On Feb 8, 6:41 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 8, 11:01 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
>
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> > On Feb 8, 2:07 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> > > > > > > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a
> > > > > > > capacity which we associate with living organisms,
>
> > > > > > rightly or wrongly
>
> > > > > There may not be a rightly or wrongly.
>
> > > > Neither rightly nor wrongly?
>
> > > Yes. There may not be an absolute correlation between living organisms
> > > and free will so much as a relative expectation of free will in things
> > > which are similar to the (any) observer.
>
> > And if there is zero FW, those relative expectations
> > will be wrong too.
>
> If they are relative there is no wrong.

If you say a value has a great-than-zero value when it actually jut
has
a zero value, that would be wrong.

> If I am very cold and I walk
> into a room temperature room, to me the room feels warm. That isn't
> right or wrong, it's a reflection of how my sense of temperature
> works.  My sense of free will may work the same way. If I am used to a
> busy social human world, being out in nature may seem to be nothing
> but randomness and determinism, but if I grew up in the wilderness,
> that may not be the case. The wilderness becomes a living context
> which can be read and perhaps dialogued with in some direct way.

Hopelessly vague.

>
>
> > >My hunch is that there
> > > probably is a correlation between what we think of as having free will
> > > and it's actual capacity for it, but who knows, we don't seem to be a
> > > very good judge of that kind of thing.
>
> > > > > Free will, as an aspect of
> > > > > consciousness, may be subjective.
> > > > > The degree to which we infer the
> > > > > other as having the capacity for free will may be directly
> > > > > proportional to the perception of similarity to oneself.
>
> > > > That doesn;t affect my point. if we are mistaken
> > > > in attributing FW to ourselves ITFP, we will be mistaken
> > > > in attributing to others on the basis of similarity to  ourselves.
>
> > > It think the possibility of falsely attributing FW to ourselves ITFP
> > > fails since it entails making a distinction between FW and
> > > determinism, which would not be conceivable without FW ITFP.
>
> > It's conceivable. I just conceived it.
>
> I just conceived it = "I, of my own free will, chose to conceive of
> it"

No. The two are not synonymous.

> > > It would
> > > be like trying to make a distinction between air and the shadow of an
> > > invisible palm tree.
>
> > ???????
>
> I'm saying that in a hypothetical universe where no freewill existed,
> there would be no way to even conceive of an alternative to
> determinism.

You could just conceive of it as a result of deteministic
forces.


> You couldn't get outside of determinism to even imagine
> that there could be any other theoretical possibility.

That makes no sense. If you drop LSD, it will
cause you to see and believe strange thngs that don't
exist. Deterministic forces can cause false beliefs.


> It would be to
> imagine the opposite of something that cannot even be named.

Where on earth did you get "cannot be named"?

> If there
> were no such thing as color, you could not imagine color simply by
> trying to conceive of 'not black and white'.

But that is a false analogy. Indeterminism just means lack
of determinism.

>Without free will in the
> first place, there is no possibility of conceiving anything or
> wondering about anything.

>The entire universe would be a machine that
> 'simply is' with no possibility for awareness (what would be the point
> of awareness?)


What is the point of anything?
>
> > > The whole idea of having an opinion of whether or
> > > not we have FW rests on our capacity to have and change an opinion,
> > > which would be meaningless under determinism.
>
> > No it wouldn't. Of course you can;t freelly change an opinion
> > without some sort of freedom.
>
> Why? If you have some sort of freedom, then you don't have
> determinism.
>
> > But that is question begging.
>
> No, it's question answering. You have a question? Then you have free
> will, otherwise there would be no point at all in the possibility of
> any sort of question.

Oh good grief. You have now gone to assumijng,
with no evidence, that everythig has a point.

>There would only be known and unknown, with no
> significant difference between them (again, what would be the point?
> if you can't do anything about your question except be a helpless
> spectator to see whether it gets answered or not, what would be the
> point?)
>
> > But the other forms of the argument are non sequiturs.
>
> What the palm tree? #

No, the arguments that "you have choices/opinions/concepts therefore
FW exists".

>I was trying to explain precisely that determinism
> and free will would both be non-sequiturs

Things aren't  non sequiturs. Purported arguments are.

> in a deterministic universe.
> It would be a name for darkness in a universe without light. No
> distinction = no sense.
>
>
>
> Craig

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