Sorry, I answered a paragraph to quickly. You raised a key question which is at the crux of the mind-body problem, and its comp reformulation.

On 09 Feb 2012, at 10:49, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Feb 2012, at 23:05, Craig Weinberg wrote:
I think that the 1p-sense that the machine has is unrelated to the 3p-

It is related to an infinity of 3p local representations.

What makes it anything other than that?


That "nothing" is not correct.
A better answer is computer science and truth.

I might say comp, by definition. But I guess you are arguing against comp, so I have to explain more.

But for this you have to be able to assume comp, if only temporarily.

With comp, we are duplicable. I can be "cut" in Brussels, and pasted in two places, W and M, says. In that simple local case, we get the two 3p local representations of 3-me (my body at the right comp level): one is W and one in M. The one in M will observe his environment, and conclude that he feels, subjectively, to be in M, and not to be in W. (And similarly for the one in W). OK?

Now, even without using comp, nor even strong AI, but just the much weaker behavioral-comp (which allows zombie and accept that machines can at least imitate humans behavior), you should be able to understand the explanations that the zombie in M (say) will give to your question, and which is that computer science will make one machine (betting on comp and surviving or pretending surviving) that she knows the difference between the objective collection of 3-me in M and 3-me in W, and what she personally feel when looking where she is.

This is a point which, I think, has already been made by Gunderson, which is the fact that men, or machines, when individuated are individuals, and that it entails a natural asymmetry between your body and the body of others. For example you can see the back of the neck of anybody else more directly than yours. That kind of obvious truth is truth for the machine as for the man. A machine can understand that an objective description of the existing 3ps will not allow a selection of one particular 1ps. So what can do that? The machine can understand the zombie machine in M, who will just say that she looked around and recognize M, making her understand the difference between her 1p and the "objective" 3p.

Formally, this will be the difference between the Gödel Bp, which asserts only that the machine (conceive in a 3p body or code, or number) believes (asserts) p, and (Bp & p) the machine believes p, and "God agree" (say), I mean "p is true".

You are saying that all the 3ps together cannot create the sense. I am saying that we can interview the individuated machines, and that for them a sort of miracle occurs, they know perfectly well the difference between them and the others. And they can make that difference relative to their probable computations.

In that context, you can describe a "free-will" choice, as of form of self-killing, for example by duplicating you in W and M, but annihilating you in W, or in M, according to your will before. Or in deciding to not reconstitute yourself in some place. A free-choice is a form of premeditated suicide. A local pruning of possibilities.

The distinction between 1p and collection of 3p will be natural for the machine points of view, and is indeed a difference of points of view.


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