On 3/6/2012 9:27 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:
2012/3/6 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net <mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
On 3/6/2012 8:12 AM, David Nyman wrote:
On 5 March 2012 23:50, meekerdb<meeke...@verizon.net
<mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:
It's unclear as to whom "you" and "your" refers to.
Let me suggest a heuristic. Assume that any given instance of
experience (by which I mean just whatever is necessary to permit some
sort of determination to be made) is selected at random from the class
of all such moments. All personal-indexical references can then be
taken as referring to the conjunction of this instance and whatever
"personal history" is implied by its content and structure.
This heuristic serves to justify the "expectation", from the
perspective of any such instance, of its substitution by other such
instances. Insofar as such substitutions imply "continuations" of the
present moment, they can be considered as constituting part of the
"future" of a particular personal history. If this heuristic is
applied consistently to the various thought experiments, (with the
usual allowance for "measure") it should be obvious that "diary
entries" recoverable within any given experiential instance will
typically record precisely the sort of prior uncertainty or
indeterminacy, with respect to the present instance, that Bruno is
talking about.
David
I don't think I have a problem with the indeterminacy. Consider in your
scenario
that we duplicated a video camera instead of a person. When look at what
the
cameras in M and W have recorded in one we see pictures of Helsinki
followed by
pictures of Moscow and from the other we see pictures of Helsinki followed
by
pictures of Washington. The ambiguity comes when, before the duplication,
we ask,
"What will this camera record?". "This" is ambiguous just as "he" is
ambiguous.
The question is indexical... it it not "he" but "I"... in the thought experiment *you*
are the one duplicated, and you ask yourself your own expectation for your next moment.
Maybe what is "you" is not well defined for something outside of you (us ;) ) but I
expect you know what you are, and feel...
At any given moment. But when you ask about my future, and under the hypothesis I may be
duplicated, then that future "I" is not longer indicial, it is ambiguous...which is the
source of the indeterminacy.
Brent
and hence "you" is well defined for yourself from your POV.
Quentin
Brent
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