On Feb 7, 12:52 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 7, 12:01 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > On Feb 6, 9:48 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > On Feb 6, 7:12 am, ronaldheld <ronaldh...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > arXiv:1202.0720v1 [physics.hist-ph]
> > > > Abstract
> > > > It is argued that it is possible to give operational meaning to free
> > > > will and
> > > > the process of making a choice without employing metaphysics.
> > > > comments?
> > > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a
> > > capacity which we associate with living organisms,
> > rightly or wrongly
> There may not be a rightly or wrongly.
Neither rightly nor wrongly?
> Free will, as an aspect of
> consciousness, may be subjective.
> The degree to which we infer the
> other as having the capacity for free will may be directly
> proportional to the perception of similarity to oneself.
That doesn;t affect my point. if we are mistaken
in attributing FW to ourselves ITFP, we will be mistaken
in attributing to others on the basis of similarity to ourselves.
>Judged from a
> distant scale and perspective, there is nothing about our patterns of
> civil construction on this planet, or the patterns of our molecules
> and cells that demands to be associated with free will from an
> objective point of view.
Hence the "maybe wrongly". Which you have disputed on
grounds that are not clear to me.
> > > particularly if
> > > they have some kind of system of self-directed propulsion. With the
> > > ability to move freely comes the opportunity for more sophisticated
> > > forms of intentionality to develop. This is not to say that a plant
> > > doesn't not have some measure of free will, but it seems that the true
> > > potential of will is tied up in control over location. Like many other
> > > biological qualities (feeling, desire, etc), free will doesn't
> > > translate meaningfully into the language of physics.
> > That might mean it never existed, and our "association" was wrong.
> > What's the counterargument?
> We would have to explain the existence of the possibility of any
> association to begin with.
Fine. Then mind exists on order to make associations, right or wrong.
That doesn't entail FW exists.
> What purpose would such an association
> serve and why is it (nearly) a human universal?
There are plenty of answers to those questions. Some of them
are Error Theories.
> This doesn't prove the
> validity of the association, but it makes sense of the failure of
> defining 1p free will in 3p mechanistic terms.
I don't think that has failed: I am a naturalistic libertarian.
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