On Friday, August 31, 2012 5:17:57 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 30 Aug 2012, at 21:23, Craig Weinberg wrote: > > > On Thursday, August 30, 2012 3:03:32 PM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> Please excuse the word, but comp can only create zombies, >> which seem to be alive but are not actually so. >> >> >> >> The problem is that you cannot know that. >> > > Then you can't know that he can't know that either. Maybe he does know it? > Maybe he can tell in his bones that this is true? You are arbitrarily being > conservative in your attribution of the veracity of human sense and liberal > in your attribution of machine sense. > > > > Oh? may be Hitler knew in his bones that Jewish were a problem. You have > weird argument. >
I'm not the one arguing that we must accept the unacceptable because we can't prove it isn't true. With sense, we don't need to prove what we already know. We can disprove things we think we know, but we can't disprove ourselves or thinking that we know. We can sense that words are not going to evolve by themselves in a book. We can sense that a computer sitting in a box is not going to start writing screenplays by itself. To argue these things can only be naive ambition or sophistry. > > > > > >> >> In case of doubt it is ethically better to attribute consciousness to >> something non conscious, than attributing non consciousness to something >> conscious, as that can generate suffering. >> > > It could generate suffering either way. If an android tells you that you > can sing and you believe it, you could be brainwashed by an advertisement. > You could choose to save a machine programmed to yell in a fire while other > real people burn alive. > > > I don't see why saving a machine from fire would prevents me to save > children and woman first, as I feel closer to them. But then if I can, > after, save a machine, why not. You are the one talking like if you knew > that machines are forever zombies/puppets. > I am giving you a what if scenario, that it isn't necessarily harmless to give non-living machines the benefit of the doubt. In my scenario there is only time to save one or the other, and since the machine is programmed to authentically yell for help, the fireman saves the machine while the family suffocates to death in the basement. They would have been found first had they not been distracted by the machine. > > > > > >> >> There is japanese engineer who is building androids, that is robot >> looking very much like humans. >> An european journalist asked him if he was not worrying about naive >> people who might believe that such machine is alive. >> He answered that in Japan they believe that everything is alive, so that >> they have no problem with such question. >> >> As I said often, the "real" question is not "can machine think", but "can >> your daughter marry a machine" (like a man who did undergone a digital >> brain transplant). >> >> When will machine get the right to vote? >> > > When will the machine demand the right to vote? > > > ? > In the year 4024. Perhaps. Or in the year 40000024. I don't care. It is > not relevant for the issue. With the comp theory, some machines, us, have > already the right to vote. > Then we can worry about it then. > > > > >> >> When the Lutherans will baptize machines? >> > > When will they demand to be baptized? > > > When Lutherans will listen to them, and become sensible to their delicate > souls. > Lutherans have email addresses. The internet works both ways... > > > > >> >> Etc. >> >> Universal machines are sort of universal babies, or universal dynamical >> mirror. If you can't develop respect for them, they won't develop respect >> for you. >> > > Not even remotely persuasive to me. Sorry Bruno, but It sounds like you > are selling me a pet rock. It's not scientific - has there ever been a case > where a universal machine has developed respect for someone? Can a machine > tell the difference between respect and disrespect? Nah. > > > In the comp theory we are machines, so all this already happened. You just > reiterate your non-comp assumption, presenting it as a truth, but in > science we never do that. > > The theory that non-comp is an assumption is your assumption. When dealing with consciousness, we don't have to justify our own non-comp experience to a comp conditionality within that experience. Who would we justify it to? Craig > Bruno > > > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >> 8/29/2012 >> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >> everything could function." >> >> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >> *From:* Alberto G. Corona >> *Receiver:* everything-list >> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 11:19:59 >> *Subject:* Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary >> >> I say nothing opposed to that. What I say is that it′s functionality is >> computable: It is possible to make a robot with this functionality of >> awareness, but may be not with the capability of _being_ aware >> >> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> >> >>> Hi Alberto G. Corona >>> Awareness = I see X. >>> or I am X. >>> or some similar statement. >>> There's no computer in that behavior or state of being. >>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >>> 8/29/2012 >>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >>> everything could function." >>> >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> *From:* Alberto G. Corona >>> *Receiver:* everything-list >>> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 09:34:22 >>> *Subject:* Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary >>> >>> Roger, >>> I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a >>> inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the >>> consequences of this inner computation. >>> >>> like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that >>> this IS the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and >>> matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in >>> the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness >>> >>> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> >>> >>>> Hi Alberto G. Corona >>>> What sort of an output would the computer give me ? >>>> It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no >>>> way to hook it to my brain. >>>> Roger Clough, rcl...@verizon.net >>>> 8/29/2012 >>>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >>>> everything could function." >>>> >>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>>> *From:* Alberto G. Corona >>>> *Receiver:* everything-list >>>> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 08:21:27 >>>> *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary >>>> >>>> Hi: >>>> >>>> Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially) >>>> computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do >>>> things >>>> depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). >>>> This >>>> is rutine in computer science and these programs are called >>>> "interpreters". >>>> >>>> The lack of understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that >>>> any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why it is said that >>>> the >>>> brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do. We humans can >>>> manage >>>> concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is >>>> the >>>> result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation. >>>> >>>> For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our >>>> intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. >>>> We can not know our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed >>>> as metacomputations. When we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to >>>> mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware >>>> of it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the >>>> observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means >>>> of an adquired metacomputation. >>>> >>>> The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a >>>> woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this >>>> intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process >>>> of diagonalization by G del makes the Hilbert program impossible, That >>>> same >>>> conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive >>>> mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem). >>>> >>>> >>>> Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free >>>> will nor in any other existential question. >>>> >>>> 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rcl...@verizon.net> >>>> >>>>> Hi Craig Weinberg >>>>> I agree. >>>>> Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: >>>>> Cs = subject + object >>>>> The subject is always first person indeterminate. >>>>> Being indeterminate, it is not computable. >>>>> QED >>>>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net >>>>> 8/29/2012 >>>>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >>>>> everything could function." >>>>> >>>>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>>>> *From:* Craig Weinberg >>>>> *Receiver:* everything-list >>>>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 >>>>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary >>>>> >>>>> This sentence does not speak English. >>>>> >>>>> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. >>>>> >>>>> s l u ,u s >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help >>>>> illustrate that form is not inherently informative. >>>>> >>>>> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as >>>>> ascertaining the origin of awareness. >>>>> >>>>> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a >>>>> meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume >>>>> that >>>>> computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a >>>>> particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. >>>>> >>>>> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of >>>>> what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non >>>>> comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only >>>>> negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding >>>>> is >>>>> that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, >>>>> and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic >>>>> system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself >>>>> completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough >>>>> understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is >>>>> enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead >>>>> end >>>>> as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume >>>>> consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any >>>>> arithmetic >>>>> logic. >>>>> >>>>> Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of >>>>> awareness. It is not enough to say **that** awareness fits into this >>>>> or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary >>>>> indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place >>>>> and *why* is has not been addressed at all. >>>>> >>>>> As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to >>>>> demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative >>>>> assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another >>>>> thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure >>>>> up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not >>>>> follow from quanta. >>>>> >>>>> Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method >>>>> of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while >>>>> retaining >>>>> shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would >>>>> necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between >>>>> channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial >>>>> frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the >>>>> entropy of the totality. >>>>> >>>>> Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from >>>>> either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and >>>>> experiences, >>>>> for direct participation? >>>>> >>>>> Craig >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To view this discussion on the web visit >>>>> https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/OP7M4cmbaCIJ. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>> >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>>> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>>> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>>> For more options, visit this group at >>>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >>> >>> -- >>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google >>> Groups "Everything List" group. >>> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >>> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >>> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >>> For more options, visit this group at >>> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >>> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> everything-li...@googlegroups.com. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To view this discussion on the web visit > https://groups.google.com/d/msg/everything-list/-/hiuDuRRt7GUJ. > To post to this group, send email to everyth...@googlegroups.com<javascript:> > . > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-li...@googlegroups.com <javascript:>. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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