On Feb 8, 2:07 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Feb 8, 6:45 am, 1Z <peterdjo...@yahoo.com> wrote:
> > On Feb 7, 12:52 pm, Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com> wrote:
> > > > > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a
> > > > > capacity which we associate with living organisms,
> > > > rightly or wrongly
> > > There may not be a rightly or wrongly.
> > Neither rightly nor wrongly?
> Yes. There may not be an absolute correlation between living organisms
> and free will so much as a relative expectation of free will in things
> which are similar to the (any) observer.
And if there is zero FW, those relative expectations
will be wrong too.
>My hunch is that there
> probably is a correlation between what we think of as having free will
> and it's actual capacity for it, but who knows, we don't seem to be a
> very good judge of that kind of thing.
> > > Free will, as an aspect of
> > > consciousness, may be subjective.
> > > The degree to which we infer the
> > > other as having the capacity for free will may be directly
> > > proportional to the perception of similarity to oneself.
> > That doesn;t affect my point. if we are mistaken
> > in attributing FW to ourselves ITFP, we will be mistaken
> > in attributing to others on the basis of similarity to ourselves.
> It think the possibility of falsely attributing FW to ourselves ITFP
> fails since it entails making a distinction between FW and
> determinism, which would not be conceivable without FW ITFP.
It's conceivable. I just conceived it.
> It would
> be like trying to make a distinction between air and the shadow of an
> invisible palm tree.
> The whole idea of having an opinion of whether or
> not we have FW rests on our capacity to have and change an opinion,
> which would be meaningless under determinism.
No it wouldn't. Of course you can;t freelly change an opinion
without some sort of freedom. But that is question begging.
But the other forms of the argument are non sequiturs.
> > >Judged from a
> > > distant scale and perspective, there is nothing about our patterns of
> > > civil construction on this planet, or the patterns of our molecules
> > > and cells that demands to be associated with free will from an
> > > objective point of view.
> > Hence the "maybe wrongly". Which you have disputed on
> > grounds that are not clear to me.
> I dispute it on the grounds that dispute is only possible with FW to
> begin with. We can only doubt the depth of the freedom of our will in
> relation to our 3p view of our behavior - which is why I say there is
> a direct proportion relation there; the further we focus outside of
> ourselves in microcosm, macrocosm, or unfamiliarity (as when we
> confront another culture for the first time), the less we are able to
> identify personally, and the more we focus on the logic of the
> Logic is impersonal, not by accident, but ontologically: Logic is the
> personal experience of the inversion of personal experience. It elides
> the 'show' of the universe into a description of the patterns
> underlying the show. Living with only logic would be paralysis (there
> was a study of a patient who lost part of his limbic system so that he
> had limited emotional capacity...he would stand frozen the cereal
> aisle in the grocery store because he couldn't figure out what his
> preference is).
> Contrast this with your imagination. Here we are most interior and
> here, not coincidentally, our will is most free. My idea then is that
> the experience of free will is the same thing as the feeling of
> subjectivity, and the deeper subjectivity you have, the more freedom
> you can exercise, both internally and potentially externally.
> > > > > particularly if
> > > > > they have some kind of system of self-directed propulsion. With the
> > > > > ability to move freely comes the opportunity for more sophisticated
> > > > > forms of intentionality to develop. This is not to say that a plant
> > > > > doesn't not have some measure of free will, but it seems that the true
> > > > > potential of will is tied up in control over location. Like many other
> > > > > biological qualities (feeling, desire, etc), free will doesn't
> > > > > translate meaningfully into the language of physics.
> > > > That might mean it never existed, and our "association" was wrong.
> > > > What's the counterargument?
> > > We would have to explain the existence of the possibility of any
> > > association to begin with.
> > Fine. Then mind exists on order to make associations, right or wrong.
> > That doesn't entail FW exists.
> No, but the universality of the association says something
> consistently true either about the mind (or the brain, individuals,
> culture, species, scale of body, etc) or about the reality which the
> mind is considering.
> > > What purpose would such an association
> > > serve and why is it (nearly) a human universal?
> > There are plenty of answers to those questions. Some of them
> > are Error Theories.
> Errors is an interpretation made on the association, the association
> itself can't ultimately be an error. That's why I say rightly or
> wrongly we still have to explain why most everyone on Earth feels that
> they have free will (whether or not they have chosen to interpret it
> as an illusion of mechanism) and why they also feels that inanimate
> objects do not have free will (whether or not they choose to interpret
> that as illusion of spirituality).
> > > This doesn't prove the
> > > validity of the association, but it makes sense of the failure of
> > > defining 1p free will in 3p mechanistic terms.
> > I don't think that has failed: I am a naturalistic libertarian.
> What is your 3p definition of 1p free will?
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