Hi Alberto G. Corona
I have no problem with that. But the act of perceiving itself is personal and
amoral.
I see what I see.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 11:54:29
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
Not only to lie. In order to commerce and in general to interact, we need to
know what to expect from whom. and the other need to know what the others
expect form me. So I have to reflect on myself in order to act in the
enviromnent of the moral and material expectations that others have about me.
This is the origin of reflective individuality, that is moral from the
beginning..
2012/8/29 meekerdb <meeke...@verizon.net>
But Craig makes a point when he says computers only deal in words. That's why
something having human like intelligence and consciousness must be a robot,
something that can act wordlessly in it's environment. Evolutionarily
speaking, conscious narrative is an add-on on top of subconscious thought which
is responsible for almost everything we do. Julian Jaynes theorized that
humans did not become conscious in the modern sense until they engaged in
inter-tribal commerce and it became important to learn to lie.
Brent
On 8/29/2012 8:40 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive.
With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he
perceive"..
>From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith
What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same
functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side.
2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>
Hi Alberto G. Corona
The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived.
For example, consider:
"I see the cat." Here:
I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived.
When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as are
all subjective
states and all experiences.
However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated the
experience
into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience into
a
publicly accessible statement.
All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words are
objective.
Any statement is then objective.
Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective,
so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless
(codeless).
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Alberto G. Corona
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-29, 10:39:37
Subject: Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory
because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it
needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
Hi Albert,
Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and
how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself to
be."
in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) operating
over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from
evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see on me.
This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of
ourselves.
No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the sense
of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for each and
every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like to be you.
That's why this uniqueness is not essential
But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to other
ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come to
consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although this
probably will never happen.
Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. There
is something important to this!
This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of
individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But
probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate
further....
2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
Hi Craig Weinberg
I agree.
Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
Cs = subject + object
The subject is always first person indeterminate.
Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
QED
Hi Roger,
It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted to
being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the object is
possibly singular.
Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
8/29/2012
Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so everything
could function."
----- Receiving the following content -----
From: Craig Weinberg
Receiver: everything-list
Time: 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
Subject: No Chinese Room Necessary
This sentence does not speak English.
These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
s l u ,u s
If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help illustrate that
form is not inherently informative.
The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as
ascertaining the origin of awareness.
Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless
epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation can
and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular category of
meta-computation is what we call awareness.
Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what Bruno
includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp contents,
Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively assert the
completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G del (and others)
are used to support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that indeed
it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete, especially in the
sense of defining itself completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't
have a deep enough understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I
do have is enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a
dead end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume
consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic
logic.
Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of awareness. It
is not enough to say *that* awareness fits into this or that category of
programmatic interiority or logically necessary indeterminacy when the question
of *what* awareness is in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed
at all.
As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to
demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative assertion
of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another thread.
Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an
acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not follow from
quanta.
Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of
sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining shared
sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would necessarily be
construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to
encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique
significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of the totality.
Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from either
physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, for direct
participation?
Craig
--
--
Onward!
Stephen
http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
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