On Feb 7, 12:52 pm, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > On Feb 7, 12:01 am, 1Z <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > > > > > > On Feb 6, 9:48 pm, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > On Feb 6, 7:12 am, ronaldheld <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > arXiv:1202.0720v1 [physics.hist-ph] > > > > > Abstract > > > > It is argued that it is possible to give operational meaning to free > > > > will and > > > > the process of making a choice without employing metaphysics. > > > > > comments? > > > > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a > > > capacity which we associate with living organisms, > > > rightly or wrongly > > There may not be a rightly or wrongly.
Neither rightly nor wrongly? > Free will, as an aspect of > consciousness, may be subjective. > The degree to which we infer the > other as having the capacity for free will may be directly > proportional to the perception of similarity to oneself. That doesn;t affect my point. if we are mistaken in attributing FW to ourselves ITFP, we will be mistaken in attributing to others on the basis of similarity to ourselves. >Judged from a > distant scale and perspective, there is nothing about our patterns of > civil construction on this planet, or the patterns of our molecules > and cells that demands to be associated with free will from an > objective point of view. Hence the "maybe wrongly". Which you have disputed on grounds that are not clear to me. > > > > particularly if > > > they have some kind of system of self-directed propulsion. With the > > > ability to move freely comes the opportunity for more sophisticated > > > forms of intentionality to develop. This is not to say that a plant > > > doesn't not have some measure of free will, but it seems that the true > > > potential of will is tied up in control over location. Like many other > > > biological qualities (feeling, desire, etc), free will doesn't > > > translate meaningfully into the language of physics. > > > That might mean it never existed, and our "association" was wrong. > > What's the counterargument? > > We would have to explain the existence of the possibility of any > association to begin with. Fine. Then mind exists on order to make associations, right or wrong. That doesn't entail FW exists. > What purpose would such an association > serve and why is it (nearly) a human universal? There are plenty of answers to those questions. Some of them are Error Theories. > This doesn't prove the > validity of the association, but it makes sense of the failure of > defining 1p free will in 3p mechanistic terms. I don't think that has failed: I am a naturalistic libertarian. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
