On 07 Feb 2012, at 00:23, Craig Weinberg wrote:
On Feb 6, 10:37 am, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
On 05 Feb 2012, at 20:10, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I'm not lowering subst level at all, I'm saying that subst level
is an
indexical.
?
That's what you aren't getting about my position. Substitution level
is not a scalar variable.
?
All of the quant descriptions in the universe
do not add up to a single experienced quality.
You don't know that. Is it an axiom?
I don't know it, but I clearly understand why it is the case.
That's not an argument.
Then you disqualify the possibility of understanding and force a 3p
supervenience to all 1p experiences.
I was saying, at the meta level, that you cannot refer to your own
understanding of your own "argument" to convey it.
Quantites are only
quantities.
No. All universal numbers can interpret a number as a function on
quantities, or as properties on quantities, which are not
quantities
themselves.
Then what are they?
Functions, relations, properties, modalities, qualities, etc.
Quantitative relations, quantitative properties, logical
(quantitative) modalities, quantitative qualities.
What are the quantities that you associate to modalities?
I take this as another axiom. You postulate the existence of
something
vague. I think that something like that might make sense perhaps,
but
as I see it it would be a consequence of the comp meta-axiom.
That just gives a name to comp's lack of explanatory power. I can
call
comp a consequence of the ecumenical meta-axiom.
comp *is* the meta-axiom. It is an axiom bearing on your own
consciousness property (of being invariant for some substitution at
some level).
Then I can call the ecumenical a meta-meta axiom.
Then you lost me, and it looks like you just want have an answer.
On the contrary. The semantics of machines explodes in the
infinities.
Explodes into what? What does it signify other than itself?
Explodes into the number of possible different interpretation of
itself, which might impact on different decisions and futures, from
the machine's point of view.
They all only signify different permutations of the emptiness of the
machine. It doesn't signify anything, it's syntax only.
It is typically not syntax. Semantics of even simple machine are given
by infinite objects.
It's circular reasoning to say that physical underpinnings have no
effect on our phenomenology when you are working from a theory
which
presupposes that phenomenology is detectable only by quantitative
measurement in the first place. In our actual experience, we know
that
in fact all phenomenological systems without exception exist as a
function of physical systems -
We don't know that.
Are you talking about ghosts or NDEs? Even so, those phenomena are
always experienced by a person with a body.
I was not talking on NDE, but on the fact that primitive matter does
not exist.
Primitive or not, all phenomenological systems that we have observed
are associated with persons or animals who have bodies.
But that's what comp can explain without assuming materially primitive
bodies.
And given that we don't know what materially primitive bodies can be,
comp solves a problem here.
Nor am I sure what it means exactly. Define "physical".
Phenomena whose properties include mass, density, volume and
interact
effectively with other phenomena bearing those properties.
Define mass, density, volume, and interaction.
I don't do definitions. The standard usage of these terms is adequate.
In fundamental inquiry, standard usage can't help. especially
discussing comp, given that the standard usage is based on billions
years of evolution and 1500 years of Aristotelianism.
Again, the standard usage might make sense if you were able to say
what you assume and what you derive.
Here, in AUDA terms, you might be confusing the "intelligible",
with
the "intelligible matter"
(Bp with Bp & Dt). [] p with [] p & <> t.
I'm really not confused at all. You keep accusing me of that but I'm
very clear on my distinctions.
You are not. And you are not well place to judge this.
You are saying that your opinions about me are facts.
I am saying that *anyone* who argue cannot refer to his own
understanding, or his own clarity.
You could as well say, like in the "hunting of the snark": "If you
were clever, and if I got the time, I could make it all clear to you,
but given that you are dumb, it is not worth the try". This is fun,
but not an argument.
Fortunately I
have other people who are familiar with my ideas who don't share your
facts.
This is not an argument. Many people have been convinced by fake
argument (on the jews, on cannabis, on terrorism, etc.). Humans are
terribly prone to believe what other people make them wanting to
believe.
virtual servers do not fly off into the
data center on their own virtual power grid - they are still
only a
complicated event of electrified semiconductors. Unplug the
hardware
node and all of the operating systems, be they first order
software or
second order virtual hardware or still only software, 100%
dependent
on the physical resources. It is generators burning diesel fuel
fifty
miles away that literally pushes the entire computation - not
arithmetic.
At first sight.
What happens at second sight?
You realize that this might be the other way round. It is in the comp
theory. Cf UDA.
What does it mean to be the other way around? That power companies are
dependent on data centers?
Not locally, but, roughly speaking, yes. In the global big picture. I
know it is amazing.
Arithmetic has 0% independence of physical systems *as a
whole* even though computations can be understood *figuratively*
as
being independent of any particular physical structure.
Why figuratively? The computable functions from N to N have been
discovered in math. It happens that we are surrounded by local
physical approximation of universal system, from gas in complex
volume, to bacteria genome, subset of human languages, brains,
higher
animals and man made computers.
You can postulate or assume some universal numbers, and say "that's
the ultimate local universal number", but comp predict that any
named
ultimate local universal numbers hides the "real" one. With comp
the
real "one" has no name.
Maybe it has no name because there's nothing there?
or by "physical" you mean something more vague, and mixing the 3p
and
1p, and then, I might interpret your intuition in some perplexities
of
the LUMs.
Physical can only be contemplated in these poetic terms because we
have the luxury of being protected from physicality by an advanced
civilization. Survival of the body and the world of the body is
physical. It doesn't need to be an absolute universal of all
possible
experiences, but it is a universal of our conscious waking
experience.
I am waiting for a theory. I have no clue what you mean by
"physical",
"body" etc.
You are overthinking it. I mean what every English speaking person on
Earth means when they say "physical" and "body".
You are naive. Anyone digging on those matter enters into a labyrinth
of difficulties. That's why science and philosophy exist. You are not
defending a new theory, you just propose the usual Aristotelian
metaphysics, with a new unintelligible rick to not evacuate
consciousness. But you are coherent, to keep such Aristotelianism you
have to abandon comp indeed (by UDA). It makes sad that you are not
willing to do the work for making your "theory" more precise.
By splitting
vernacular terms into infinities of linguistic formalism, you tip the
scales to prejudice theory over practice.
That would be the case if I was a sort of comp practitioners, but I am
a theoretician.
It's not necessary and adds
nothing.
It makes comp refutable.
All computation can be impacted by changes to it's physical
underpinning. Devices which are damaged or have low power
supply, or
brains which have physiological irregularities produce changes to
their phenomenology independent of program logic. The physical
topology, the materials and events that effect them can drive
phenomenology as well.
Obviously assuming comp. We have to bet on locally stable universal
number to say "yes" to a doctor.
The physical is not denied. On the contrary it is justified on a
conceptually deeper ground.
That's the problem. It is presumed that the physical needs our
theoretical justification while hiding the fact that it is the
theoretical justification itself that is more in need of tethering
to
the physical.
You confuse level of explanation. You could say that we cannot
explain
how a chalkboard works because we need it to write the explanation on
the board.
I'm not confused at all. A chalkboard 'works' in a lot of ways besides
writing explanations, but no explanation has ever existed which was
not associated with some physical body's activity.
You are confusing levels again and again. the proof of the
irrationality of sqrt(2) is not associated with any physical activity,
and that fact is independent of the fact that an explanation of this
from a human to another human require some physical activity, but not
at the relevant level.
That is a constant error you are doing all the time, and by making
more precise your theory, you will see this by yourself.
You cannot invoke your own understanding. That's an argument per
authority (it proves nothing and augment the plausibility that you
are
crackpot in the interlocutor ear).
It's not an argument from authority, it's an argument from sense.
An argument cannot refer to senses.
All arguments refer only to senses.
Not at all. An argument is valid or not independently of sense or even
interpretation of the formula in the argument. That's what logic is
all about. You are doing some confusion of level again.
Just
as your theory is contingent upon the acceptance of primitive
arithmetic truth, my hypothesis comes out of a sense primitive. In
order to understand the cosmos as a whole, including subjectivity,
we
must invoke our own understanding or mechanism will mislead us into
disproving ourselves. Sense is the price of admission to the real
world.
Define cosmos, define sense. Only a wrong understanding of mechanism
can mislead us.
Eliciting definition-fetching is a passive aggressive tactic. The
common usage definitions of cosmos and sense will suffice.
Precisely not around the comp context.
It will
only change according to what and how it's script allows it to
change.
The "allowing" is a universal machine dependent notion, and they
are
many.
But what is allowed can never exceed the range of possibilities of
the
script. Living organisms seem to be able to do that.
There are no evidence for that.
We are the evidence of that.
Humans can change the physical laws?
We cannot change the physical laws,
which are deterministic in all physical theories (except QM+collapse,
which is not really a theory).
We don't need to change physical laws, we transcend them with
psychological non-laws.
I see words only.
When you talk with them, do they answer the same way to the same
question every time?
The conversation is made in Platonia, and is not entangled to our
history, except for period where I implement it on some machines.
Even
in that case, they didn't dispose on short and long term memories,
except for their intrinsic basic arithmetical experiences (which
bifurcate up to you and me).
I can't really interpret that in any way other than an evasion of
the
question. You say there have been public dialogs at various times. I
asked if the answers are the same every time. You answered in a way
that sounds like 'talking to machines isn't anything like talking
and
it doesn't occur in time, but then somehow they become us and then
talking becomes talking.'
They become us when entangled in the long and deep computations
(which
belongs to arithmetic).
sigh
That's not an argument either.
that all such machines remain silent
on all of these questions every time tells me that they clearly
possess no awareness.
You have frightening telepathic power.
It's not telepathy, it's first hand knowledge that awareness entails
natural variation in response. You cannot ask any question of any
person over and over and expect to get the same response every time
for every person.
Because they have a good handling on short and among term memories.
The machine I interview are virgin of any sustained experience
related
to our environment. Your question just don't apply to them.
How convenient.
Nor this.
That's because awareness is not mechanical.
It is not entirely mechanical, but that is a theorem in the comp
theory. Not an argument against mechanism.
Define mechanism, theorem, argument...
Read my posts or papers. Help yourself with standard introduction to
logic.
That's
what makes a machine a machine, a lack of capacity to transcend
recursive behavior or deviate from universal behavior.
They don't lack that capacity, at their own high level.
That seems entirely theoretical at this point.
Comp is a theory. That's the point.
They lack that
capacity on their lower levels, and below. So do we, very
plausibly. I
cannot change the local laws of physics.
Because I limit myself to ideally self-referentially correct
machine.
They already know that it is insane to let the secret of their
identity slip.
So it's impossible for a machine to go insane? Seems like another
fundamental difference between minds and machines.
On the contrary all sane machine can know that they can become
insane,
and even that they cannot know if they are sane or not.
Of course any self-referentially correct entity, be it man or
machine,
is sane (by definition).
If it's possible for a machine to go insane but not possible to give
up their mysteries under questioning through that insanity, that puts
an arbitrary limit on insanity.
Because I interview sane machines. So that remark is trivial.
Humans don't have any kind of limit
like that.
because they fall, like most machine, into insanity. But the goal is
to find an explanation of the correct laws of physics, and in that
case it is better to interview simple correct machines.
They can answer any question they want, any way they want,
sane or insane. If there is any limitation at all for machines, then
they can never have fully human consciousness.
Now I understand how you function. You can indeed answer all
questions ...
Not at all. When you ask them why they remain silent on some
question,
they can find answer and provide (theological) theories/hypothesis.
For example?
Question: <>t ? (= ~[] f ? = Are you consistent. = "Will you prove
bulshit?")
Answer: <none> (= the machine remains silent)
But later the machine asserts <> t -> ~[] <> t (If I am consistent
I will never tell you so).
Note that <> t, [] f are used here as abbreviation of purely
arithmetical propositions, and I interview any sound (and rich
enough)
theorem prover of arithmetical proposition.
I think all that tells you is about how logic works. If there were any
awareness at all there, there would be variation in the answers
locally from machine to machine. It can't have a personality if all of
them tell you that they won't tell you if they are consistent.
Such difference are acquired in contextual deep computation. I
interview baby machines.
What about them makes them perceptible as opposed to
computational?
But they are perceptible, if the theory is correct.
Only because deciding that they are perceptible is the only way to
preserve the possibility that the theory could be correct.
Not just that. They verifies the usual property of qualia. (Having
qualitative attributes which are non communicable in a 3p-way,
obeying already given axiomatic for qualia, etc).
You don't need to have qualia to have a property of 3p non
communicability.
There are many non communicable 3p things indeed. I never said that
they are all qualia. Only the one which verify other axioms, and
appears related to truth. Z* minus Z is non communicable, but is not
qualia.
I didn't say that. You confuse level. When you say that sense and
matter are self-explanatory, you just make no sense at all.
You're overthinking it. Sense is the ability to detect and
incorporate
what is detected into a larger coherence.
That is a not to bad 3p-definition of sense. Note that machine have
that ability, although they have to assume locally the larger
coherence, and bet on some truth, and so they have to be a bit
mystical (conscious) for this. But they are indeed. Note that this
implicit inference allows us to connect the 1p-sense to the 3p-notion
that you describe.
I think that the 1p-sense that the machine has is unrelated to the 3p-
mechanism.
It is related to an infinity of 3p local representations.
The real 1p- sense of any given machine reflects the
experience of the substrate,
That makes anything more hard to understand.
not the human code riding on top of that.
The 1p we imagine behind the function of the program is 100%
projection.
Not sure what you mean. Seems quite solipsistic to me.
How? Given that sense are primitive, which makes no sense.
If sense is primitive, then it makes sense by definition.
So the ability to detect and incorporate what is detected into a
larger coherence is a primitive operation?
That seems senseless to me.
Why? Since arithmetic truth requires detection
A new axioms, and what could that mean? I suspect confusion of level
again.
and integrative
coherence, it cannot be as primitive as sense. Nothing more primitive
than sense can make sense by definition, so it cannot be detected or
integrated. This is what I'm telling you - sense is *the* primitive of
the cosmos.
But you don't succeed in making sense for that. Except by constant
allusion to your experience. But this does not work, because machines
do the same ... until they realize exactly this.
It is not a proof that comp is true, but an argument showing the non
validity of your refutation of comp.
A machine can say "17 is prime".
Can it? Or do we have to define what prime is for it in advance?
Most
machines don't know what 17 or prime is.
Same for man. Of course we have to define the object we talk about if
we want argue for or against their existence. This does not
distinguish machine and man, unless you endow man with magical
abilities.
Is the ability to participate in the world without having to define it
arithmetically a magical ability?
No. It is natural for all machine. All correct machine have
difficulties to believe in comp. It is necessarily counter-intuitive.
I took it here that prime (17) is something like (~(x = 1) and ((y
divides x) -> ((x = 1) or (x = 17))))
(y divides x) is supposed to be an abbreviation of Ez (yz = x).
It also means that machine can justify it by the +
and * laws.
Ideally correct machine cannot say, in general "True('17 is
prime')".
They can refer to a reality as such. they are modest.
It makes the entire universe into a uniform meaningless exercise of
self reference.
Shakespeare said so. And then what? Science is not wishful thinking.
To be sure, what you say does not follow, given that the self-
reference and contexts provides the 1p and 3p sense (in comp +
classical theory of knowledge).
That doesn't even make sense. Any scientific truth can be
expressed in
a poetic form. Genres aren't real.
There is no scientific truth. There is only scientific beliefs.
"scientific truth" is a term used by journalist in bad popular
journal. Or by old scientists having brain problems, or by
epistemologists working at a higher non assertive level. In science
we
never use the word truth, nor should we do in religion, except when
it
is the subject matter, but again, we will not pretend that we are
true, or that we propose scientific truth. Science is only beliefs,
even when true (by chance, for example).
I'm ok with that, but even more reason to say that scientific beliefs
can be expressed in a poetic form.
It can, and if it don't refer to assertive truth, it can even be both
poetical and scientific. My point is that we don't pretend a truth in
science. Only hypothesis and arguments whose verifiability is quasi-
mechanical.
Or are you saying there are no
truths or that arithmetic is not poetic?
Truth exist, but we don't pretend to know them when we do science.
That's only half of reality, but it is only through that reality
that
we can know any part of the other half.
Argument?
The argument is that all truths beyond our senses are known to us
only
through our senses. What is the argument against it?
I asked an argument for the quantity 1/2.
not sure what you mean. you want me to argue with myself about this?
I was ciricizing your idea that the universe split in halve. Sense and
matter. With comp it is more like sense is 99,999%, matter is the tip
of the iceberg, and primitive matter is a myth. The importance of
sense might explain why some machine want it primitive, at first sight.
No problem with that. I wish only you try harder.
Try harder to be impartial, or try harder to stack the deck in favor
of comp?
Try harder to refute comp.
Ohh. Comp can only be refuted outside of comp. It's a closed loop of
tautology.
Comp, like any theory bearing on reality can only be refuted by
looking at that reality.
No, a machine cannot think because the only reason that we might be
tempted to think it could can be explained through that example. You
can make the piano more sensitive to bumps, and you can make the
bumps
more sophisticated to articulate the piano's mechanism better, but
neither the truck, the piano, nor the bumps can play the piano, they
are all parts of a recording made by humans trying to imitate their
own playing of the piano.
You beg the question.
I'm showing that it's absurd. I guess if you actually believe that the
truck is a pianist, you certainly are entitled to that view - and it's
a logical view for figurative purposes, but if we apply it literally
in public, it would be considered delusional, and not for no reason.
Todays truck are not person.
The logical sense of coherence is in the "Dt", the tangible
detection
is in "p", and the machine's body and relative belief is in "Bp".
The
Bp & Dt & p is a variant of the self-reference logic. The non first
person communicable part of the logic of that variant (named X1* in
AUDA) is the qualia logic, or the sensible matter hypostasis. The
bootstrap law is given by p -> [] <> p, with []p defined roughly by
Bp
& Dt & p. Bp is Gödel probability applied on the arithmetical
sigma_1
sentence p. Dp is ~B~p. <> p is ~ [] ~, and t is "1=1".
The existence of variables like Dt and p already presupposes sense
and
detection of visual symbols.
It does not. But it implies them.
What are they without them?
They are like the natural numbers without the number 13. Nonsense.
It sounds like bones are ontologically less important than brains?
I don't see why. Brains are also locally stable patterns obtained
by a
relative statistics on
infinities of (infinite) computations.
So why are brains more associated with human consciousness than
bones?
Because brains seems to be needed for a person to manifest his
consciousness relatively to another, one; where bones seem to be
needed only to stand up and make sports.
That's begging the qwesch. I'm asking why brains over bones?
Because brains cells got the cable. Not bones cells.
In string theory, you can compute the mass of the photon. A long
computation (from precise general axiom) leads spectacularly to a
sum
of two terms which when evaluated gives (1+2+3+4+ ...) + 1/12.
Of course this only shows that IF string theory is correct then the
mass of the photon is zero (because it is obvious that
1+2+3+4+5+ ...
= minus 1/12, isn't it?).
I don't understand the minus 1/12 part.
It is not simple to understand. The shorter explanation is that
(1+2+3+...) = Riemann-Zeta(-1), which gives, on the complex plane the
value -1/12 in its provable unique analytical extension.
Riemann-zeta(z) is the analytical extension of Euler sum (1 + 1/2^z +
1/3^z + ...). By a beautiful formula of Euler, the Riemann-zeta
functions provides crucial information on the distribution of the
prime number.
I'll take your word for it. You know I don't speak math. At least if
you spoke French I could try to pick out some words here and there.
Who said this? The pope? The Ayatollah? The government?
It's not an authoritative proposition, it's a voluntary
interpretation
(which, if I'm right, is what half of the universe is anyhow).
You dream aloud.
Isn't that what you say numbers do also?
OK. But with the number I limit myself to those simple one who are
easily shown to be self-referentially correct.
We are sharply divided in the US in our opinions about that. Are
universal numbers less conflicted about when life or consciousness
begins and ends? Are they Pro-Life or Pro-Choice?
I intuit that the correct LUMs are pro-choice, but the LUMs in
general
can harbor any idea.
Except the idea that they can reveal their deep secrets.
No one can, by definition of deep secret.
But here all the problem is in linking the easy 1p and the less
easy 3p.
It's not a problem when you realize they are linked in only in their
anomalous symmetry with each other.
That does not help.
I don't quite understand why not.
Because I don't see the symmetry. You never show it. What is then an
anomalous symmetry. You seems to escape forwards by adding new
vocabulary, when you have not yet explain the one you are already using.
I might become tired to try to help you making sense for the others.
We don't have to include it. Brains are the simplifier tools.
No, brains are just the meaty end of a simplifier tool which is
semantic and experiential.
Such brain does not exist in the comp theory. yet we can explain why
person will correctly believe in the observation of such brain, in
the
epistemology.
I can explain why a person will correctly believe in the observation
of comp too, even though the universe of comp is not real.
No machine can correctly believe she is some precise machine, and it
is hard for them to make the leap of faith.
Study the work of other people. Address their problem, with or
without
your "theory" as training.
That would be worthwhile I'm sure, but unfortunately it would be
too
much of a distraction.
OK. That why I am not good in saucer. All those guy running after
the
ball distract me too much. But then I don't pretend marking the
goal.
This isn't a game though, it's the truth of reality.
If you don't study the work of others, you will not succeed in making
your point "really" accessible to others.
It already is accessible to some others, I don't think that anyone can
succeed in making any point to all others.
To all those interested. Yes that is possible, even if that can take
time for fashion and human reasons. That's the point of science and
rationalism.
Why not? What about numbers suggests dreaming?
The fact that they organize themselves, by just obeying their + and *
laws, into computations.
That can happen through our pattern recognition. It's universal
apophenia.
Elementary arithmetic can explain how pattern recognition works. You
don't need the concept of pattern recognition to explain elementary
arithmetic. Yes human need pattern recognition to communicate, but
that is at another level.
The, the fact that comp implies a mind-comp
supervenience thesis.
It doesn't say anything dreamy to me.
?
Incompleteness says the opposite to me that it does to you. I see
Gödel showing the limitation of arithmetic truth in the face of
organic sense, not the omnipotence of it.
Gödel's result show on the contrary that arithmetical truth is beyond
the grasp of any machine (and of any super-machine, super-super-
machine, etc.).
That only means that it cannot be reconciled with our local reality,
not that reality emerges from it.
Study UDA. Learn to reason in the comp theory, before trying to refute
it.
Fantasy is the same way. It too is
beyond the grasp of all real systems and arithmetic too.
But it has, in the relevant sense, once you admit there is a
substitution level.
Substitution level is an indexical of perception.
If this is true, then comp would lead to solipsism.
No because there is no self there to anchor a solipsistic orientation.
It leads to vacuous nihilism.
Self exists in comp by the Kleene second recursion theorem. I can
explain if you want, but your tone makes me think that whatever
explanations are provided you will refute it by confusing some levels,
or by referring to your experience.
But the evidences
are that first person plural makes sense, in the comp theory, and in
"reality" (thanks to the MWI which multiplies collection of
machines).
There is no perception going on, so substitution level is fixed
programmatically. Come to the light side Bruno...
You really talk like a priest.
You are saying that you are superior, in some sense, to other
entities. You deny a soul to a class of individuals, by invoking
fuzzy
rhetorical trick reifying your own experience.
That is precisely why I am superior to a machine, because I can do
that. A machine can't. It needs a reason to presume it's own
existence. I don't. I can assert my primordial authority because I
feel and know, and understand that I can. I don't need permission
from
a program or a script or a rule book. I embody the theory. We don't
view the universe as impartial voyeurs, we are fully immersed within
it. We define it and it defines us.
What makes you sure that some machine cannot do that? This is still
an
example of your persistent question begging.
If it could then I would not call it a machine.
?
Since I know that I
can do this, but I naturally define machines as not being able to do
that, I would need to see or understand something that convinces me
otherwise.
You really don't make give them any chance.
You continue to reiterate the only axiom of yours which makes sense:
comp is false. That's possible, but I don't hear any genuine argument.
You confuse the script and the show, for the numbers. The universal
numbers plays the shows of the numbers.
Why would they play anything? For what audience?
For the local UMs in their neighborhood, or for themselves.
Why do they need a show?
They don't need it, but they take the habits and usually don't see the
big picture.
Isn't the arithmetic truth enough?
It is. That one is responsible for the many-shows, in the comp theory.
By having some disease in some part of the cortex inside. The
modalities can be stopped to be handled correctly, or self-
referentially correctly.
Why wouldn't the machine just route around the disease? If color is
everywhere inside, I don't see why color blindness should be
localized
to some part of anything.
That's a problem for your theory.
It's explained in my theory as large organisms employ a division of
labor among sense organs.
Which makes substrate sense even more weird.
That sounds to me like the song does the singing and songwriting.
Yes. That's the magic of the universal numbers. They can do both.
Then the singers and songwriters are innocent bystanders?
No. They are UMs too.
That seems redundant.
?
Arithmetical truth and MW are redundant indeed. By they are not the
explanation, they are what we try to explain. Sands on the beach are
redundant too.
I don't assume theory as primitive. Only numbers and +, *.
The existence of theories and machines is a theorem in N,+, *.
But +, * is already a theory of what can be done with numbers.
No. They are symbol used in a theory.
If they don't correspond to something they can't be symbols. A theory
is required for their interpretation.
That's what I was saying.
The theory assumes some formula,
among which you will not find a formula assuming the existence of a
theory. You are confusing level of explanation. You could say that
the
big-bang theory assumes the existence of an alphabet, without which
we
cannot express "big-bang".
The theory and formula are parts of the same thing. From an absolute
perspective you cannot have a formula without a theory that it is part
of.
That might be true or false, relevant or not, but is not precise enough.
Which would make sense if we lived in a
world of disembodied theories settling into matter but it seems
obvious that he opposite is the case.
Because we are deluded by the fact that we participate to the drama
from inside.
Why does that prevent us from encountering disembodied theories from
entering our drama?
Nothing. The question is what do you mean by matter, and please don't
refer to physical notion, because this would beg the question.
We should see formulas written in the sky then sometimes.
?
Arithmetic emulate all histories.
Only if you believe in emulation.
Emulations existence is a theorem in arithmetic (even without comp).
That is why arithmetic separates from reality. It assumes generic
interchangeability and discards the primacy of 1p unrepeatability.
Not at all. It can explain that, by indexicalness + deep linear
histories.
Comp is not a truth. It is not an obligation either. But it is a
right.
Sure, it's a right. So are the other alternatives.
Sure. But this does not make your argument against comp more valid.
I'm only arguing that comp is no more or less valid than any other
belief system, it just has different strengths and weaknesses. My
argument is for a meta theory.
Comp is a meta-theory. I am still waiting your theory (as opposed to
your personal feelings).
you should study computer science. It could help you to understand
that comp is hard to be refuted.
It's impossible to refute, because it defines how it can and cannot be
refuted in it's own narrow terms which disqualify subjective authority
a priori.
No. it is the most refutable of all theory given that it describes, or
not, physics.
It does not disqualify subjective authority for the 1p, on the
contrary it relies on it.
Of course, like everywhere in science, it disqualify the 1p discourse
when used in the theory (not when tackle by the theory).
If not is is called literature, and belongs to another genere (novel,
fiction, phenonomenology, etc.).
UDA itself comes from an attempt to
refute it, but computer science already explains how machines
themselves can debunk the anti-comp arguments.
Judson Webb has already well understood the problem. Either your
argument if fuzzy and proves nothing, or your argument is precise and
technical, and machines can found them for themselves leading to
prove
correctly that their first person is not a machine (which is true) or
that their body are not Turing machine emulable (which is true), or
that comp is false (which makes no genuine sense when proved by a
correct machine).
I don't think I will comment paragraph where you refer to truth,
reality, your personal understanding, nor will I comment paragraph
which I have already answered, nor will I comment the begging
question
trick. So you have to work a bit harder.
I'm only doing this for your benefit and anyone else who might be
interested. I'm not working to convince you
I can see that.
of something that I
already suspect you cannot be convinced of.
That's prejudices on yourself, but they have some foundations: mainly
that you seem not interested in studying the theory that you want to
refute. This makes your point rather weak.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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