On Mar 8, 11:32 am, Andrew Soltau <andrewsol...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On 06/03/11 15:06, 1Z wrote:
> > On Mar 4, 5:46 pm, Andrew Soltau<andrewsol...@gmail.com>  wrote:
> >> The measurement problem is the question of why, or even if, collapse
> >> occurs. Certainly no coherent concept of how and why collapse occurs has
> >> been formulated in a manner which meets with general acceptance. It
> >> appears, as Davies and others explain, the appearance of collapse is
> >> purely subjective,
> > It doesn't "appear" in an univocal way, since there are
> > such things as objective collapse theories
> >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objective_collapse_theory
> OK, perhaps I stand corrected. But I am sure that no objective collapse
> theory has been formulated in a manner which meets with general acceptance.

Subjective collapse theories, and no collapse theories have
not met with general acceptance either!

>>> as Everett demonstrates.
> > MWI isn't usually presented as a subjective theory. Penrose
> > argues that it makes surreptitious assumptions about how
> > observers' minds work, but that is part of an argument against
> > it.
> I would differentiate between Everett and MWI. MWI means to me many
> worlds in some way separate.

That's vague. Worlds separate on decoherence but share the
same space time

> Everett is without question, in my view,
> saying that there is one physical environment,

That's vague too.

>and that it is only
> subjectively that there are different, determinate views of that
> environment.

And that. Observers embedded in the system will see determinate
results to interaction
where in fact ever result occured. However, observer does not mean
human here, since observation is fundamentally entanglement for

>> In this case, consciousness
> >> is necessarily central, as it is consciousness, and only consciousness,
> >> which encounters this appearance of collapse and change.
> > It is only consciousness that consciously encounters everything else
> > too. However, that does not make consciousness *ontologically*
> > fundamental.
> It does if the physical system is static.

>If there is no change,
> objectively, only subjectively, this points to consciousness -
> phenomenal consciousness - being ontologically fundamental.

On the other hand, the appearance of change refutes the
static universe hypothesis.

>> We know there
> >> is an effective collapse, or the appearance of collapse, because we
> >> experience this subjectively. On the other hand, nothing in the physical
> >> world, including the physical body and the physical brain, can account
> >> for this.
> > Whoah! What he have is a profusion of theores, with no clear winner
> What I mean is that if the physical domain is indeed static, as Davies,
> Barbour, Deutsch and others explain, then nothing physical can account
> for the appearance of change we encounter as observers.

Well, *they* don't think that,

> Coupled with the
> inability to find any physiology corresponding to phenomenal
> consciousness,

That's an odd thing to say. It is rather well known
that phenomenal consciousness can be switched off
by drugs.

> and Chalmers finding that there can be no such
> explanation, I infer this consciousness to be ontologically fundamental
> - an emergent property of the unitary system as a whole.

But you could have observers in quantum mechanics
with no phenomenality at all. All the problems of
QM relate to access consciousness, ie to how
observers get information.

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to