On 22 Jul 2011, at 17:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:

Unless you believe in zombie, the point is that there *is* enough
phenomenological qualia and subjectivity, and contingencies, in the
realm of numbers. The diffrent 1-views (the phenomenology of mind, of
matter, etc.) are given by the modal variant of self-reference. This
has been done and this does explain the shape of modern physics (where
physicists are lost in a labyrinth of incompatible interpretations).
Most of the quantum weirdness are theorem in arithmetic.

I believe in zombies as far as it would be possible to simulate a
human presence with a YouTube flip book as I described, or a to
simulate a human brain digitally which would be zombies as far as
having any internal awareness beyond the semiconductor experience of
permittivity/permeability/wattage, etc.


So they would behave like you and me, yet have consciousness of permittivity/permeability/wattage?




so that we may not only have
restricted access by virtue of our own separation from each other, but qualia itself may somehow present the experience of entities which we
would consider to be in the future as well as the past.

Non sense with comp. We just cannot *assume* things like past and
future.

I'm saying that we human beings consider them to be in the future and
the past, not that there is a future or past.

I am not sure I understand what you mean.




That is their error. You don't need to copy them.

You think that asserting a hypothesis that feeling is not quantifiable
is the same thing as rationalizing genocide and slavery?

Not at all. Comp prevents feeling to be quantifiable. I am on your side here.



I think it's
just the opposite. It's the belief in arithmetic over subjectivity
that is leading the planet down the primrose path to asphyxiation and
madness.

You are the one disallowing subjectivity to some entities, based on their 'number skin'. You are the reductionist here, telling us that only wet human brain can think. On the contrary, mechanism, when well understood, is a vaccine against reductionism, even against reductionism of robots and numbers.




Only persons can think.

I thought the point of comp was that digital simulation is sufficient
to simulate thought.

Thought/consciousness exists only in the arithmetical platonia. Digital emulation makes them only relatively accessible to universal machines, relatively to other universal machines. I know this is a bit a subtle counter-intuitive point.




That is tautological. I agree of course. But the question is about the
nature of that system. You seem to want it described by physics. This
is logically OK, but you have to abandon comp. That's all.

If comp cannot embrace physics, and physics cannot embrace comp, then
we have to turn to something which reconciles both.

Comp explains where the laws of physics come from, and this without eliminating the person and souls.




I am not convinced by argument of impossibility pointing on actual
technology.

Not sure what you mean.

You were arguing from the current and contingent shape of today's technology.

Bruno




On Jul 22, 5:27 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 22 Jul 2011, at 00:42, Craig Weinberg wrote:



that doesn't need any
complex logic behind it,

Why? This is just like saying "we can't explain it". I am OK with
that, but then I look for better definitions and assumptions, with
the
goal of at least finding an explanation of why it seems like that, or
why there is no explanation. Without this, it is like invoking the
will of God, and adding "don't search for an explanation".

Right, I totally agree. I just think there's a significant chance that
we will be looking in the wrong place if we restrict ourselves to
digital-analytic logic. Not saying that we should abandon all hope of
producing insights from that area too, I'm just wanting to know if
anyone has any objections to me planting a flag on this new continent
to explore.

My thinking at this point is that why it seems so difficult to explain
is that :

1) since we, the subjective observer is in my opinion a phenomena of a
category which is identical to qualia, the sameness leads to an
ontological problem of not being able to examine qualia from outside
of the realm of qualia.

2) the nature of qualitative phenomenon itself is the opposite
(interior, perhaps trans-terior) of quantitative phenomenology so we
may have to control our scientific impulses toward deterministic
theory to allow for more flexible and intuitive apprehensions to
embrace the nuances of how it works.

Unless you believe in zombie, the point is that there *is* enough
phenomenological qualia and subjectivity, and contingencies, in the
realm of numbers. The diffrent 1-views (the phenomenology of mind, of
matter, etc.) are given by the modal variant of self-reference. This
has been done and this does explain the shape of modern physics (where
physicists are lost in a labyrinth of incompatible interpretations).
Most of the quantum weirdness are theorem in arithmetic.



3) the qualitative principle is identical to privacy in an ontological
sense of being self-sequestering from public exterior access. The
privacy itself is what defines the locus of qualitative phenomena.

OK.



4) this 'stuff' may be ultimately originating through non-local, a-
temporal axiom of the Singularity,

?

so that we may not only have
restricted access by virtue of our own separation from each other, but qualia itself may somehow present the experience of entities which we
would consider to be in the future as well as the past.

Non sense with comp. We just cannot *assume* things like past and
future.





As far as 3 goes, we may actually be able to overcome our separateness
using technology. To be able to experiment with a neural prosthetic
which could extend our visual cortex to access multiple visual systems
- insect, bird, dog, etc.. To be able to record and play back neural
activity records.. These things are entirely possible and I think
would be hugely informative. Maybe we can break some qualia codes that
way, tweak our sensation retroperceptually, etc.

1 and 2 are just a matter of breaking habits of how we think about
these things. That's the fun part. Next time you turn on the light in
your room, look at what it is that you see, not as a flood of
invisible photon stuff, but as eavesdropping on your eyeball's
conversation with the illuminated surfaces of the room. The light
isn't being added to your face or the room, it's all lighting itself
up according to the perceptual-relativistic protocols of illumination.
The surface of everything is lit up from the inside, or the trans-
terior side in the presence of a sufficiently excited quantity of
matter. It works just like a painting or computer graphic, in the
sense that it is the surface itself which is changing and not some
intangible light juice spraying all over the place.

Pain cannot
be simulated quantitatively in any way.

How do you know?

I don't, but I think if it could, then you would be asking my theory
directly how it knows instead of me.

You remind me of the Spanish christians arguing that south american
indians have no souls. You can rape and enslave them at will: it is
not a sin! (To be sure they *did* eventually conclude, at the
Valladolid meeting, that they have a soul, so that it was necessary
to
convert them to save them from hell).
(That's why the "spirit" of the Salvia divinorum plant became known
as
the Virgin Mary!)

That's the tragic irony. Turned out that they themselves were the ones
who had no souls. Oops.

That is their error. You don't need to copy them.

I'm only taking a hard line on this because I think that it's in such contradistinction to the momentum of civilized thought. A sufficiently
evolved card game could be pretty damn impressive, and if we invest
our own feeling into it, there is arguably new feelings that we
experience as a result, I just don't think that what we see as the
game can have feelings that we can realize. We can't rule out though
that anything we experience as having no feeling has a private
dimension that may see us as having no feeling. It just gets a bit too psychedelic (salviadelic?) to actually implement that level of animism
practically, don't you think?

Only persons can think.



I am OK with this. But I do think plausible that you can emulate
digitally first hand experiences of pain and pleasure. Then 'real'
human-like pain, which can last for a time, will need the whole
(arithmetical) truth to be stable on its many 'futures'.

I think you can emulate first and experiences only in a system capable
of subjectively experiencing them.

That is tautological. I agree of course. But the question is about the
nature of that system. You seem to want it described by physics. This
is logically OK, but you have to abandon comp. That's all.



We certainly should be able emulate
the output of some kind of pain or pleasure and input it into another
nervous system. Simple record and playback through an analog or
digital medium. That's really one of my earliest and strongest dreams
would be to be involved in the orchestration of full sensory
experiences, brain-direct.

Our first
person experiences are non computably distributed on an  infinite
structure, but that is a consequence of its digitalness at some
level.

There was a lot made of the perceived difference in digital music when
CDs first came out, in the audiophile communities particularly. I do
think that a subtle difference can be detected but hard to know
whether it's the digital nature itself or the processing, mixing,
playback equipment, confirmation bias, etc. Digital music seems
harsher, more sibilant and shallow on the percussion. It doesn't
bother me much, but I think there could be a legitimate, if subtle
difference stemming from the pure conversion of analog waveforms to
digital samples.

I am not convinced by argument of impossibility pointing on actual
technology.

Bruno

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/

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