On 09.06.2012 12:36 Bruno Marchal said the following:
On 09 Jun 2012, at 08:39, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote:
On 08.06.2012 21:00 Pzomby said the following:
Using mathematics, computations and symbols; human embodied
consciousness can (using computers) create models, simulations,
emulations, depictions, replications, representations etc. of
observations of the physical universe and its processes.
This assumes that the actual observable physical universe is
exemplified by, and is, instantiations of, mathematics and
Why not assume that model is different from what is modeled?
That is usually the case. But this does not mean that it is always
the case. In particular digital "processes", or relations, can be
emulated exactly, so if you assume the brain is a natural computer,
there are possible "exact model", like a digital brain and its
corresponding relative state in arithmetic. From the 1p-view, those
cannot be distinguished in any immediate way.
If I simulate a typhoon on a computer in front of you, you will never
become wet by it. But if I read and cut you, and simulate with that
computer "you + the typhoon" at the right comp level (assuming it
exists) then you will, in that case, feel to be wet due to the
simulated typhoon. Likewise, the arithmetical typhoons can make wet
the relative arithmetical entities (with comp).
But then even in this case, I distinguish between a typhoon on a
computer in front of me and a real typhoon. I mean that let us assume
comp for a moment. Let me agree with you for a moment that
arithmetics -> mind -> physics
Said that, I still see a computer in front of me (or a computer cluster
at work, well I do not see it there but rather access but I guess this
does not matter). In other words, even after having accepted your
theorem, I do not observe that the typhoon in the computer in front of
me makes me wet.
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