On 29 Dec 2011, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:

On 12/29/2011 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:

On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two consciousness.
In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
supervenes (weakly) on the physical activity in the classroom (to
change them, we have to change something physical in the classroom),
in the same manner than the consciousness of Bruno and Russell
supervenes on the (phsyical, here) execution of the UD. That is what
is used in the argument.


We have two conscious states (Tommy and Samantha)

It might be the same consciousness, with different content.

??? That would be two different conscious states. What is a consciousness apart from its content?

That's a good question. May be it is cosmic consciousness, or pure consciousness of pure consciousness, or perhaps the innate consciousness of the pre-löbian universal machine. Of course we lack identification criterium for consciousness, and my point was more logical than assertative, in the frame of "MGA's alleged refutations". I hope this will be clarified in my answer to Russell on supervenience. I will be occupied those next days, so I might answer this next year.

Happy new year, Brent.



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