Roger Clough, [email protected]
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 11:19:59
Subject: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
I say nothing opposed to that. What I say is that it′s
functionality is computable: It is possible to make a robot with
this functionality of awareness, but may be not with the
capability of _being_ aware
2012/8/29 Roger Clough <[email protected]>
Hi Alberto G. Corona
Awareness = I see X.
or I am X.
or some similar statement.
There's no computer in that behavior or state of being.
Roger Clough, [email protected]
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 09:34:22
Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Roger,
I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is
that a inner computation can affect an external computation which
is aware of the consequences of this inner computation.
like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do
not say that this IS the experience of awareness, but given the
duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that
the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind,
the mind experiences awareness
2012/8/29 Roger Clough <[email protected]>
Hi Alberto G. Corona
What sort of an output would the computer give me ?
It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no
way to hook it to my brain.
Roger Clough, [email protected]
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Hi:
Awareness can be functionally (we do not know if experientially)
computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram)
and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his
real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these
programs are called "interpreters".
The lack of understanding, of this capability of
metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the
reason why it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a
computer can never do. We humans can manage concepts in two
ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result
of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation.
For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or
our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not
interpreted programs. We can not know our deep thinking
structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When
we use metaphorically the verb "to be fired" to mean being
redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of
it. Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with
the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of
it by means of an adquired metacomputation.
The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of
a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that
produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the
fact that the process of diagonalization by G del makes the
Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by
a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program.
(see my post about the G del theorem).
Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of
free will nor in any other existential question.
2012/8/29 Roger Clough <[email protected]>
Hi Craig Weinberg
I agree.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
Cs = subject + object
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
QED
Roger Clough, [email protected]
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help
illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far
as ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a
meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we
presume that computation can and does exist independently of all
awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is
what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding
of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy
and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of
these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic
truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to
support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed
it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete,
especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect
that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding
of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough
to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead
end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume
consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any
arithmetic logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of
awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this
or that category of programmatic interiority or logically
necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what*
awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been
addressed at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried
to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a
negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of
cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-
mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration
associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a
method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy
while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels.
These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to
insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the
coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique
significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the
totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived
from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings
and experiences, for direct participation?
Craig
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