On Feb 8, 2:07 pm, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > On Feb 8, 6:45 am, 1Z <[email protected]> wrote: > > > On Feb 7, 12:52 pm, Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > It depends if you consider biology metaphysical. Free will is a > > > > > capacity which we associate with living organisms, > > > > > rightly or wrongly > > > > There may not be a rightly or wrongly. > > > Neither rightly nor wrongly? > > Yes. There may not be an absolute correlation between living organisms > and free will so much as a relative expectation of free will in things > which are similar to the (any) observer.
And if there is zero FW, those relative expectations will be wrong too. >My hunch is that there > probably is a correlation between what we think of as having free will > and it's actual capacity for it, but who knows, we don't seem to be a > very good judge of that kind of thing. > > > > > > Free will, as an aspect of > > > consciousness, may be subjective. > > > The degree to which we infer the > > > other as having the capacity for free will may be directly > > > proportional to the perception of similarity to oneself. > > > That doesn;t affect my point. if we are mistaken > > in attributing FW to ourselves ITFP, we will be mistaken > > in attributing to others on the basis of similarity to ourselves. > > It think the possibility of falsely attributing FW to ourselves ITFP > fails since it entails making a distinction between FW and > determinism, which would not be conceivable without FW ITFP. It's conceivable. I just conceived it. > It would > be like trying to make a distinction between air and the shadow of an > invisible palm tree. ??????? > The whole idea of having an opinion of whether or > not we have FW rests on our capacity to have and change an opinion, > which would be meaningless under determinism. No it wouldn't. Of course you can;t freelly change an opinion without some sort of freedom. But that is question begging. But the other forms of the argument are non sequiturs. > > >Judged from a > > > distant scale and perspective, there is nothing about our patterns of > > > civil construction on this planet, or the patterns of our molecules > > > and cells that demands to be associated with free will from an > > > objective point of view. > > > Hence the "maybe wrongly". Which you have disputed on > > grounds that are not clear to me. > > I dispute it on the grounds that dispute is only possible with FW to > begin with. We can only doubt the depth of the freedom of our will in > relation to our 3p view of our behavior - which is why I say there is > a direct proportion relation there; the further we focus outside of > ourselves in microcosm, macrocosm, or unfamiliarity (as when we > confront another culture for the first time), the less we are able to > identify personally, and the more we focus on the logic of the > behavior. > > Logic is impersonal, not by accident, but ontologically: Logic is the > personal experience of the inversion of personal experience. It elides > the 'show' of the universe into a description of the patterns > underlying the show. Living with only logic would be paralysis (there > was a study of a patient who lost part of his limbic system so that he > had limited emotional capacity...he would stand frozen the cereal > aisle in the grocery store because he couldn't figure out what his > preference is). > > Contrast this with your imagination. Here we are most interior and > here, not coincidentally, our will is most free. My idea then is that > the experience of free will is the same thing as the feeling of > subjectivity, and the deeper subjectivity you have, the more freedom > you can exercise, both internally and potentially externally. > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > particularly if > > > > > they have some kind of system of self-directed propulsion. With the > > > > > ability to move freely comes the opportunity for more sophisticated > > > > > forms of intentionality to develop. This is not to say that a plant > > > > > doesn't not have some measure of free will, but it seems that the true > > > > > potential of will is tied up in control over location. Like many other > > > > > biological qualities (feeling, desire, etc), free will doesn't > > > > > translate meaningfully into the language of physics. > > > > > That might mean it never existed, and our "association" was wrong. > > > > What's the counterargument? > > > > We would have to explain the existence of the possibility of any > > > association to begin with. > > > Fine. Then mind exists on order to make associations, right or wrong. > > That doesn't entail FW exists. > > No, but the universality of the association says something > consistently true either about the mind (or the brain, individuals, > culture, species, scale of body, etc) or about the reality which the > mind is considering. > > > > > > What purpose would such an association > > > serve and why is it (nearly) a human universal? > > > There are plenty of answers to those questions. Some of them > > are Error Theories. > > Errors is an interpretation made on the association, the association > itself can't ultimately be an error. That's why I say rightly or > wrongly we still have to explain why most everyone on Earth feels that > they have free will (whether or not they have chosen to interpret it > as an illusion of mechanism) and why they also feels that inanimate > objects do not have free will (whether or not they choose to interpret > that as illusion of spirituality). > > > > > > This doesn't prove the > > > validity of the association, but it makes sense of the failure of > > > defining 1p free will in 3p mechanistic terms. > > > I don't think that has failed: I am a naturalistic libertarian. > > What is your 3p definition of 1p free will? > > Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. 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