On 29 Dec 2011, at 19:13, meekerdb wrote:
On 12/29/2011 8:47 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 28 Dec 2011, at 22:21, Russell Standish wrote:
On Tue, Dec 27, 2011 at 12:10:29PM +0100, Bruno Marchal wrote:
But I still fail to see what you mean by swapping two
In this case we have that the consciousness of [Tommy and Samantha]
supervenes (weakly) on the physical activity in the classroom (to
change them, we have to change something physical in the
in the same manner than the consciousness of Bruno and Russell
supervenes on the (phsyical, here) execution of the UD. That is
is used in the argument.
We have two conscious states (Tommy and Samantha)
It might be the same consciousness, with different content.
??? That would be two different conscious states. What is a
consciousness apart from its content?
That's a good question. May be it is cosmic consciousness, or pure
consciousness of pure consciousness, or perhaps the innate
consciousness of the pre-löbian universal machine. Of course we lack
identification criterium for consciousness, and my point was more
logical than assertative, in the frame of "MGA's alleged refutations".
I hope this will be clarified in my answer to Russell on
supervenience. I will be occupied those next days, so I might answer
this next year.
Happy new year, Brent.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at