On Feb 8, 6:45 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> On Feb 7, 12:52 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:

> > > > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a
> > > > capacity which we associate with living organisms,
> > > rightly or wrongly
> > There may not be a rightly or wrongly.
> Neither rightly nor wrongly?

Yes. There may not be an absolute correlation between living organisms
and free will so much as a relative expectation of free will in things
which are similar to the (any) observer. My hunch is that there
probably is a correlation between what we think of as having free will
and it's actual capacity for it, but who knows, we don't seem to be a
very good judge of that kind of thing.

> > Free will, as an aspect of
> > consciousness, may be subjective.
> > The degree to which we infer the
> > other as having the capacity for free will may be directly
> > proportional to the perception of similarity to oneself.
> That doesn;t affect my point. if we are mistaken
> in attributing FW to ourselves ITFP, we will be mistaken
> in attributing to others on the basis of similarity to  ourselves.

It think the possibility of falsely attributing FW to ourselves ITFP
fails since it entails making a distinction between FW and
determinism, which would not be conceivable without FW ITFP. It would
be like trying to make a distinction between air and the shadow of an
invisible palm tree. The whole idea of having an opinion of whether or
not we have FW rests on our capacity to have and change an opinion,
which would be meaningless under determinism.

> >Judged from a
> > distant scale and perspective, there is nothing about our patterns of
> > civil construction on this planet, or the patterns of our molecules
> > and cells that demands to be associated with free will from an
> > objective point of view.
> Hence the "maybe wrongly". Which you have disputed on
> grounds that are not clear to me.

I dispute it on the grounds that dispute is only possible with FW to
begin with. We can only doubt the depth of the freedom of our will in
relation to our 3p view of our behavior - which is why I say there is
a direct proportion relation there; the further we focus outside of
ourselves in microcosm, macrocosm, or unfamiliarity (as when we
confront another culture for the first time), the less we are able to
identify personally, and the more we focus on the logic of the

Logic is impersonal, not by accident, but ontologically: Logic is the
personal experience of the inversion of personal experience. It elides
the 'show' of the universe into a description of the patterns
underlying the show. Living with only logic would be paralysis (there
was a study of a patient who lost part of his limbic system so that he
had limited emotional capacity...he would stand frozen the cereal
aisle in the grocery store because he couldn't figure out what his
preference is).

Contrast this with your imagination. Here we are most interior and
here, not coincidentally, our will is most free. My idea then is that
the experience of free will is the same thing as the feeling of
subjectivity, and the deeper subjectivity you have, the more freedom
you can exercise, both internally and potentially externally.

> > > > particularly if
> > > > they have some kind of system of self-directed propulsion. With the
> > > > ability to move freely comes the opportunity for more sophisticated
> > > > forms of intentionality to develop. This is not to say that a plant
> > > > doesn't not have some measure of free will, but it seems that the true
> > > > potential of will is tied up in control over location. Like many other
> > > > biological qualities (feeling, desire, etc), free will doesn't
> > > > translate meaningfully into the language of physics.
> > > That might mean it never existed, and our "association" was wrong.
> > > What's the  counterargument?
> > We would have to explain the existence of the possibility of any
> > association to begin with.
> Fine. Then mind exists on order to make associations, right or wrong.
> That doesn't entail FW exists.

No, but the universality of the association says something
consistently true either about the mind (or the brain, individuals,
culture, species, scale of body, etc) or about the reality which the
mind is considering.

> > What purpose would such an association
> > serve and why is it (nearly) a human universal?
> There are plenty of answers to those questions. Some of them
> are Error Theories.

Errors is an interpretation made on the association, the association
itself can't ultimately be an error. That's why I say rightly or
wrongly we still have to explain why most everyone on Earth feels that
they have free will (whether or not they have chosen to interpret it
as an illusion of mechanism) and why they also feels that inanimate
objects do not have free will (whether or not they choose to interpret
that as illusion of spirituality).

> > This doesn't prove the
> > validity of the association, but it makes sense of the failure of
> > defining 1p free will in 3p mechanistic terms.
> I don't think that has failed: I am a naturalistic libertarian.

What is your 3p definition of 1p free will?


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