That you perceive is accesible to us by your words. You say that you
perceive. With these worlds you transmit to us this information "craig says
that he perceive"..

>From my side, The belief tat you REALLY perceive is a matter of faith

What i said is that it is THEORETICALLY create a robot with the same
functionality, and subject to the same statement of faith from my side.

2012/8/29 Roger Clough <rclo...@verizon.net>

>  Hi Alberto G. Corona
>
> The subject is the perceiver, not that which is perceived.
>
> For example, consider:
>
> "I see the cat."    Here:
>
> I is the perceiving subject, cat is the object perceived.
>
> When the subject experiences seeing the cat, the experience is personal,
> as are all subjective
> states and all experiences.
>
> However, when he afterwards vocalizes "I see the cat", he has translated
> the experience
> into words, which means he has translated a subjective personal
> experience into a
> publicly accessible statement.
>
> All personal experiences are subjective, all experiences shared in words
> are objective.
> Any statement is then objective.
>
> Computers can only deal in words (computer code), which are objective,
> so computers cannot experience anything, since experience is wordless
> (codeless).
>
>
> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
> 8/29/2012
> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
> everything could function."
>
> ----- Receiving the following content -----
> *From:* Alberto G. Corona <agocor...@gmail.com>
> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
> *Time:* 2012-08-29, 10:39:37
> *Subject:* Re: No Chinese Room Necessary
>
>
>
> 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
>
>>  On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
>>
>> the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory
>> because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it
>> needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
>>
>>
>> Hi Albert,
>>
>> Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory and
>> how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember myself
>> to be."
>>
>>
>> in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation)
> operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes
> from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others
> see on me.
>
>>
>> This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life of
>> ourselves.
>>
>>
>> No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the
>> sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for
>> each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like
>> to be you.
>>
>> That′s why this uniqueness is not essential
>
>>
>>  But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to
>> other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could come
>> to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones. Although
>> this probably will never happen.
>>
>>
>> Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur.
>> There is something important to this!
>>
>
> This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of
> individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But
> probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate
> further....
>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
>>
>>>  On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
>>>
>>> Hi Craig Weinberg
>>>  I agree.
>>>  Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
>>>  Cs = subject + object
>>>  The subject is always first person indeterminate.
>>> Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
>>>  QED
>>>
>>> Hi Roger,
>>>
>>> It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not restricted
>>> to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity) while the
>>> object is possibly singular.
>>>
>>>    Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>>> 8/29/2012
>>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
>>> everything could function."
>>>
>>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>>> *From:* Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
>>> *Receiver:* everything-list <everything-list@googlegroups.com>
>>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
>>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary
>>>
>>>  This sentence does not speak English.
>>>
>>> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
>>>
>>> s l u ,u s
>>>
>>>
>>> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help
>>> illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
>>>
>>> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as
>>> ascertaining the origin of awareness.
>>>
>>> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless
>>> epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation
>>> can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular
>>> category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
>>>
>>> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of
>>> what Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non
>>> comp contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only
>>> negatively assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is
>>> that G del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion,
>>> and I of course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic
>>> system to be complete, especially in the sense of defining itself
>>> completely. I suspect that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough
>>> understanding of this, but I think that what understanding I do have is
>>> enough to persuade me that this entire line of investigation is a dead end
>>> as far as explaining consciousness. It only works if we assume
>>> consciousness as a possibility a priori and independently of any arithmetic
>>> logic.
>>>
>>> Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of
>>> awareness. It is not enough to say **that** awareness fits into this or
>>> that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary
>>> indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place
>>> and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
>>>
>>> As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to
>>> demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative
>>> assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another
>>> thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure
>>> up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not
>>> follow from quanta.
>>>
>>> Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method
>>> of sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining
>>> shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would
>>> necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between
>>> channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial
>>> frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the
>>> entropy of the totality.
>>>
>>> Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from
>>> either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences,
>>> for direct participation?
>>>
>>> Craig
>>>
>>> --
>>>
>>>
>> --
>> Onward!
>>
>> Stephen
>> http://webpages.charter.net/stephenk1/Outlaw/Outlaw.html
>>
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