On 7/8/2011 2:59 PM, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 7/8/2011 2:44 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 7/8/2011 5:46 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote:
That's what I thought he said.  But I see no reason to suppose a UD is
>  running, much less running without physics.  We don't know of any
>  computation that occurs immaterially.
All computation occurs materially and immaterially. An abacus doesn't
count itself. You ultimately have to have a conscious interpreter to
signify any particular text as quantitatively meaningful. Unplug all
monitors from all computers and what do you have left? Expensive

But the question is what makes a conscious interpreter conscious. Would replacing part of your brain by artificial circuits that are computationally equivalent preserve your consciousness? Your example of computers without monitors makes a good point, but one I think different from your intention. Computation must have some meaning, at least implicitly. Meaning is conferred by interaction with the world. Computers with monitors interact rather narrowly via humans. But consider a computer that runs the utilities in a hospital or flies an airliner. They don't need humans to look at a screen to give meaning to their computation.


Hi Brent,

I found the papers of Marius Buliga <http://arxiv.org/find/math/1/au:+Buliga_M/0/1/0/all/0/1> (For example: http://arxiv.org/abs/1103.6007 )offer an interesting solution to this problem! The point is that a model or map of a computer becomes the territory of a model of the original model, so we break the map vs. territory dichotomy. This bypasses the substitution question completely, I think.


This post focuses on the question: http://chorasimilarity.wordpress.com/2011/06/06/the-cartesian-theater-philosophy-of-mind-versus-aerography/

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