On 26 Dec 2011, at 02:09, Russell Standish wrote:

On Sat, Dec 24, 2011 at 04:12:20PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

It looks like. But with comp we would survive even if we are sent in
a classical universe, once it runs the classical computation.
Russell is adding something to the comp hypothesis.

I don't believe I am, except for considering the argument in a
Multiverse. I am trying to understand the MGA qua proof. I'm not
trying to postulate any additional mechanism of consciousness beyond
that of computationalism. I'm am just trying to understand why
supervenience on a multiversal physics is ruled out.

Not only that is not ruled out, but that is made obligatory (by UDA 1-8).
The comp-physics is multiversal.
What is rule out is that the multiverse needs to be primitive.
The point is mainly epistemological: physics is no more the fundamental science. It becomes a branch of machines' psychology (in a large sense). But the first person persistent experience is multiversal. The "persistence" uses the first person indeterminacy.

It presupposes
that comp works only in some type of universe. Such a refutation is
a bit "bibilical". It is like saying yes to the doctor because some
transcendant entity (God, a universe of type X, ...) makes it
possible. it is implicit in comp that we survive because the physics
allow the running of a computation in its usual classical (Church-
Turing-Post sense). I might need to make that explicit perhaps?

No need to make it more explicit: comp includes the functionalist
assumption that any reimplementation of the conscious computation on
no matter what hardware reimplements the consciousness.

OK. MGA is used only for those who make precise that although the hardware can be changed, there is still a need of some matter, and/or some primitive physicalness. The MGA shows that such demand *cannot* help. It cannot have any use, except blocking the comp mind-body problem solution.

Since it is the same consciousness, the reimplementation of the
physics must also be indistinguishable by supervenience. But that
physics can be emulated (ie needn't be concrete), just
indistinguishable. It seems the me that the dovetailer faithfully
reproduces the multiversal physics, albeit emulated, so I don't see
the contradiction with SUP-PHYS.

It is just a contradiction with SUP-PRIMITIVE-PHYS. It contradicts the Aristotelian physics, not the Platonist physics, where physics is a secondary, high level emergent phenomenon.



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