On 31 Aug 2012, at 11:05, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Bruno Marchal

I would answer by saying that even unconscious entities, such as
an immune system,  can enhance life, and so IMHO are good
(moral) while cancer, which tends to deminish life, is bad or evil.

Sure.

Bruno




Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/31/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him
so that everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Bruno Marchal
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-30, 15:03:20
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary

Hi Roger

On 29 Aug 2012, at 17:44, Roger Clough wrote:

Hi Alberto G. Corona

Seeming to be aware is not the same as actually being aware,
just as seeming to be alive is not the same as actually being alive.

And my view is that comp, since it must operate in (objective) code,
can only create entities that might seem to be alive, not actually be alive.

Please excuse the word, but comp can only create zombies,
which seem to be alive but are not actually so.


The problem is that you cannot know that.

In case of doubt it is ethically better to attribute consciousness to something non conscious, than attributing non consciousness to something conscious, as that can generate suffering.

There is japanese engineer who is building androids, that is robot looking very much like humans. An european journalist asked him if he was not worrying about naive people who might believe that such machine is alive. He answered that in Japan they believe that everything is alive, so that they have no problem with such question.

As I said often, the "real" question is not "can machine think", but "can your daughter marry a machine" (like a man who did undergone a digital brain transplant).

When will machine get the right to vote?

When the Lutherans will baptize machines?

Etc.

Universal machines are sort of universal babies, or universal dynamical mirror. If you can't develop respect for them, they won't develop respect for you.


Bruno






Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 11:19:59
Subject: Re: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary

I say nothing opposed to that. What I say is that  it′s functionality is computable: It is possible to make a robot with this functionality of awareness, but may be not with the capability of _being_ aware

2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
Hi Alberto G. Corona
 
Awareness = I see X.
 or I am X.
or some similar statement.
 
There's no computer in that behavior or state of being.
 
 
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 09:34:22
Subject: Re: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary

Roger,
I said that the awareness functionalty can be computable, that is that a inner computation can affect an external computation which is aware of the consequences of this inner computation.

  like in the case of any relation of brain and mind, I do not say that this IS  the experience of awareness, but given the duality between mind and matter/brain, it is very plausible that the brain work that way when, in the paralell word of the mind, the mind experiences awareness

2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
Hi Alberto G. Corona
 
What sort of an output would the computer give me ?
It can't be experiential, 0or if it is, I know of no
way to hook it to my brain.
 
 
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 08:21:27
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary

Hi:

Awareness can  be functionally (we do not know if experientially)  computable. A program can run another program (a metaprogram) and do things depending on its results of the metaprogram (or his real time status). This is rutine in computer science and these programs are called "interpreters".

 The lack of  understanding, of this capability of metacomputation that any turing complete machine has, is IMHO the reason why  it is said that the brain-mind can do things that a computer can never do.  We humans can manage concepts in two ways : a direct way and a reflective way. The second is the result of an analysis of the first trough a metacomputation.

For example we can not be aware of our use of category theory or our intuitions because they are hardwired programs, not interpreted programs. We can not know  our deep thinking structures because they are not exposed as metacomputations. When we use  metaphorically the verb "to be fired"  to mean being redundant, we are using category theory but we can not be aware of it.  Only after research that assimilate mathematical facts with the observable psichology of humans, we can create an awareness of it by means of an adquired metacomputation.

The same happens with the intuitions. We appreciate the beauty of a woman for adaptive reasons, but not the computation that produces this intuition. In the other side, we can appreciate the fact that the process  of diagonalization by G del  makes the Hilbert program impossible, That same conclusion can be reached by a program that metacomputes a constructive mathematical program. (see my post about the G del theorem).


Again, I do not see COMP a problem for the Existential problem of free will nor in any other existential question.

2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
Hi Craig Weinberg
 
I agree.
 
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
 
Cs = subject + object
 
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
 
QED
 
 
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary

This sentence does not speak English.

These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.

s     l u     ,u     s   



If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that form is not inherently informative.

The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as ascertaining the origin of awareness.

Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.

Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.

Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at all.

As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical- mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from quanta.

Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.

Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct participation?

Craig




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