on the critics on Einstein's > relativity by Bergson. I do appreciate Bergson, but his dialog with > Einstein was a dialog of deaf. A bit like Goethe critics of Newton. > Pseudo-philosophy, like pseudo-religion, are authoritative argument in > disguise. > > > > >>> You cannot come to conclusions about my existence > >>> with a merely formal statement of bivalence > > >> I use bivalence but also "yes doctor". > > > But YD doesn't get anywhere if I am only agreeing > > to a physical substitution > > The whole point of the UDA+MGA is to show that YD (defined by a > physical substitution) does lead to the abandon of the physical as > primary. The physical cant be abandoned unless there is something to take its place. Hence you need Platonism > So you are just confirming that you are using the notion of > primary matter as a reason for not studying an argument. You should > better search an error in it. > > > > > > >> Then after concluding, we can > >> take as theory of everything just elementary arithmetic, and it is > >> explained in all detail how to recover formally physics (among other > >> things) from that. > > >>>>>> Use AR formally. The theological conclusion will be provided by > >>>>>> the > >>>>>> fact that you might be able to imagine surviving a digital graft. > > >>>>> I might well imagine being reincarnated in some other physical > >>>>> medium. I won't imagine being reincarnated as a number > > >>>> It is not so difficult to imagine. If you can imagine being > >>>> reincarneted in a virtual reality, like in a dream, you can > >>>> uderstand > >>>> that the feeling of "matter" is a construct of your mind. Then it > >>>> is > >>>> just a matter of study to understand that arithmetical truth > >>>> contains > >>>> all the emulation of all programs, > > >>> As it is purely hypothetical it doesn't contain a ny actual > >>> running programmes. > > >> Actual is an indexical, and can be relative to numbers' > >> configurations. > > > If a multiverse is not actual, no-one within it can make > > and indexical judgement of actuality. > > Sure. But that's begging the question again and again. The converse is also question begging. > >>>>>>>> You contradict your self, > > >>>>>>> No I don't. How many times have I explained that > >>>>>>> mathematical existence claims are true in a fictive > >>>>>>> sense that doesn't imply real existence > > >>>>>> Then please use that fictive sense in the reasoning. Then yes > >>>>>> doctor + > >>>>>> occam gives the ontological conclusion. > > >>>>> No, if it has a fictive premise, it has a fictive conclusion. > > >>>> That is your idiosyncracy. You can add as many "fictive" terms as > >>>> you > >>>> want, it will not change the validity of the reasoning, and the > >>>> testability of comp (+ the classical theory of knowledge). > > >>> If it is testable, it is false. > > >> Why? > > > Not enough WR's. > > Intuitively you are right, but you have to take into account computer > science which shows that intuition here is of no use. It might be > possible that in fine mechanism leads to too much White Rabbits, but > that has not been proved yet. Again, that would not change the > reasoning, just the conclusion. WRs follow from any straightforward approach to measure. The burden is on the multiversalists to avoid the objection. > >>>>>>> What does "comp nothing exists" mean? > > >>>>>> Sorry. I meant "In which case comp implies nothing exists." > > >>>>> Comp implies that the midn is a computer. All known > >>>>> computers are phsycial, so comp implies that the mind is physical. > > >>>> You will not find any book in physics, except by Zristotle which > >>>> use > >>>> the notion of primary matter. > > >>> They all do. Physicists think matter/energy exists. > > >> Some does not. John A. Wheeler is open to the idea that physics > >> emerge > >> from something non physical (cf It from Bit). > > > And everyone else doesn't. > > New paradigm takes time to be swallowed. That is quite a climb-down from your original claim that no physicist believes in matter. > >> Anyway, to refer to a what people think is not an argument. > > > Then why is it refer to books? > > Because (good) books contain (good) arguments. Oh, right, If a physics text mentions matter, it is a Bad Book. > >>>> You will not find any book on computers which mention the notion of > >>>> matter. > > >>> They don't mention pixie dust either. One cannot > >>> conclude from that that anyone has a background > >>> assumption that computers are made of pixie dust. > > >> The point is that the notion of computer used in the proof is the > >> traditional mathematical notion. > > > There is no mathematical notion such that you can run a programme on > > it. > > (Sigma_1) arithmetical reality do run all programs, in the > mathematical (non material, but real) ie Platonic! > sense. To make primitive matter > to instantiate consciousness, you will have to make consciousness and > matter non Turing emulable, I do not, as I have explained many times > and this is in a very special way. With > mechanism, neither consciousness nor matter are globally emulable. > Consciousness and matter is related to infinities of computations, and > they are observable once we look below our substitution level. > > > > >>>> That is why I make those things precise through the MGA. But it > >>>> helps > >>>> people to understand that we are immaterial before learning the MGA > >>>> stuff. I am immaterial with comp in the sense that I can in > >>>> principle > >>>> chose a different body at all times, so I am not my body. > > >>> That is misleading for the usual reasons. > > >> Klein on Maudlin? > > > No: "not dependent on a particular body" does not mean "capable of > > existing with no body" > > You still beg the question. The UDA+MGA shows that "not dependent on a > particular body" entails that your consciousness needs a relative body > only for manifesting itself with some reasonable relative > probabilities, and that eventually a body is made of the interference > of infinities of bodies emulations. I am not saying that this is true, > but that it follows from the mechanist assumption. Not from comp alone. You cannot eliminate matter without having somethin to replace it with >Please study the > argument. All what you show is that the conclusion of the reasoning > contradicts your assumption that there is a need of primitive matter > for consciousness to exist. > If you argument can be resume into the statement that seven is not > real, then you are on the materialist eliminativist slope. Pushing > your logic a bit farer, you will tell us that consciousness is not > real. Indeed, that's the point of my usual opponents, and even Dennett > flirts with that idea. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.