On 06 Mar 2012, at 17:12, David Nyman wrote:
On 5 March 2012 23:50, meekerdb <[email protected]> wrote:
It's unclear as to whom "you" and "your" refers to.
Let me suggest a heuristic. Assume that any given instance of
experience (by which I mean just whatever is necessary to permit some
sort of determination to be made) is selected at random from the class
of all such moments. All personal-indexical references can then be
taken as referring to the conjunction of this instance and whatever
"personal history" is implied by its content and structure.
OK.
This heuristic serves to justify the "expectation", from the
perspective of any such instance, of its substitution by other such
instances. Insofar as such substitutions imply "continuations" of the
present moment, they can be considered as constituting part of the
"future" of a particular personal history.
OK. And with comp such substitutions imply "continuations" when there
is a universal number/machine u running the the continuation in the UD
(or the sigma_1 complete part of arithmetic).
That's why comp predicts that if we look below our substitution level,
the computations multiply effectively, because there are an infinity
of such universal u.
QM-without collapse/Everett witnesses the first person plural, which
is "just" the contagion of the "duplications" from observers to
observers.
Bruno
If this heuristic is
applied consistently to the various thought experiments, (with the
usual allowance for "measure") it should be obvious that "diary
entries" recoverable within any given experiential instance will
typically record precisely the sort of prior uncertainty or
indeterminacy, with respect to the present instance, that Bruno is
talking about.
David
On 3/5/2012 3:23 PM, David Nyman wrote:
On 5 March 2012 21:30, John Clark<[email protected]> wrote:
Yes. I John K Clark just saw a 90 minutes documentary on the
history of
asphalt, and as that is certainly one of the large but finite
number of
90
minute movies I can see on that screen it is entirely consistent
with my
prediction that John K Clark will see every 90 minute movie that
screen
can
show.
For some reason that really puzzles me, you are systematically
failing
to answer the question as posed. It is equivalent to asking: if you
knew that the entire stock of tickets in a lottery would be
distributed among multiple 3-Johns, what is the probability that
your
future experience would be of poverty or wealth? Of course, you
know
in advance that one copy will end up rich, but the 3-situation is
not
at issue. The issue is only whether your next 1-experience will
be of
sudden wealth, or not. It can only be one or the other, not both,
and
which it will be is indeterminate in the usual sense of any lottery.
The point being demonstrated is that, regardless of the 3-situation,
you can never "sum" 1-experiences - they are always mutually
exclusive. Isn't that clear?
It's unclear as to whom "you" and "your" refers to.
Brent
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