On Feb 7, 6:06 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
> On 07 Feb 2012, at 00:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
> >>> I'm not lowering subst level at all, I'm saying that subst level
> >>> is an
> >>> indexical.
> >> ?
> > That's what you aren't getting about my position. Substitution level
> > is not a scalar variable.
> ?

There is no fixed level at which a plastic plant cannot be
distinguished from a real plant. A person looking through binoculars
is on one level, an ant that crawls on it is on another, a molecule
within it is on another. There is no such thing as substitution level,
and there is no such thing as substitution in an absolute sense. There
is only relativistic imitation - which is subjective and indexical -
not scalar.

> >>>>> All of the quant descriptions in the universe
> >>>>> do not add up to a single experienced quality.
> >>>> You don't know that. Is it an axiom?
> >>> I don't know it, but I clearly understand why it is the case.
> >> That's not an argument.
> > Then you disqualify the possibility of understanding and force a 3p
> > supervenience to all 1p experiences.
> I was saying, at the meta level, that you cannot refer to your own
> understanding of your own "argument" to convey it.

You can when the argument is about subjectivity. I get a vote, non-
subjects don't.

> >>>>> Quantites are only
> >>>>> quantities.
> >>>> No. All universal numbers can interpret a number as a function on
> >>>> quantities, or as properties on quantities, which are not
> >>>> quantities
> >>>> themselves.
> >>> Then what are they?
> >> Functions, relations, properties, modalities, qualities, etc.
> > Quantitative relations, quantitative properties, logical
> > (quantitative) modalities, quantitative qualities.
> What are the quantities that you associate to modalities?

The only modalities you refer to are those associated with
quantitative representation.

> >>>> I take this as another axiom. You postulate the existence of
> >>>> something
> >>>> vague. I think that something like that might make sense perhaps,
> >>>> but
> >>>> as I see it it would be a consequence of the comp meta-axiom.
> >>> That just gives a name to comp's lack of explanatory power. I can
> >>> call
> >>> comp a consequence of the ecumenical meta-axiom.
> >> comp *is* the meta-axiom. It is an axiom bearing on your own
> >> consciousness property (of being invariant for some substitution at
> >> some level).
> > Then I can call the ecumenical a meta-meta axiom.
> Then you lost me, and it looks like you just want have an answer.

You are saying that anything that comp can't explain can still be
explained by comp. I'm saying that anyone can say that. Churches,
governments, corporations, courts.

> >>>> On the contrary. The semantics of machines explodes in the
> >>>> infinities.
> >>> Explodes into what? What does it signify other than itself?
> >> Explodes into the number of possible different interpretation of
> >> itself, which might impact on different decisions and futures, from
> >> the machine's point of view.
> > They all only signify different permutations of the emptiness of the
> > machine. It doesn't signify anything, it's syntax only.
> It is typically not syntax. Semantics of even simple machine are given
> by infinite objects.

There are no semantic objects in reality, only semantic subjects that
can seem objectified subjectively.

> >>>>> It's circular reasoning to say that physical underpinnings have no
> >>>>> effect on our phenomenology when you are working from a theory
> >>>>> which
> >>>>> presupposes that phenomenology is detectable only by quantitative
> >>>>> measurement in the first place. In our actual experience, we know
> >>>>> that
> >>>>> in fact all phenomenological systems without exception exist as a
> >>>>> function of physical systems -
> >>>> We don't know that.
> >>> Are you talking about ghosts or NDEs? Even so, those phenomena are
> >>> always experienced by a person with a body.
> >> I was not talking on NDE, but on the fact that primitive matter does
> >> not exist.
> > Primitive or not, all phenomenological systems that we have observed
> > are associated with persons or animals who have bodies.
> But that's what comp can explain without assuming materially primitive
> bodies.
> And given that we don't know what materially primitive bodies can be,
> comp solves a problem here.

I don't see any advantage that computational primitives bring to the
table over material primitives. To the contrary, it makes sense that
material should precipitate computational properties through mechanism
while disembodied mechanism shows no sign of logically precipitating

> >>>> Nor am I sure what it means exactly. Define "physical".
> >>> Phenomena whose properties include mass, density, volume and
> >>> interact
> >>> effectively with other phenomena bearing those properties.
> >> Define mass, density, volume, and interaction.
> > I don't do definitions. The standard usage of these terms is adequate.
> In fundamental inquiry, standard usage can't help.

That's a presumption. A prejudice that says complex and granular =
better. That's the opposite of how subjectivity works though. We are
looking for simplicity and significance.

> especially
> discussing comp, given that the standard usage is based on billions
> years of evolution and 1500 years of Aristotelianism.
> Again, the standard usage might make sense if you were able to say
> what you assume and what you derive.

I'm not discussing comp, I'm discussing comp's lack of realism. Those
billions of years of evolution count. Besides, I think that even in
cultures where few have been influenced by Aristotelianism, matter and
weight are well understood.

> >>>> Here, in AUDA terms, you might be confusing the "intelligible",
> >>>> with
> >>>> the "intelligible matter"
> >>>> (Bp with Bp & Dt). [] p with [] p & <> t.
> >>> I'm really not confused at all. You keep accusing me of that but I'm
> >>> very clear on my distinctions.
> >> You are not. And you are not well place to judge this.
> > You are saying that your opinions about me are facts.
> I am saying that *anyone* who argue cannot refer to his own
> understanding, or his own clarity.

It depends on what you are arguing about. In this case, where
subjectivity is critically important, *not* referring to our own
understanding is a mistake - one which will be exploited by default by
comp. As long as you use comp to frame the argument, comp can't lose.
If you see the players only from the game's point of view, there is no
possibility of recovering the world of the players - everything is
described only as rules of the game.

> You could as well say, like in the "hunting of the snark": "If you
> were clever, and if I got the time, I could make it all clear to you,
> but given that you are dumb, it is not worth the try". This is fun,
> but not an argument.

The point is that you have to make it clear to yourself. You have to
directly draw upon your own experience of being a living person. Your
arguments are predicated on tying everything back to a specific kind
of logic, which I am telling you is a tautological trap. You are in
the trap, telling me that I have to give you something that forces you
to be freed from the trap, and I am telling you that you have to free
yourself. That's how it works. You have to care. You have to want to
understand the whole truth rather than just a numerical theory of

> > Fortunately I
> > have other people who are familiar with my ideas who don't share your
> > facts.
> This is not an argument. Many people have been convinced by fake
> argument (on the jews, on cannabis, on terrorism, etc.). Humans are
> terribly prone to believe what other people make them wanting to
> believe.

Then that explains your position as well.

> >>>>> virtual servers do not fly off into the
> >>>>> data center on their own virtual power grid - they are still
> >>>>> only a
> >>>>> complicated event of electrified semiconductors. Unplug the
> >>>>> hardware
> >>>>> node and all of the operating systems, be they first order
> >>>>> software or
> >>>>> second order virtual hardware or still only software, 100%
> >>>>> dependent
> >>>>> on the physical resources. It is generators burning diesel fuel
> >>>>> fifty
> >>>>> miles away that literally pushes the entire computation - not
> >>>>> arithmetic.
> >>>> At first sight.
> >>> What happens at second sight?
> >> You realize that this might be the other way round. It is in the comp
> >> theory. Cf UDA.
> > What does it mean to be the other way around? That power companies are
> > dependent on data centers?
> Not locally, but, roughly speaking, yes. In the global big picture. I
> know it is amazing.

Amazingly inverted maybe. Since power companies existed before data
centers, it doesn't make much sense, and further cements the picture I
have of comp as the naked emperor.

> >>>>> Arithmetic has 0% independence of physical systems *as a
> >>>>> whole* even though computations can be understood *figuratively*
> >>>>> as
> >>>>> being independent of any particular physical structure.
> >>>> Why figuratively? The computable functions from N to N have been
> >>>> discovered in math. It happens that we are surrounded by local
> >>>> physical approximation of universal system, from gas in complex
> >>>> volume, to bacteria genome, subset of human languages, brains,
> >>>> higher
> >>>> animals and man made computers.
> >>>> You can postulate or assume some universal numbers, and say "that's
> >>>> the ultimate local universal number", but comp predict that any
> >>>> named
> >>>> ultimate local universal numbers hides the "real" one. With comp
> >>>> the
> >>>> real "one" has no name.
> >>> Maybe it has no name because there's nothing there?
> >>>> or by "physical" you mean something more vague, and mixing the 3p
> >>>> and
> >>>> 1p, and then, I might interpret your intuition in some perplexities
> >>>> of
> >>>> the LUMs.
> >>> Physical can only be contemplated in these poetic terms because we
> >>> have the luxury of being protected from physicality by an advanced
> >>> civilization. Survival of the body and the world of the body is
> >>> physical. It doesn't need to be an absolute universal of all
> >>> possible
> >>> experiences, but it is a universal of our conscious waking
> >>> experience.
> >> I am waiting for a theory. I have no clue what you mean by
> >> "physical",
> >> "body" etc.
> > You are overthinking it. I mean what every English speaking person on
> > Earth means when they say "physical" and "body".
> You are naive. Anyone digging on those matter enters into a labyrinth
> of difficulties.

I don't, because I see the labyrinth as naive. I take the figurative
literally and the literal figuratively, then it all makes sense.

>That's why science and philosophy exist. You are not
> defending a new theory, you just propose the usual Aristotelian
> metaphysics, with a new unintelligible rick to not evacuate
> consciousness. But you are coherent, to keep such Aristotelianism you
> have to abandon comp indeed (by UDA). It makes sad that you are not
> willing to do the work for making your "theory" more precise.

I'm not opposed to making it more precise, but it may be precise
enough as it is, given that what is says is that half of the universe
is an imprecise 'seems like'.

> > By splitting
> > vernacular terms into infinities of linguistic formalism, you tip the
> > scales to prejudice theory over practice.
> That would be the case if I was a sort of comp practitioners, but I am
> a theoretician.

Why would a theoretician not want to privilege theory?

> > It's not necessary and adds
> > nothing.
> It makes comp refutable.

Or maybe it gives an illusion of refutability to comp?

> >>>>> All computation can be impacted by changes to it's physical
> >>>>> underpinning. Devices which are damaged or have low power
> >>>>> supply, or
> >>>>> brains which have physiological irregularities produce changes to
> >>>>> their phenomenology independent of program logic. The physical
> >>>>> topology, the materials and events that effect them can drive
> >>>>> phenomenology as well.
> >>>> Obviously assuming comp. We have to bet on locally stable universal
> >>>> number to say "yes" to a doctor.
> >>>> The physical is not denied. On the contrary it is justified on a
> >>>> conceptually deeper ground.
> >>> That's the problem. It is presumed that the physical needs our
> >>> theoretical justification while hiding the fact that it is the
> >>> theoretical justification itself that is more in need of tethering
> >>> to
> >>> the physical.
> >> You confuse level of explanation. You could say that we cannot
> >> explain
> >> how a chalkboard works because we need it to write the explanation on
> >> the board.
> > I'm not confused at all. A chalkboard 'works' in a lot of ways besides
> > writing explanations, but no explanation has ever existed which was
> > not associated with some physical body's activity.
> You are confusing levels again and again.

You are confusing my clarity with confusion again and again.

>the proof of the
> irrationality of sqrt(2) is not associated with any physical activity,

Yes, it is associated with human neurological process. It is easily
derailed by fatigue, inebriation, mathematical illiteracy due to
organic deficiencies and malnutrition, etc. The proof is not a proof
unless something understands what is being proved and why it should
care. Sense and motive.

> and that fact is independent of the fact that an explanation of this
> from a human to another human require some physical activity, but not
> at the relevant level.

The levels of relevance are not independent. It is all one thing:
sensorimotive electromagnetism. It only seems objectively true to us
because it is a very low level sense which we share with physical
objects (counting arises from our motive to control what is outside of
us). There is no disembodied arithmetic truth, it is the truth of
bodies and space, not subjects and experience.

> That is a constant error you are doing all the time, and by making
> more precise your theory, you will see this by yourself.

There is no error, I promise you. The appeal to more 'precision' is a
demand for more obedience to the axioms of comp.

> >>>> You cannot invoke your own understanding. That's an argument per
> >>>> authority (it proves nothing and augment the plausibility that you
> >>>> are
> >>>> crackpot in the interlocutor ear).
> >>> It's not an argument from authority, it's an argument from sense.
> >> An argument cannot refer to senses.
> > All arguments refer only to senses.
> Not at all. An argument is valid or not independently of sense

Valid to whom? For what purpose?

> or even
> interpretation of the formula in the argument. That's what logic is
> all about. You are doing some confusion of level again.

It's an accusation that doesn't mean anything to me, because I know
that you are either not understanding my argument or are in denial
about it.

> >>> Just
> >>> as your theory is contingent upon the acceptance of primitive
> >>> arithmetic truth, my hypothesis comes out of a sense primitive. In
> >>> order to understand the cosmos as a whole, including subjectivity,
> >>> we
> >>> must invoke our own understanding or mechanism will mislead us into
> >>> disproving ourselves. Sense is the price of admission to the real
> >>> world.
> >> Define cosmos, define sense. Only a wrong understanding of mechanism
> >> can mislead us.
> > Eliciting definition-fetching is a passive aggressive tactic. The
> > common usage definitions of cosmos and sense will suffice.
> Precisely not around the comp context.

That's how comp is used to cheat common sense.

> >>>>> It will
> >>>>> only change according to what and how it's script allows it to
> >>>>> change.
> >>>> The "allowing" is a universal machine dependent notion, and they
> >>>> are
> >>>> many.
> >>> But what is allowed can never exceed the range of possibilities of
> >>> the
> >>> script. Living organisms seem to be able to do that.
> >> There are no evidence for that.
> > We are the evidence of that.
> Humans can change the physical laws?

Is there a physical law that says humans should be able to leave the
planet and go to the Moon?

> >> We cannot change the physical laws,
> >> which are deterministic in all physical theories (except QM+collapse,
> >> which is not really a theory).
> > We don't need to change physical laws, we transcend them with
> > psychological non-laws.
> I see words only.

Thinking, feeling, imagining.. these give us the power to transcend
physical laws in the context of our subjectivity.

> >>>>> When you talk with them, do they answer the same way to the same
> >>>>> question every time?
> >>>> The conversation is made in Platonia, and is not entangled to our
> >>>> history, except for period where I implement it on some machines.
> >>>> Even
> >>>> in that case, they didn't dispose on short and long term memories,
> >>>> except for their intrinsic basic arithmetical experiences (which
> >>>> bifurcate up to you and me).
> >>> I can't really interpret that in any way other than an evasion of
> >>> the
> >>> question. You say there have been public dialogs at various times. I
> >>> asked if the answers are the same every time. You answered in a way
> >>> that sounds like 'talking to machines isn't anything like talking
> >>> and
> >>> it doesn't occur in time, but then somehow they become us and then
> >>> talking becomes talking.'
> >> They become us when entangled in the long and deep computations
> >> (which
> >> belongs to arithmetic).
> > sigh
> That's not an argument either.

My argument becomes you when entangled in the long and deep
computations which belongs to arithmetic. (Doesn't everything become
everything that way?)

> >>>>> that all such machines remain silent
> >>>>> on all of these questions every time tells me that they clearly
> >>>>> possess no awareness.
> >>>> You have frightening telepathic power.
> >>> It's not telepathy, it's first hand knowledge that awareness entails
> >>> natural variation in response. You cannot ask any question of any
> >>> person over and over and expect to get the same response every time
> >>> for every person.
> >> Because they have a good handling on short and among term memories.
> >> The machine I interview are virgin of any sustained experience
> >> related
> >> to our environment. Your question just don't apply to them.
> > How convenient.
> Nor this.

Naked evasion requires no argument.

> >>> That's because awareness is not mechanical.
> >> It is not entirely mechanical, but that is a theorem in the comp
> >> theory. Not an argument against mechanism.
> > Define mechanism, theorem, argument...
> Read my posts or papers. Help yourself with standard introduction to
> logic.
> >>> That's
> >>> what makes a machine a machine, a lack of capacity to transcend
> >>> recursive behavior or deviate from universal behavior.
> >> They don't lack that capacity, at their own high level.
> > That seems entirely theoretical at this point.
> Comp is a theory. That's the point.

So you are really saying that there is a theory that they don't lack
that capacity, not that the theory is correct. I can't argue with
that...yes there is a theory.

> >> They lack that
> >> capacity on their lower levels, and below. So do we, very
> >> plausibly. I
> >> cannot change the local laws of physics.
> >>>> Because I limit myself to ideally self-referentially correct
> >>>> machine.
> >>>> They already know that it is insane to let the secret of their
> >>>> identity slip.
> >>> So it's impossible for a machine to go insane? Seems like another
> >>> fundamental difference between minds and machines.
> >> On the contrary all sane machine can know that they can become
> >> insane,
> >> and even that they cannot know if they are sane or not.
> >> Of course any self-referentially correct entity, be it man or
> >> machine,
> >> is sane (by definition).
> > If it's possible for a machine to go insane but not possible to give
> > up their mysteries under questioning through that insanity, that puts
> > an arbitrary limit on insanity.
> Because I interview sane machines. So that remark is trivial.

There you go putting an arbitrary limit on insanity. If sane machines
can't go insane then you are postulating a primitive sanity dualism,
one which is not borne out in human machines.

> > Humans don't have any kind of limit
> > like that.
> because they fall, like most machine, into insanity. But the goal is
> to find an explanation of the correct laws of physics, and in that
> case it is better to interview simple correct machines.

Then you can only find the answers that you already agree with and
erroneously presume the rest is disposable.

> > They can answer any question they want, any way they want,
> > sane or insane. If there is any limitation at all for machines, then
> > they can never have fully human consciousness.
> Now I understand how you function. You can indeed answer all
> questions ...
> >>>> Not at all. When you ask them why they remain silent on some
> >>>> question,
> >>>> they can find answer and provide (theological) theories/hypothesis.
> >>> For example?
> >> Question: <>t ?   (= ~[] f ? = Are you consistent. = "Will you prove
> >> bulshit?")
> >> Answer: <none> (= the machine remains silent)
> >> But later the machine asserts  <> t -> ~[] <> t   (If I am consistent
> >> I will never tell you so).
> >> Note that <> t, [] f are used here as abbreviation of purely
> >> arithmetical propositions, and I interview any sound (and rich
> >> enough)
> >> theorem prover of arithmetical proposition.
> > I think all that tells you is about how logic works. If there were any
> > awareness at all there, there would be variation in the answers
> > locally from machine to machine. It can't have a personality if all of
> > them tell you that they won't tell you if they are consistent.
> Such difference are acquired in contextual deep computation. I
> interview baby machines.

Babies have personalities too. Machines don't (which is why we need to
dress them up with 'skins', GUIs and voices to tolerate their
monotonous automatism).

> >>>>> What about them makes them perceptible as opposed to
> >>>>> computational?
> >>>> But they are perceptible, if the theory is correct.
> >>> Only because deciding that they are perceptible is the only way to
> >>> preserve the possibility that the theory could be correct.
> >> Not just that. They verifies the usual property of qualia. (Having
> >> qualitative attributes which are  non communicable in a 3p-way,
> >> obeying already given axiomatic for qualia, etc).
> > You don't need to have qualia to have a property of 3p non
> > communicability.
> There are many non communicable 3p things indeed. I never said that
> they are all qualia. Only the one which verify other axioms, and
> appears related to truth. Z* minus Z is non communicable, but is not
> qualia.

That definition conflates qualia with representation though, which
misrepresents qualia completely. Blue is a presentation in it's own
right, not a quantitative placeholder for luminosity vectors. I can
see or imagine blue without any verification of axioms. I can conjure
it directly in my mind's eye at any moment.

> >>>> I didn't say that. You confuse level. When you say that sense and
> >>>> matter are self-explanatory, you just make no sense at all.
> >>> You're overthinking it. Sense is the ability to detect and
> >>> incorporate
> >>> what is detected into a larger coherence.
> >> That is a not to bad 3p-definition of sense. Note that machine have
> >> that ability, although they have to assume locally the larger
> >> coherence, and bet on some truth, and so they have to be a bit
> >> mystical (conscious) for this. But they are indeed. Note that this
> >> implicit inference allows us to connect the 1p-sense to the 3p-notion
> >> that you describe.
> > I think that the 1p-sense that the machine has is unrelated to the 3p-
> > mechanism.
> It is related to an infinity of 3p local representations.

What makes it anything other than that?

> > The real 1p- sense of any given machine reflects the
> > experience of the substrate,
> That makes anything more hard to understand.

I think it makes it easier because you understand that you can't
understand. It frees you up to understand how to get out of it what
you want.

> > not the human code riding on top of that.
> > The 1p we imagine behind the function of the program is 100%
> > projection.
> Not sure what you mean. Seems quite solipsistic to me.

I mean that it's no different from a puppet or a cartoon. We can
project a figurative personality on it but it's pure projection.

> >>>> How? Given that sense are primitive, which makes no sense.
> >>> If sense is primitive, then it makes sense by definition.
> >> So the ability to detect and incorporate what is detected into a
> >> larger coherence is a primitive operation?
> >> That seems senseless to me.
> > Why? Since arithmetic truth requires detection
> A new axioms, and what could that mean? I suspect confusion of level
> again.

Why am I put on the defensive for exposing the metaphysical
assumptions of comp? Since we cannot detect anything without detecting
it, then we cannot assume that any truth can exist outside of

> > and integrative
> > coherence, it cannot be as primitive as sense. Nothing more primitive
> > than sense can make sense by definition, so it cannot be detected or
> > integrated. This is what I'm telling you - sense is *the* primitive of
> > the cosmos.
> But you don't succeed in making sense for that. Except by constant
> allusion to your experience. But this does not work, because machines
> do the same ... until they realize exactly this.
> It is not a proof that comp is true, but an argument showing the non
> validity of your refutation of comp.

Sense is constant allusion to experience. I make sense by
demonstrating how sense is made. Pretend I am a machine you are
interviewing. Then maybe it will make more sense to you.

> >>>> A machine can say "17 is prime".
> >>> Can it? Or do we have to define what prime is for it in advance?
> >>> Most
> >>> machines don't know what 17 or prime is.
> >> Same for man. Of course we have to define the object we talk about if
> >> we want argue for or against their existence. This does not
> >> distinguish machine and man, unless you endow man with magical
> >> abilities.
> > Is the ability to participate in the world without having to define it
> > arithmetically a magical ability?
> No. It is natural for all machine. All correct machine have
> difficulties to believe in comp. It is necessarily counter-intuitive.

What machine does not define its world arithmetically?

> >> I took it here that prime (17) is something like (~(x = 1) and ((y
> >> divides x) -> ((x = 1) or (x = 17))))
> >> (y divides x) is supposed to be an abbreviation of Ez (yz = x).
> >>>> It also means that machine can justify it by the +
> >>>> and * laws.
> >>>> Ideally correct machine cannot say, in general  "True('17 is
> >>>> prime')".
> >>>> They can refer to a reality as such. they are modest.
> >>> It makes the entire universe into a uniform meaningless exercise of
> >>> self reference.
> >> Shakespeare said so. And then what? Science is not wishful thinking.
> >> To be sure, what you say does not follow, given that the self-
> >> reference and contexts provides the 1p and 3p sense (in comp +
> >> classical theory of knowledge).
> >>> That doesn't even make sense. Any scientific truth can be
> >>> expressed in
> >>> a poetic form. Genres aren't real.
> >> There is no scientific truth. There is only scientific beliefs.
> >> "scientific truth" is a term used by journalist in bad popular
> >> journal. Or by old scientists having brain problems, or by
> >> epistemologists working at a higher non assertive level. In science
> >> we
> >> never use the word truth, nor should we do in religion, except when
> >> it
> >> is the subject matter, but again, we will not pretend that we are
> >> true, or that we propose scientific truth. Science is only beliefs,
> >> even when true (by chance, for example).
> > I'm ok with that, but even more reason to say that scientific beliefs
> > can be expressed in a poetic form.
> It can, and if it don't refer to assertive truth, it can even be both
> poetical and scientific. My point is that we don't pretend a truth in
> science. Only hypothesis and arguments whose verifiability is quasi-
> mechanical.

That is indeed appropriate for the science of the Western empirical
tradition. That tradition came out of Hermetic/alchemical forms of
epistemology. The frontier of science now, I think weaves the truths
of both approaches in order to study the full spectrum of
phenomenology and cosmology.

> > Or are you saying there are no
> > truths or that arithmetic is not poetic?
> Truth exist, but we don't pretend to know them when we do science.

That's fine, but we aren't that. We can no longer afford to pretend
that we aren't a form of truth that exists (or existence that is true)
for the sake of a science that is designed specifically to exclude our

> >>>>> That's only half of reality, but it is only through that reality
> >>>>> that
> >>>>> we can know any part of the other half.
> >>>> Argument?
> >>> The argument is that all truths beyond our senses are known to us
> >>> only
> >>> through our senses. What is the argument against it?
> >> I asked an argument for the quantity 1/2.
> > not sure what you mean. you want me to argue with myself about this?
> I was ciricizing your idea that the universe split in halve. Sense and
> matter.

It's really Experience and matter. Both of them are sense. Sense is
the split and the split is sense.

> With comp it is more like sense is 99,999%, matter is the tip
> of the iceberg, and primitive matter is a myth. The importance of
> sense might explain why some machine want it primitive, at first sight.
> >>>> No problem with that. I wish only you try harder.
> >>> Try harder to be impartial, or try harder to stack the deck in favor
> >>> of comp?
> >> Try harder to refute comp.
> > Ohh. Comp can only be refuted outside of comp. It's a closed loop of
> > tautology.
> Comp, like any theory bearing on reality can only be refuted by
> looking at that reality.

Comp refuses to look at the reality though. It looks at a straw man of
reality in which comp is elevated to the level of the modeled reality.

> >>> No, a machine cannot think because the only reason that we might be
> >>> tempted to think it could can be explained through that example. You
> >>> can make the piano more sensitive to bumps, and you can make the
> >>> bumps
> >>> more sophisticated to articulate the piano's mechanism better, but
> >>> neither the truck, the piano, nor the bumps can play the piano, they
> >>> are all parts of a recording made by humans trying to imitate their
> >>> own playing of the piano.
> >> You beg the question.
> > I'm showing that it's absurd. I guess if you actually believe that the
> > truck is a pianist, you certainly are entitled to that view - and it's
> > a logical view for figurative purposes, but if we apply it literally
> > in public, it would be considered delusional, and not for no reason.
> Todays truck are not person.

It's not clear where the line is between a sophisticated truck and a
simple person. Comp seems to say there is no line, therefore all
trucks are simple persons.

> >>>> The logical sense of coherence is in the "Dt", the tangible
> >>>> detection
> >>>> is in "p", and the machine's body and relative belief is in "Bp".
> >>>> The
> >>>> Bp & Dt & p is a variant of the self-reference logic. The non first
> >>>> person communicable part of the logic of that variant (named X1* in
> >>>> AUDA) is the qualia logic, or the sensible matter hypostasis. The
> >>>> bootstrap law is given by p -> [] <> p, with []p defined roughly by
> >>>> Bp
> >>>> & Dt & p. Bp is Gödel probability applied on the arithmetical
> >>>> sigma_1
> >>>> sentence p. Dp is ~B~p. <> p is ~ [] ~, and t is "1=1".
> >>> The existence of variables like Dt and p already presupposes sense
> >>> and
> >>> detection of visual symbols.
> >> It does not. But it implies them.
> > What are they without them?
> They are like the natural numbers without the number 13. Nonsense.

That's what I'm saying. Visual symbols without vision and symbolic
thought are nonsense.

> >>>>> It sounds like bones are ontologically less important than brains?
> >>>> I don't see why. Brains are also locally stable patterns obtained
> >>>> by a
> >>>> relative statistics on
> >>>> infinities of (infinite) computations.
> >>> So why are brains more associated with human consciousness than
> >>> bones?
> >> Because brains seems to be needed for a person to manifest his
> >> consciousness relatively to another, one; where bones seem to be
> >> needed only to stand up and make sports.
> > That's begging the qwesch. I'm asking why brains over bones?
> Because brains cells got the cable. Not bones cells.

I know, but why would they in 100% of the cases? Why is no creature
born with an intelligent exoskeleton and an inert space filling organ
for a brain?

> >>>> In string theory, you can compute the mass of the photon. A long
> >>>> computation (from precise general axiom) leads spectacularly to a
> >>>> sum
> >>>> of two terms which when evaluated gives (1+2+3+4+ ...) + 1/12.
> >>>> Of course this only shows that IF string theory is correct then the
> >>>> mass of the photon is zero (because it is obvious that
> >>>> 1+2+3+4+5+ ...
> >>>> = minus 1/12, isn't it?).
> >>> I don't understand the minus 1/12 part.
> >> It is not simple to understand. The shorter explanation is that
> >> (1+2+3+...) = Riemann-Zeta(-1), which gives, on the complex plane the
> >> value -1/12 in its provable unique analytical extension.
> >> Riemann-zeta(z) is the analytical extension of Euler sum (1 + 1/2^z +
> >> 1/3^z + ...). By a beautiful formula of Euler, the Riemann-zeta
> >> functions provides crucial information on the distribution of the
> >> prime number.
> > I'll take your word for it. You know I don't speak math. At least if
> > you spoke French I could try to pick out some words here and there.
> >>>>>> Who said this? The pope? The Ayatollah? The government?
> >>>>> It's not an authoritative proposition, it's a voluntary
> >>>>> interpretation
> >>>>> (which, if I'm right, is what half of the universe is anyhow).
> >>>> You dream aloud.
> >>> Isn't that what you say numbers do also?
> >> OK. But with the number I limit myself to those simple one who are
> >> easily shown to be self-referentially correct.
> >>> We are sharply divided in the US in our opinions about that. Are
> >>> universal numbers less conflicted about when life or consciousness
> >>> begins and ends? Are they Pro-Life or Pro-Choice?
> >> I intuit that the correct LUMs are pro-choice, but the LUMs in
> >> general
> >> can harbor any idea.
> > Except the idea that they can reveal their deep secrets.
> No one can, by definition of deep secret.

There is no such thing in consciousness. Only a machine is capable of
keeping a deep secret.

> >>>> But here all the problem is in linking the easy 1p and the less
> >>>> easy 3p.
> >>> It's not a problem when you realize they are linked in only in their
> >>> anomalous symmetry with each other.
> >> That does not help.
> > I don't quite understand why not.
> Because I don't see the symmetry. You never show it.

You don't see a symmetry between public and private? objects across
space and subjects through time? matter and energy? generic and
proprietary? significance and entropy?

> What is then an
> anomalous symmetry.

An anomalous symmetry is a way of describing the relation of something
like the content of perceptions with the neurological activity of the
nervous system. They are symmetrical in that perceptions present a
particular moment in the life of a person as an event in a story,
while the neurological activity presents the same moment in exactly
the opposite way (as a many synchronized but mechanical (non-
experienced) events across the brain). They are anomalous in that the
narrative of the biography cannot be deduced by analyzing the
mechanics of the brain alone, and the mechanics of the brain cannot be
deduced by experiencing them from the inside. It's an anomalous

>You seems to escape forwards by adding new
> vocabulary, when you have not yet explain the one you are already using.
> I might become tired to try to help you making sense for the others.

The words aren't important. They are interchangeable pointers to the
underlying concepts.

> >>>> We don't have to include it. Brains are the simplifier tools.
> >>> No, brains are just the meaty end of a simplifier tool which is
> >>> semantic and experiential.
> >> Such brain does not exist in the comp theory. yet we can explain why
> >> person will correctly believe in the observation of such brain, in
> >> the
> >> epistemology.
> > I can explain why a person will correctly believe in the observation
> > of comp too, even though the universe of comp is not real.
> No machine can correctly believe she is some precise machine, and it
> is hard for them to make the leap of faith.

How do you know this?

> >>>>>> Study the work of other people. Address their problem, with or
> >>>>>> without
> >>>>>> your "theory" as training.
> >>>>> That would be worthwhile I'm sure, but unfortunately it would be
> >>>>> too
> >>>>> much of a distraction.
> >>>> OK. That why I am not good in saucer. All those guy running after
> >>>> the
> >>>> ball distract me too much. But then I don't pretend marking the
> >>>> goal.
> >>> This isn't a game though, it's the truth of reality.
> >> If you don't study the work of others, you will not succeed in making
> >> your point "really" accessible to others.
> > It already is accessible to some others, I don't think that anyone can
> > succeed in making any point to all others.
> To all those interested. Yes that is possible, even if that can take
> time for fashion and human reasons. That's the point of science and
> rationalism.

That may be the point, but that doesn't mean it succeeds.

> >>> Why not? What about numbers suggests dreaming?
> >> The fact that they organize themselves, by just obeying their + and *
> >> laws, into computations.
> > That can happen through our pattern recognition. It's universal
> > apophenia.
> Elementary arithmetic can explain how pattern recognition works.

Only if you recognize the patterns of elementary arithmetic first.
Sense is always primary.

> You
> don't need the concept of pattern recognition to explain elementary
> arithmetic.

Not the concept of pattern recognition, the reality of pattern
recognition. You need that to have any concept at all.

>Yes human need pattern recognition to communicate, but
> that is at another level.

What level can be said to make sense without pattern recognition? They
are the same thing.

> >> The, the fact that comp implies a mind-comp
> >> supervenience thesis.
> > It doesn't say anything dreamy to me.
> ?

I don't see the dream connection.

> >>> Incompleteness says the opposite to me that it does to you. I see
> >>> Gödel showing the limitation of arithmetic truth in the face of
> >>> organic sense, not the omnipotence of it.
> >> Gödel's result show on the contrary that arithmetical truth is beyond
> >> the grasp of any machine (and of any super-machine, super-super-
> >> machine, etc.).
> > That only means that it cannot be reconciled with our local reality,
> > not that reality emerges from it.
> Study UDA. Learn to reason in the comp theory, before trying to refute
> it.

That's the same as the fundamentalist who says to read the Bible
before you refute it.

> > Fantasy is the same way. It too is
> > beyond the grasp of all real systems and arithmetic too.
> >>>> But it has, in the relevant sense, once you admit there is a
> >>>> substitution level.
> >>> Substitution level is an indexical of perception.
> >> If this is true, then comp would lead to solipsism.
> > No because there is no self there to anchor a solipsistic orientation.
> > It leads to vacuous nihilism.
> Self exists in comp by the Kleene second recursion theorem. I can
> explain if you want, but your tone makes me think that whatever
> explanations are provided you will refute it by confusing some levels,
> or by referring to your experience.

Only if you can explain Kleene without using any variables at all.
Then sure, I'm interested in understanding what it's about.

> >> But the evidences
> >> are that first person plural makes sense, in the comp theory, and in
> >> "reality" (thanks to the MWI which multiplies collection of
> >> machines).
> > There is no perception going on, so substitution level is fixed
> > programmatically. Come to the light side Bruno...
> You really talk like a priest.

I was going for Jedi.

> >>>> You are saying that you are superior, in some sense, to other
> >>>> entities. You deny a soul to a class of individuals, by invoking
> >>>> fuzzy
> >>>> rhetorical trick reifying your own experience.
> >>> That is precisely why I am superior to a machine, because I can do
> >>> that. A machine can't. It needs a reason to presume it's own
> >>> existence. I don't. I can assert my primordial authority because I
> >>> feel and know, and understand that I can. I don't need permission
> >>> from
> >>> a program or a script or a rule book. I embody the theory. We don't
> >>> view the universe as impartial voyeurs, we are fully immersed within
> >>> it. We define it and it defines us.
> >> What makes you sure that some machine cannot do that? This is still
> >> an
> >> example of your persistent question begging.
> > If it could then I would not call it a machine.
> ?

A machine that can exercise a personal preference over it's program I
would not call a machine.

> > Since I know that I
> > can do this, but I naturally define machines as not being able to do
> > that, I would need to see or understand something that convinces me
> > otherwise.
> You really don't make give them any chance.
> You continue to reiterate the only axiom of yours which makes sense:
> comp is false. That's possible, but I don't hear any genuine argument.

Comp being false is only an incidental consequence of all forms of
epistemological supremacy outside of sense itself being false in the
sense of not being absolutely and universally true. Sense is the only
bridge between quantity and quality. All other theories are constructs
within sense channels, and as such are true in some sense, false in
some sense, true and false in some sense, neither true and false in
some sense. Sense itself however, is that very symmetry of truth
modulation. The primordial possibility of perspective and distinction
which is simultaneously unified and divided.

> >>>> You confuse the script and the show, for the numbers. The universal
> >>>> numbers plays the shows of the numbers.
> >>> Why would they play anything? For what audience?
> >> For the local UMs in their neighborhood, or for themselves.
> > Why do they need a show?
> They don't need it, but they take the habits and usually don't see the
> big picture.


> > Isn't the arithmetic truth enough?
> It is. That one is responsible for the many-shows, in the comp theory.

The many totally unneeded, but senselessly habitual shows?

> >>>> By having some disease in some part of the cortex inside. The
> >>>> modalities can be stopped to be handled correctly, or self-
> >>>> referentially correctly.
> >>> Why wouldn't the machine just route around the disease? If color is
> >>> everywhere inside, I don't see why color blindness should be
> >>> localized
> >>> to some part of anything.
> >> That's a problem for your theory.
> > It's explained in my theory as large organisms employ a division of
> > labor among sense organs.
> Which makes substrate sense even more weird.

Why? Different variations on the substrate specialize in amplifying
different senses and motives up to the top level organism.

> >>>>> That sounds to me like the song does the singing and songwriting.
> >>>> Yes. That's the magic of the universal numbers. They can do both.
> >>> Then the singers and songwriters are innocent bystanders?
> >> No. They are UMs too.
> > That seems redundant.
> ?
> Arithmetical truth and MW are redundant indeed. By they are not the
> explanation, they are what we try to explain. Sands on the beach are
> redundant too.


> >>>> I don't assume theory as primitive. Only numbers and +, *.
> >>>> The existence of theories and machines is a theorem in N,+, *.
> >>> But +, * is already a theory of what can be done with numbers.
> >> No. They are symbol used in a theory.
> > If they don't correspond to something they can't be symbols. A theory
> > is required for their interpretation.
> That's what I was saying.

You were saying + and * aren't a theory. I'm saying that symbols and
theories are part of the same thing, so that it's disingenuous to say
that + and * are primitive without admitting that they supervene on an
arithmetic theory. Therefore you do assume that theory is primitive.
You can't create theory-ness from + and * alone, because they don't
mean anything without theory in the first place.

> >> The theory assumes some formula,
> >> among which you will not find a formula assuming the existence of a
> >> theory. You are confusing level of explanation. You could say that
> >> the
> >> big-bang theory assumes the existence of an alphabet, without which
> >> we
> >> cannot express "big-bang".
> > The theory and formula are parts of the same thing. From an absolute
> > perspective you cannot have a formula without a theory that it is part
> > of.
> That might be true or false, relevant or not, but is not precise enough.

What determines whether a proposition is precise enough?

> >>>>> Which would make sense if we lived in a
> >>>>> world of disembodied theories settling into matter but it seems
> >>>>> obvious that he opposite is the case.
> >>>> Because we are deluded by the fact that we participate to the drama
> >>>> from inside.
> >>> Why does that prevent us from encountering disembodied theories from
> >>> entering our drama?
> >> Nothing. The question is what do you mean by matter, and please don't
> >> refer to physical notion, because this would beg the question.
> > We should see formulas written in the sky then sometimes.
> ?

If nothing prevents theories from existing independently of physical
form, then we should be able to observe them appearing in space or
under the couch or online. The internet should be haunted by
innumerable autonomous entities that appear and disappear at will.
It's not though. No sentient activity on the internet has been
observed not attributable to human efforts.

> >>>> Arithmetic emulate all histories.
> >>> Only if you believe in emulation.
> >> Emulations existence is a theorem in arithmetic (even without comp).
> > That is why arithmetic separates from reality. It assumes generic
> > interchangeability and discards the primacy of 1p unrepeatability.
> Not at all. It can explain that, by indexicalness + deep linear
> histories.

Indexicalness + deep linear histories are two key factors for
subjectivity in multisense realism as well - only I call them
orientation + cumulative entanglement. + and * can be extracted from
significance and perceptual inertia but my terms are whole grain, full
spectrum concepts, while comp's have all of the important nutrients
refined out of them.

> >>>> Comp is not a truth. It is not an obligation either. But it is a
> >>>> right.
> >>> Sure, it's a right. So are the other alternatives.
> >> Sure. But this does not make your argument against comp more valid.
> > I'm only arguing that comp is no more or less valid than any other
> > belief system, it just has different strengths and weaknesses. My
> > argument is for a meta theory.
> Comp is a meta-theory. I am still waiting your theory (as opposed to
> your personal feelings).

Mine is a meta-meta theory. You can read my theory anytime you like:

> >> you should study computer science. It could help you to understand
> >> that comp is hard to be refuted.
> > It's impossible to refute, because it defines how it can and cannot be
> > refuted in it's own narrow terms which disqualify subjective authority
> > a priori.
> No. it is the most refutable of all theory given that it describes, or
> not, physics.

I can describe physics or not too. Why does that make me refutable?

> It does not disqualify subjective authority for the 1p, on the
> contrary it relies on it.
> Of course, like everywhere in science, it disqualify the 1p discourse
> when used in the theory (not when tackle by the theory)

That's why it is ultimately false. 1p is primary in reality.

> If not is is called literature, and belongs to another genere (novel,
> fiction, phenonomenology, etc.).

Then the cosmos belongs to that genre as well.

> >> UDA itself comes from an attempt to
> >> refute it, but computer science already explains how machines
> >> themselves can debunk the anti-comp arguments.
> >> Judson Webb has already well understood the problem. Either your
> >> argument if fuzzy and proves nothing, or your argument is precise and
> >> technical, and machines can found them for themselves leading to
> >> prove
> >> correctly that their first person is not a machine (which is true) or
> >> that their body are not Turing machine emulable (which is true), or
> >> that comp is false (which makes no genuine sense when proved by a
> >> correct machine).
> >> I don't think I will comment paragraph where you refer to truth,
> >> reality, your personal understanding, nor will I comment paragraph
> >> which I have already answered, nor will I comment the begging
> >> question
> >> trick. So you have to work a bit harder.
> > I'm only doing this for your benefit and anyone else who might be
> > interested. I'm not working to convince you
> I can see that.
> > of something that I
> > already suspect you cannot be convinced of.
> That's prejudices on yourself, but they have some foundations: mainly
> that you seem not interested in studying the theory that you want to
> refute. This makes your point rather weak.

I don't feel that there is anything important that I'm missing. I get
the idea. It used to be my worldview. I only see now that the symmetry
of the entire collection of universal perspectives makes more sense
than any one of them. Any of them can make a strong point if you study
them. Any of them make the other points seem weak. That's how the
symmetry works. You focus on one thing by marginalizing the other


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