On 08/03/11 12:29, 1Z wrote:

On Mar 8, 11:32 am, Andrew Soltau<andrewsol...@gmail.com>  wrote:
On 06/03/11 15:06, 1Z wrote:

On Mar 4, 5:46 pm, Andrew Soltau<andrewsol...@gmail.com>    wrote:
The measurement problem is the question of why, or even if, collapse
occurs. Certainly no coherent concept of how and why collapse occurs has
been formulated in a manner which meets with general acceptance. It
appears, as Davies and others explain, the appearance of collapse is
purely subjective,
It doesn't "appear" in an univocal way, since there are
such things as objective collapse theories
OK, perhaps I stand corrected. But I am sure that no objective collapse
theory has been formulated in a manner which meets with general acceptance.

Subjective collapse theories, and no collapse theories have
not met with general acceptance either!
True of course. But there is definitely no need to posit physical collapse.
as Everett demonstrates.
MWI isn't usually presented as a subjective theory. Penrose
argues that it makes surreptitious assumptions about how
observers' minds work, but that is part of an argument against
I would differentiate between Everett and MWI. MWI means to me many
worlds in some way separate.
That's vague. Worlds separate on decoherence but share the
same space time
A mixture
Everett is without question, in my view,
saying that there is one physical environment,
That's vague too.
The mixture
and that it is only
subjectively that there are different, determinate views of that
And that. Observers embedded in the system will see determinate
results to interaction
where in fact ever result occured. However, observer does not mean
human here, since observation is fundamentally entanglement for
Everett states that there is only the appearance of collapse, and hence change, with respect to the memory of the observer.
In this case, consciousness
is necessarily central, as it is consciousness, and only consciousness,
which encounters this appearance of collapse and change.
It is only consciousness that consciously encounters everything else
too. However, that does not make consciousness *ontologically*
It does if the physical system is static.

If there is no change,
objectively, only subjectively, this points to consciousness -
phenomenal consciousness - being ontologically fundamental.
On the other hand, the appearance of change refutes the
static universe hypothesis.
Unless the universe is indeed objectively static, and there is only the subjective appearance of collapse and change.
We know there
is an effective collapse, or the appearance of collapse, because we
experience this subjectively. On the other hand, nothing in the physical
world, including the physical body and the physical brain, can account
for this.
Whoah! What he have is a profusion of theores, with no clear winner
What I mean is that if the physical domain is indeed static, as Davies,
Barbour, Deutsch and others explain, then nothing physical can account
for the appearance of change we encounter as observers.
Well, *they* don't think that,
Deutsch does. He states that the appearance of change is necessarily an illusion. Davies makes similar statements. Barbour simply leaves it at there is no time.
Coupled with the
inability to find any physiology corresponding to phenomenal
That's an odd thing to say. It is rather well known
that phenomenal consciousness can be switched off
by drugs.
True, but when not switched off, when operating in an alive and awake human being, no physiological explanation can be found for phenomenal consciousness, as Chalmers spends the majority of a whole book carefully explaining.
and Chalmers finding that there can be no such
explanation, I infer this consciousness to be ontologically fundamental
- an emergent property of the unitary system as a whole.
But you could have observers in quantum mechanics
with no phenomenality at all. All the problems of
QM relate to access consciousness, ie to how
observers get information.
Certainly you could, the zombies that Chalmers talks about, mindless hulks in other commentaries. But invoking phenomenal consciousness as a system property solves the 'objectively static, subjective appearance of collapse and change' issue.

I'm not aware of a problem of how observers get information in QM. Everett posits the basic mechanism of an observer as one with sensory apparatus and recording capability. As he demonstrates, this physical entity becomes a superposition -> mixture of all possible states having made all possible versions of the observation, and only with respect to the contents of the memory is there a specific determinate outcome, which is perhaps what you are referring to as 'getting information'. (Agreed of course that all this is to do with access consciousness.) This seems to me to be exactly the same process as in RQM, where the correlations record defines the determinacy of the effective physical environment of the observer, except that in Everett the correlations record is defined by sensory observations. But is nonetheless a record of correlations with the physical environment, and thus defines the determinacy of the effective physical environment. (And hence my conclusion, that the 'record of sensory observations and machine state', which I dub the world hologram, as it is the definition of the subjective reality of the observer, defines the determinacy of the effective physical environment of that observer, which I find as fascinating as it is also to me rather terrifying!)

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