On 06 Mar 2012, at 17:12, David Nyman wrote:

On 5 March 2012 23:50, meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net> wrote:

It's unclear as to whom "you" and "your" refers to.

Let me suggest a heuristic.  Assume that any given instance of
experience (by which I mean just whatever is necessary to permit some
sort of determination to be made) is selected at random from the class
of all such moments. All personal-indexical references can then be
taken as referring to the conjunction of this instance and whatever
"personal history" is implied by its content and structure.

OK.



This heuristic serves to justify the "expectation", from the
perspective of any such instance, of its substitution by other such
instances.  Insofar as such substitutions imply "continuations" of the
present moment, they can be considered as constituting part of the
"future" of a particular personal history.


OK. And with comp such substitutions imply "continuations" when there is a universal number/machine u running the the continuation in the UD (or the sigma_1 complete part of arithmetic).

That's why comp predicts that if we look below our substitution level, the computations multiply effectively, because there are an infinity of such universal u.

QM-without collapse/Everett witnesses the first person plural, which is "just" the contagion of the "duplications" from observers to observers.

Bruno



If this heuristic is
applied consistently to the various thought experiments, (with the
usual allowance for "measure") it should be obvious that "diary
entries" recoverable within any given experiential instance will
typically record precisely the sort of prior uncertainty or
indeterminacy, with respect to the present instance, that Bruno is
talking about.

David

On 3/5/2012 3:23 PM, David Nyman wrote:

On 5 March 2012 21:30, John Clark<johnkcl...@gmail.com>  wrote:

Yes. I John K Clark just saw a 90 minutes documentary on the history of asphalt, and as that is certainly one of the large but finite number of
90
minute movies I can see on that screen it is entirely consistent with my prediction that John K Clark will see every 90 minute movie that screen
can
show.

For some reason that really puzzles me, you are systematically failing
to answer the question as posed.  It is equivalent to asking: if you
knew that the entire stock of tickets in a lottery would be
distributed among multiple 3-Johns, what is the probability that your future experience would be of poverty or wealth? Of course, you know in advance that one copy will end up rich, but the 3-situation is not at issue. The issue is only whether your next 1-experience will be of sudden wealth, or not. It can only be one or the other, not both, and
which it will be is indeterminate in the usual sense of any lottery.
The point being demonstrated is that, regardless of the 3-situation,
you can never "sum" 1-experiences - they are always mutually
exclusive.  Isn't that clear?


It's unclear as to whom "you" and "your" refers to.

Brent


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