On Feb 7, 12:01 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote: > On Feb 6, 9:48 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > On Feb 6, 7:12 am, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com> wrote: > > > > arXiv:1202.0720v1 [physics.hist-ph] > > > > Abstract > > > It is argued that it is possible to give operational meaning to free > > > will and > > > the process of making a choice without employing metaphysics. > > > > comments? > > > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a > > capacity which we associate with living organisms, > > rightly or wrongly
There may not be a rightly or wrongly. Free will, as an aspect of consciousness, may be subjective. The degree to which we infer the other as having the capacity for free will may be directly proportional to the perception of similarity to oneself. Judged from a distant scale and perspective, there is nothing about our patterns of civil construction on this planet, or the patterns of our molecules and cells that demands to be associated with free will from an objective point of view. > > > particularly if > > they have some kind of system of self-directed propulsion. With the > > ability to move freely comes the opportunity for more sophisticated > > forms of intentionality to develop. This is not to say that a plant > > doesn't not have some measure of free will, but it seems that the true > > potential of will is tied up in control over location. Like many other > > biological qualities (feeling, desire, etc), free will doesn't > > translate meaningfully into the language of physics. > > That might mean it never existed, and our "association" was wrong. > What's the counterargument? We would have to explain the existence of the possibility of any association to begin with. What purpose would such an association serve and why is it (nearly) a human universal? This doesn't prove the validity of the association, but it makes sense of the failure of defining 1p free will in 3p mechanistic terms. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
