I'm having trouble understanding what you're saying.

>> Computer chips don't behave in the same way though.

>That is just a question of choice of level of description. Unless you
>believe in substantial infinite souls.

Not sure what you mean in either sentence. A plastic flower behaves
differently than a biological plant. A computer chip behaves
differently than a neuron. Why assume that a computer chip can feel
what a living cell can feel?

>> Your computer
>> can't become an ammoniaholic or commit suicide.

>Why?

I'm talking about your actual computer that you are reading this on.
Are you asking me why it can't commit suicide or spontaneously develop
a hankering for ammonia?

>The other side is well explained in the comp theory.

I'm giving it a good try reading your SANE2004 pdf but I think I'm
hovering at around 4% comprehension. If you want me to be able to
consider your hypothesis I think that you will have to radically
simplify it's insights to concrete examples which are not dependent
upon references to anyone else's work, logical/mathematical/or
philosophical notation, teleportation, or Turing anything.

As near as I can tell, it seems like you are looking at the hows and
whys of sensation - how physics and sensation are both logical
relations rather than noumenal existential artifacts and why it might
be necessary. I can't really tell what your answer is though. My focus
is on describing what and who we are in the simplest way. To my mind,
what and who we are cannot be described in purely arithmetic
relations, unless arithmetic relations automatically obscure their
origin and present themselves in all possible universes as color,
sound, taste, feeling, etc.

>No problem. That would mean that the substitution level is low. It
>does no change the conclusion: the physical world is a projection of
>the mind, and the mind is an inside view of arithmetic (or comp is
>false, that is, at all level and you need substantial souls). But we
>don't even find a substance for explaining matter, so that seems a
>regression to me. Anyway, it is inconsistent with the comp assumption.

When you say that the physical world is a projection of the mind, do
you mean that in the sense that it might be possible to stop bullets
directly with our thoughts or in the sense of physicality only seeming
physical because our mind is programmed to read it as such? I would
agree that physicality arises only from the body's own physical
composition and our mind's apprehension of the body's awareness of
itself in relation to it's world, but I wouldn't say that physical
matter is a mental phenomenon. By definition, mental phenomena are
exempt from physical constraints, such as gravity, thermodynamics,
etc.

I don't know about the mind being an inside view of arithmetic. I
would say that arithmetic is only one category of sense and see no
reason to privilege it above aesthetic sense or anthropomorphic sense.
Sense is the elemental level to me. Pattern and pattern detection.
Counting is just another pattern. Not all patterns can be reduced to
something that can be counted. Some things have to be named. Still
others cannot be named or numbered.

>But computer science explains why and how such feelings occur.

Computer science explains why pain exists?

>If you get the six or seven first steps, it is an easy exercise to
>show that matter cannot be cloned. Ask if you have any difficulty.

Unfortunately I can't really get any of the steps.


On Jul 11, 4:26 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 11 Jul 2011, at 04:17, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >> All right, but then honesty should force you to do the same with
> >> computer ships. Unless you presuppose the molecules not being Turing
> >> emulable.
>
> > Computer chips don't behave in the same way though.
>
> That is just a question of choice of level of description. Unless you  
> believe in substantial infinite souls.
>
> > Your computer
> > can't become an ammoniaholic or commit suicide.
>
> Why?
>
> > The problem with
> > emulating molecules is that we are only emulating the side of the coin
> > we can see.
>
> That is true.
>
> > The other side is blank and that's the side that
> > interiority and awareness is made of. We can add chips to our brain
> > though, or build a computer out of cells.
>
> The other side is well explained in the comp theory.
>
>
>
> >> Any mechanical arrangement defining a self-referentially correct
> >> machine automatically leads the mechanical arrangement to distinguish
> >> third person point of view and first person points of view. The
> >> machine already have a theory of qualia, with an explanation of why
> >> qualia and quanta seems different.
>
> > If you are saying that the machine may already have it's own qualia,
> > then sure, I agree, I just don't think it will be our qualia. I think
> > that our experience of yellow, for example, probably comes through
> > cellular experiences with photosynthesis and probably has not evolved
> > much since the Pre-Cambrian. Of course that's a guess. It could be a
> > mammalian thing or a hominid thing that arises out of the experience
> > of elaborations throughout the cortex. In order for a silicon chip to
> > generate that experience of yellow, I think it would have to learn to
> > speak chlorophyll and hemoglobin.
>
> No problem. That would mean that the substitution level is low. It  
> does no change the conclusion: the physical world is a projection of  
> the mind, and the mind is an inside view of arithmetic (or comp is  
> false, that is, at all level and you need substantial souls). But we  
> don't even find a substance for explaining matter, so that seems a  
> regression to me. Anyway, it is inconsistent with the comp assumption.
>
>
>
> >> I agree. But this is a consequence of comp, and it leads to a
> >> derivation of physics from computer science/machine's theology. No
> >> need to introduce any physics (old or new).
>
> > It could be that, but the transparency of comp to physical realities
> > and semantic consistencies are pretty convincing to me.
>
> It is not.
>
> > I would rather
> > think that I am feeling what my fingers are feeling then imagining
> > that feeling is just a mathematical illusion. Mathematics seem
> > abstract and yellow seems concrete.
>
> But computer science explains why and how such feelings occur.
>
>
>
> >> That's certainly *looks* like the arithmetical plotinian physics.
> >> Again, you can extract it (or have to extract it for getting the
> >> correct quanta/qualia) from computer science (actually from just
> >> addition and multiplication and a small amount of logic).
>
> >> I don't really do that. I don't think that consciousness can be
> >> created or be synthetic. It is not the product of any machine,  
> >> natural
> >> or artificial. Such machines only filter consciousness and select
> >> relative partial realities. My main point is that this is testable.  
> >> It
> >> already explains non locality, indeterminacy, non-cloning of matter,
> >> and some formal aspect of quantum mechanics.
>
> > Sorry, not sure what you mean. Probably over my head. What is it that
> > explains non-cloning of matter? comp? Give me some details and I'll
> > try to understand.
>
> Readhttp://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract...
>
> If you get the six or seven first steps, it is an easy exercise to  
> show that matter cannot be cloned. Ask if you have any difficulty.
>
>
>
> >> That is too vague. It can make sense in the computationalist theory.
> >> yet the brain itself is a construct of the mind. Not the human mind
> >> but the relative experience of the many universal numbers/
> >> computational histories. This follows from the digital mechanist
> >> hypothesis.
>
> > Again, I'm not familiar enough with the theories. It sounds like
> > you're saying that the brain is made of numbers. Maybe? Not sure it
> > makes a difference?
>
> The brain is not made of numbers.
>
> The belief in brains (and atoms) entirely results from infinities of  
> number relations.
>
> Or comp is false.
>
> My point is just that computer science makes this enough precise so  
> that comp can be tested.
>
> Bruno
>
> > On Jul 10, 11:32 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >> On 10 Jul 2011, at 15:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>>> You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
>
> >>> The fact that consciousness changes predictably when different
> >>> molecules are introduced to the brain, and that we are able to  
> >>> produce
> >>> different molecules by changing the content of our consciousness
> >>> subjectively suggests to me that it makes sense to give molecules  
> >>> the
> >>> benefit of the doubt.
>
> >> All right, but then honesty should force you to do the same with
> >> computer ships. Unless you presuppose the molecules not being Turing
> >> emulable.
>
> >>>> What in the brain would be not Turing emulable
>
> >>> Let's take the color yellow for example. If you build a brain out of
> >>> ideal ping pong balls, or digital molecular emulations, does it
> >>> perceive yellow from 580nm oscillations of electromagnetism
> >>> automatically, or does it see yellow when it's own emulated units  
> >>> are
> >>> vibrating on the functionally proportionate scale to itself? Does  
> >>> the
> >>> ping pong ball brain see it's own patterns of collisions as yellow  
> >>> or
> >>> does yellow = electromagnetic ~580nm and nothing else. At what point
> >>> does the yellow come in? Where did it come from? Were there other
> >>> options? Can there ever be new colors? From where? What is the  
> >>> minimum
> >>> mechanical arrangement required to experience yellow?
>
> >> Any mechanical arrangement defining a self-referentially correct
> >> machine automatically leads the mechanical arrangement to distinguish
> >> third person point of view and first person points of view. The
> >> machine already have a theory of qualia, with an explanation of why
> >> qualia and quanta seems different.
>
> >>>> You need to speculate
> >>>> on a new physics,
>
> >>> Yes, I do speculate on a new physics. I think that what we can
> >>> possibly see outside of ourselves is half of what exists.
>
> >> I agree. But this is a consequence of comp, and it leads to a
> >> derivation of physics from computer science/machine's theology. No
> >> need to introduce any physics (old or new).
>
> >>> What we
> >>> experience is only a small part of the other half. Physics wouldn't
> >>> change, but it would be seen as the exterior half of a universal
> >>> topology. I did a post this morning that might 
> >>> help:http://s33light.org/post/7453105138
>
> >> That's certainly *looks* like the arithmetical plotinian physics.
> >> Again, you can extract it (or have to extract it for getting the
> >> correct quanta/qualia) from computer science (actually from just
> >> addition and multiplication and a small amount of logic).
>
> >>> I do appreciate your point, and I think there is great value in
> >>> studying cognitive mechanics and pursuing AGI regardless of it's
> >>> premature assumption to lead to synthetic consciousness.
>
> >> I don't really do that. I don't think that consciousness can be
> >> created or be synthetic. It is not the product of any machine,  
> >> natural
> >> or artificial. Such machines only filter consciousness and select
> >> relative partial realities. My main point is that this is testable.  
> >> It
> >> already explains non locality, indeterminacy, non-cloning of matter,
> >> and some formal aspect of quantum mechanics.
>
> >>> I think that
> >>> physicalism and mechanism are both useful in their appropriate
> >>> contexts -
>
> >> Mechanism and physicalism are incompatible.
>
> >>> the brain does have physical organization which determines
> >>> how consciousness develops,
>
> >> I do agree with this.
>
> >>> just as a cell phone or desktop determines
> >>> how the internet is presented. It's a bidirectional flow of  
> >>> influence.
> >>> We unknowingly affect the brain and the brain unknowingly affects  
> >>> us.
> >>> They are two intertwined but mutually ignorant topologies of the  
> >>> same
> >>> ontological coin.
>
> >> That is too vague. It can make sense in the computationalist theory.
> >> yet the brain itself is a construct of the mind. Not the human mind
> >> but the relative experience of the many universal numbers/
> >> computational histories. This follows from the digital mechanist
> >> hypothesis.
>
> >> Bruno
>
> >>> Craig
>
> >>> On Jul 9, 2:35 pm, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> >>>> On 09 Jul 2011, at 18:58, Craig Weinberg wrote:
>
> >>>>> Sure, it would be great to have improved synthetic bodies, but I
> >>>>> have
> >>>>> no reason to believe that depth and quality of consciousness is
> >>>>> independent from substance. If I have an artificial heart, that
> >>>>> artificiality may not affect me as much as having an artificial  
> >>>>> leg,
> >>>>> however, an artificial brain means an artificial me, and that's a
> >>>>> completely different story. It's like writing a computer program  
> >>>>> to
> >>>>> replace computer users. You might find out that digital circuits  
> >>>>> are
> >>>>> unconscious by definition.
>
> >>>> You might find out that molecules in brain are unconscious too.
> >>>> What in the brain would be not Turing emulable? You need to  
> >>>> speculate
> >>>> on a new physics, or on the fact that a brain would be a very  
> >>>> special
> >>>> analogical infinite machine. Why not?
> >>>> You might still appreciate my point. I don't think that today  
> >>>> someone
> >>>> shown that comp leads to a contradiction, but comp leads to a
> >>>> reappraisal of the relation between first person and 3 person,  
> >>>> or, at
> >>>> some other level, of consciousness and matter, and this in a  
> >>>> testable
> >>>> way.
> >>>> But there is no problem with what you say. If you believe in
> >>>> physicalism, then indeed mechanism is no more an option.
> >>>> In my opinion, mechanism is more plausible than physicalism, and  
> >>>> also
> >>>> more satisfactory in explaining where the "illusion" of matter come
> >>>> from. Actually I don't know of any other explanation.
>
> >>>> Bruno
>
> >>>>> On Jul 9, 12:14 am, Kim Jones <kimjo...@ozemail.com.au> wrote:
> >>>>>> Indeed, why? Any talk of 'artificial circuits' might risk the
> >>>>>> patient saying 'No' to the doctor. I want real, digital circuits.
> >>>>>> Meat circuits are fine, though there might be something better. I
> >>>>>> mean, if something better than 'skin' comes along, I'll swap my
> >>>>>> skin for that. Probably need the brain upgrade anyway to read the
> >>>>>> new skin. You could even make me believe I had a new skin via the
> >>>>>> firmware in the brain upgrade. No need to change skin at all.
>
> >>>>>> I could even sell you a brain upgrade that looked like it was
> >>>>>> composed of meat when in fact it was a bunch of something else.  
> >>>>>> You
> >>>>>> only have to believe what your brain presents you.
>
> >>>>>> Kim Jones
>
> >>>>>> On 09/07/2011, at 12:44 PM, meekerdb wrote:
>
> >>>>>>>> Replacing parts of the brain depends what the artificial  
> >>>>>>>> circuits
> >>>>>>>> are
> >>>>>>>> made of. For them to be experienced as something like human
> >>>>>>>> consciousness then I think they would have to be made of
> >>>>>>>> biological
> >>>>>>>> tissue.
>
> >>>>>>> Why?  Biological tissue is made out of protons, neutrons, and
> >>>>>>> electrons just like computer chips.  Why should anything other
> >>>>>>> than their input/output function matter?
>
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