On 03 Jul 2011, at 00:55, John Mikes wrote:

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Dear Bruno, here we go again....A very colorful discussion about that darn consciousness, indeed, asit develops. I find YOUR scholarly text a bit skewed (Goedel andGoedel) since math logic is IMO a product of human(!) consciousness.

`This is either self-defeating, or universal and empty. Would you say`

`"no" to the digitalist doctor because the artificial brain is a human`

`construct?`

I do not comment on your "MACHINE" consciousness, since I don't feelcomfortable as a machine with set inventory/design,

`I don't argue that we are machine. I argue that if we are machine, the`

`entire Aristotelian conception of reality has to be revised.`

even a universal one - IF IT IS a machine.

`The universal machine is a machine. I have no clue to what other`

`universal thing you are alluding too.`

The human intellect (another unknown! - not sarcastically said) hasno borders or inventory, at least we have not experienced such so far.

`Yes. And the assumption that we are machine does explain that fact.`

`Today, assuming we are machine, we know that we know nothing even in`

`the apparently restricted field of what machine can do. No borders or`

`inventory for the machine abilities.`

A "causally effective" Ccness? I wrote already my 'causality'deviation as considered within the 'model' of our so far acquiredknowledge and the deterministic 'reasons' considered only by factors'within', while the still unknown factors (maybe lots of such) alsoinfluence all that happens assigned to 'causality' of the partiallisting.

`When you say yes to the doctor, you don't pray for a model, but for`

`the real thing.`

(This is the reason why our terms are not 'absolute' and "The Truth".)

`Of course. But they might be fact under an assumption, or theorem in a`

`theory.`

We may 'list' EFFECTIVE causes, but maybe not all.

Sure. Actually we can prove that they are not listable.

<I would not like to offend you with my hint to 'the world beyondarithmetical truth (logic).>

`The point is that the inside machine's view of arithmetic is already`

`beyond arithmetical truth (which is far beyond logic).`

------------------------Soroud's expression: "consciousness is always embodiedconsciousness of life..."begs the question: what is life? how different is it from Ccness, ifI identify the latter as'response to relations' (information)? what else is life?They seem to be close in such formulation. None of them "human" oreven "terrestrial".Not even 'bodily ascertainable' which is a part of the figment"physical world".The JCS-online list has a long discussion about structured andunstructured dualism.I think Descartes HAD to include the soul into his 'human' unit toescape from Inquisition and that is why he anticipated the"complexity" in our time's idea - that includes the body and mindwith its bi sided influences as a body-soul dualism. (I don't wantto start a battle on this).Consciousness - as the process of responding to relations isuniversal, human and terrestrial concepts are includable, it isindependent of our so far acquired knowledge and does not restrictthe application to the physical world and so the domains developedby the human mind. I have no theory to that, am insecure about thedeterministic 'happening' - a term that requires 'time' - for asystem where there is no time-factor identified as we know it. Theso far perceived reality I know of did not give me(!) answers to alot of questions.That's why I say I am agnostic.

`All scientists are agnostic. But we can put theories and reason in the`

`theories. No scientist will ever pretend it has the true theory. Those`

`who does are pseudo-priesters in disguise.`

Bruno

John MikesOn Sat, Jul 2, 2011 at 7:27 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>wrote:On 01 Jul 2011, at 13:23, selva kumar wrote: Is consciousness causally effective ? I found this question in previous threads,but I didn't find a answer.Was it in the FOR list (on the book Fabric of reality by DavidDeutsch) ? I thought I did answer this question, which is a veryimprtant and fundamental question.It is also a tricky question, which is very similar or related tothe question of free-will, and it can lead to vocabulary issue. Ioften defend the idea that consciousness is effective. Indeed therole I usually defend for consciousness is a relative self-speedingup ability. Yet the question is tricky, especially due to thepresence of the "causally", which is harder to grasp or define than"consciousness" itself.Let me try to explain. For this I need some definition, and I hopefor some understanding of the UDA and a bit of AUDA. Ask precisionif needed.The main ingredient for the explanation are three theorems due toGödel:- the Gödel completeness theorem (available for machine talkingfirst order logic or a sufficiently effective higher order logic).The theorem says that a theory or machine is consistent (syntacticalnotion, = ~Bf) iff the theory has a model (a mathematical structurein which it makes sense to say that a proposition is true). I willrephrase this by saying that a machine is consistent if and only ifthe machine's beliefs make sense in some reality.- the Gödel second incompleteness theorem ~Bf -> ~B(~Bf): if themachine is consistent, then this is not provable by the machine. Soif the beliefs are real in some reality, the machine cannot provethe existence of that reality. This is used in some strict way,because we don't assume the machine can prove its completeness(despite this has shown to be the case by Orey). This entails thateventually, the machine can add as new axiom its own consistency,but this leads to a new machine, for which a novel notion ofconsistency appears, and the 'new' machine can still not prove theexistence of a reality "satisfying its beliefs. yet that machine caneasily prove the consistency of the machine she was. This can bereitered as many times as their are (constructive) ordinals, andthis is what I describe as a climbing from G to G*. The modal logicof self-reference remains unchanged, but the arithmeticalinterpretation of it expands. An infinity of previously undecidablepropositions become decidable, and ... another phenomenon occurs:- Gödel length of proof theorem. Once a machine adds an undecidableproposition, like its own consistency, as a new axiom/belief, notonly an infinity of (arithmetical) propositions become decidable,but an infinity of already provable propositions get shorter proofs.Indeed, and amazingly enough, for any number x, we can find aproposition which proofs will be x times shorter than its shorterproof in the beliefs system without the undecidable proposition. Asimilar, but not entirely equivalent theorem is true for universalcomputation ability, showing in particular that there is no bound tothe rapidity of computers, and this just by change of the software(alas, with finite numbers of exceptions in the *effective* self-speeding up: but evolution of species needs not to be effective orprogrammable in advance).Now I suggest to (re)define consciousness as a machine (instinctive,preprogrammed) ability to bet on a reality. This is equivalent(stricto sensu: the machine does not need to know this) to anability of betting its own consistency (excluding that very newaxiom to avoid inconsistency). As a universal system, this willspeed-up the machine relatively to the probable local universalsystem(s) and will in that way augment its freedom degree. If twomachines play ping-pong, the machine which is quicker has a greaterrange of possible moves/strategy than its opponent.So the answer to the question "is consciousness effective" would beyes, if you accept such definition.Is that consciousness *causally* effective? That is the tricky partrelated to free will. If you accept the definition of free will thatI often suggested, then the answer is yes. Causality will have itsnormal "physical definition", except that with comp suchphysicalness is given by an arithmetical quantization (based on thematerial hypostase defined by Bp & Dp): p physically causes q, iffsomething like BD(BDp -> BDq). I recall Dp = ~B ~p. But of course,in God eyes, there is only true (and false) number relations. Thelöbian phenomenon then shows that the consciousness self-speeding upis coupled with the building of the reality that the machine bet on.At that level, it is like if consciousness is the main force,perhaps the only original one, in the physical universe! This needsstill more work to make precise enough. There is a complex tradeoffin between the "causally" and the "effective" at play, I think.I hope this was not too technical. The work of Gödel plays afundamental role. This explanation is detailed in "Conscience etMécanisme", and related more precisely to the inference inductiveframe.To sum up: machine consciousness, in the theory, confers self-speeding up abilities to the machine with respect to the mostprobable continuation/universal-machine. It is obviously somethinguseful for self-moving creature: to make them able to anticipate andavoid obstacles, which would explain why the self-moving creatureshave developed self-reflexive brains, and become Löbian (self-conscious). Note that here the role is attributed to self-consciousness, and not really to consciousness. But you needconsciousness to have self-consciousness. Consciousness per se hasno role, like in pure contemplation, but once reflected in theLöbian way, it might be the stronger causally effective forceoperating in the 'arithmetical truth', the very origin of the (self)acceleration/force.Note that the Gödel speed-up theorem is not hard to prove. There isa simple proof of it in the excellent book by Torkel Franzen"Gödel's theorem An Incomplete Guide To Its Use and Abuse" which Irecommend the reading (despite it is more on the abuses than theuses). The original paper is in the book by Davis: the undecidable(republished in Dover), and which I consider as a bible for"machine's theology".Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.--You received this message because you are subscribed to the GoogleGroups "Everything List" group.To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

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