But Craig makes a point when he says computers only deal in words. That's why something having human like intelligence and consciousness must be a robot, something that can act wordlessly in it's environment. Evolutionarily speaking, conscious narrative is an add-on on top of subconscious thought which is responsible for almost everything we do. Julian Jaynes theorized that humans did not become conscious in the modern sense until they engaged in inter-tribal commerce and it became important to learn to lie.

Brent

On 8/29/2012 8:40 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive"..

From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith

What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side.

2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>>

    Hi Alberto G. Corona
    The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived.
    For example, consider:
    "I see the cat."    Here:
    I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived.
    When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, as 
are all
    subjective
    states and all experiences.
    However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated 
the experience
    into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal experience 
into a
    publicly accessible statement.
    All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words 
are objective.
    Any statement is then objective.
    Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective,
    so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless 
(codeless).
    Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>
    8/29/2012
    Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so 
everything could
    function."

        ----- Receiving the following content -----
        *From:* Alberto G. Corona <mailto:agocor...@gmail.com>
        *Receiver:* everything-list <mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>
        *Time:* 2012-08-29, 10:39:37
        *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary



        2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net 
<mailto:stephe...@charter.net>>

            On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
            the subject  is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has 
memory
            because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. 
therefore it
            needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with 
others.

            Hi Albert,

                Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of 
memory
            and how it is sequentially ordered  that matters. "I am what I 
remember
            myself to be."


        in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) 
operating
        over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes from
        evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others see 
on me.


            This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same 
life of
            ourselves.

                No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular 
in the
            sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true 
for each
            and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is 
like to be
            you.

        That′s why this uniqueness is not  essential


            But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to 
other
            ourselves.  Most twins consider each other another self. We  could 
come
            to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. 
Although
            this probably will never happen.

                Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might 
occur.
            There is something important to this!


        This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness 
of
        individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy).  But
        probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not 
ellaborate
        further....




            2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net
            <mailto:stephe...@charter.net>>

                On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
                Hi Craig Weinberg
                 
                I agree.
                 
                Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
                 
                Cs = subject + object
                 
                The subject is always first person indeterminate.
                Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
                 
                QED
                Hi Roger,

                    It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not
                restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular
                (necessity) while the object is possibly singular.

                 
                 
                Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net <mailto:rclo...@verizon.net>
                8/29/2012
                Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him 
so
                everything could function."

                    ----- Receiving the following content -----
                    *From:* Craig Weinberg <mailto:whatsons...@gmail.com>
                    *Receiver:* everything-list 
<mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>
                    *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
                    *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary

                    This sentence does not speak English.

                    These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.

                    s     l u     ,u     s   


                    If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can 
help
                    illustrate that form is not inherently informative.

                    The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring 
as far
                    as ascertaining the origin of awareness.

                    Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a
                    meaningless epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or 
we
                    presume that computation can and does exist independently 
of all
                    awareness but that a particular category of 
meta-computation is
                    what we call awareness.

                    Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my 
understanding
                    of what Bruno includes) in the form of first person 
indeterminacy
                    and/or non comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all 
of
                    these can only negatively assert the completeness of 
arithmetic
                    truth. My understanding is that G  del (and others) are 
used to
                    support this negative assertion, and I of course agree that 
indeed
                    it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be complete,
                    especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I 
suspect
                    that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough 
understanding
                    of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is 
enough
                    to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a 
dead
                    end as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we 
assume
                    consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently 
of any
                    arithmetic logic.

                    Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive 
assertion of
                    awareness. It is not enough to say /*that*/ awareness fits 
into
                    this or that category of programmatic interiority or 
logically
                    necessary indeterminacy when the question of *what* 
awareness is
                    in the first place and *why* is has not been addressed at 
all.

                    As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle 
tried
                    to demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically 
from a
                    negative assertion of computability. I bring up the example 
of
                    cymatics on another thread. Scooping salt into a
                    symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure up an acoustic
                    vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not 
follow
                    from quanta.

                    Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia 
as a
                    method of sequestering experiences to different degrees of 
privacy
                    while retaining shared sense on more primitive 'public' 
levels.
                    These methods would necessarily be construed as automatic to
                    insulate crosstalk between channels of sense - to encourage 
the
                    coherence of perceptual inertial frames to develop unique
                    significance rather than to decohere into the entropy of 
the totality.

                    Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness 
derived
                    from either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual 
feelings
                    and experiences, for direct participation?

                    Craig


                --


-- Onward!

            Stephen

            http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html

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