That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says that he perceive"..
>From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side. 2012/8/29 Roger Clough <[email protected]> > Hi Alberto G. Corona > > The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived. > > For example, consider: > > "I see the cat." Here: > > I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived. > > When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal, > as are all subjective > states and all experiences. > > However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated > the experience > into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal > experience into a > publicly accessible statement. > > All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words > are objective. > Any statement is then objective. > > Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective, > so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless > (codeless). > > > Roger Clough, [email protected] > 8/29/2012 > Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so > everything could function." > > ----- Receiving the following content ----- > *From:* Alberto G. Corona <[email protected]> > *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> > *Time:* 2012-08-29, 10:39:37 > *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary > > > > 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <[email protected]> > >> On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >> >> the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory >> because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it >> needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others. >> >> >> Hi Albert, >> >> Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and >> how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself >> to be." >> >> >> in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation) > operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes > from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others > see on me. > >> >> This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of >> ourselves. >> >> >> No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the >> sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for >> each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like >> to be you. >> >> That′s why this uniqueness is not essential > >> >> But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to >> other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come >> to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although >> this probably will never happen. >> >> >> Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur. >> There is something important to this! >> > > This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of > individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But > probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate > further.... > >> >> >> >> 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <[email protected]> >> >>> On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote: >>> >>> Hi Craig Weinberg >>> I agree. >>> Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole: >>> Cs = subject + object >>> The subject is always first person indeterminate. >>> Being indeterminate, it is not computable. >>> QED >>> >>> Hi Roger, >>> >>> It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted >>> to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the >>> object is possibly singular. >>> >>> Roger Clough, [email protected] >>> 8/29/2012 >>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so >>> everything could function." >>> >>> ----- Receiving the following content ----- >>> *From:* Craig Weinberg <[email protected]> >>> *Receiver:* everything-list <[email protected]> >>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50 >>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary >>> >>> This sentence does not speak English. >>> >>> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves. >>> >>> s l u ,u s >>> >>> >>> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help >>> illustrate that form is not inherently informative. >>> >>> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as >>> ascertaining the origin of awareness. >>> >>> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless >>> epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation >>> can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular >>> category of meta-computation is what we call awareness. >>> >>> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of >>> what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non >>> comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only >>> negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is >>> that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, >>> and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic >>> system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself >>> completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough >>> understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is >>> enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end >>> as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume >>> consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic >>> logic. >>> >>> Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of >>> awareness. It is not enough to say **that** awareness fits into this or >>> that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary >>> indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place >>> and *why* is has not been addressed at all. >>> >>> As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to >>> demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative >>> assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another >>> thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure >>> up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not >>> follow from quanta. >>> >>> Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method >>> of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining >>> shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would >>> necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between >>> channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial >>> frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the >>> entropy of the totality. >>> >>> Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from >>> either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences, >>> for direct participation? >>> >>> Craig >>> >>> -- >>> >>> >> -- >> Onward! >> >> Stephen >> http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups >> "Everything List" group. >> To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. >> To unsubscribe from this group, send email to >> [email protected]. >> For more options, visit this group at >> http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. >> > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > [email protected]. > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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