2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
> On 8/29/2012 8:44 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote:
> the subject is preceived as singular because it has memory. It has memory
> because it is intelligent and social. thereforre it is moral. therefore it
> needs memory to give and take account of its debts and merits with others.
> Hi Albert,
> Memory is necessary but not sufficient. It the the content of memory
> and how it is sequentially ordered that matters. "I am what I remember
> myself to be."
> in my own terms, this is a metacomputation (interpreted computation)
operating over my own memory. The possibility of this metacomputation comes
from evolutionary reasons: to reflect about the moral Albert that others
see on me.
> This singularity is by definition because no other lived the same life
> of ourselves.
> No, because we could never know that for sure. It is singular in the
> sense of "only I can know what it is like to be me" is exactly true for
> each and every one of us. The result is that I cannot know what it is like
> to be you.
> That´s why this uniqueness is not essential
> But up to a point it is not essential. We can be made accustomed to
> other ourselves. Most twins consider each other another self. We could
> come to consider normal to say hello to our recently created clones.
> Although this probably will never happen.
> Please elaborate! Try to speculate a situation where it might occur.
> There is something important to this!
This is a logical possibility due to the nonessentiality of uniqueness of
individuality. (Or in Bruno terms: the first person indeterminacy). But
probably the cloning machine would never exist. Sorry I can not ellaborate
> 2012/8/29 Stephen P. King <stephe...@charter.net>
>> On 8/29/2012 7:38 AM, Roger Clough wrote:
>> Hi Craig Weinberg
>> I agree.
>> Consciousness is not a monople, it is a dipole:
>> Cs = subject + object
>> The subject is always first person indeterminate.
>> Being indeterminate, it is not computable.
>> Hi Roger,
>> It is not a dipole in the normal sense, as the object is not
>> restricted to being singular. The subject is always singular (necessity)
>> while the object is possibly singular.
>> Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net
>> Leibniz would say, "If there's no God, we'd have to invent him so
>> everything could function."
>> ----- Receiving the following content -----
>> *From:* Craig Weinberg <whatsons...@gmail.com>
>> *Receiver:* everything-list <firstname.lastname@example.org>
>> *Time:* 2012-08-28, 12:19:50
>> *Subject:* No Chinese Room Necessary
>> This sentence does not speak English.
>> These words do not ‘refer’ to themselves.
>> s l u ,u s
>> If you don't like Searle's example, perhaps the above can help
>> illustrate that form is not inherently informative.
>> The implication here for me is that comp is a red herring as far as
>> ascertaining the origin of awareness.
>> Either we view computation inherently having awareness as a meaningless
>> epiphenomenal byproduct (yay, no free will), or we presume that computation
>> can and does exist independently of all awareness but that a particular
>> category of meta-computation is what we call awareness.
>> Even with the allowances that Bruno includes (or my understanding of what
>> Bruno includes) in the form of first person indeterminacy and/or non comp
>> contents, Platonic number dreams, etc - all of these can only negatively
>> assert the completeness of arithmetic truth. My understanding is that G
>> del (and others) are used to support this negative assertion, and I of
>> course agree that indeed it is impossible for any arithmetic system to be
>> complete, especially in the sense of defining itself completely. I suspect
>> that Bruno assumes that I don't have a deep enough understanding of this,
>> but I think that what understanding I do have is enough to persuade me that
>> this entire line of investigation is a dead end as far as explaining
>> consciousness. It only works if we assume consciousness as a possibility a
>> priori and independently of any arithmetic logic.
>> Nowhere do I find in any AI/AGI theory any positive assertion of
>> awareness. It is not enough to say **that** awareness fits into this or
>> that category of programmatic interiority or logically necessary
>> indeterminacy when the question of *what* awareness is in the first place
>> and *why* is has not been addressed at all.
>> As I demonstrate in the three lines at the top, and Searle tried to
>> demonstrate, awareness does not follow automatically from a negative
>> assertion of computability. I bring up the example of cymatics on another
>> thread. Scooping salt into a symmetrical-mandala pattern does not conjure
>> up an acoustic vibration associated with that pattern. Qualia does not
>> follow from quanta.
>> Quanta, however, could and I think does follow from qualia as a method of
>> sequestering experiences to different degrees of privacy while retaining
>> shared sense on more primitive 'public' levels. These methods would
>> necessarily be construed as automatic to insulate crosstalk between
>> channels of sense - to encourage the coherence of perceptual inertial
>> frames to develop unique significance rather than to decohere into the
>> entropy of the totality.
>> Does anyone have any positive assertion of consciousness derived from
>> either physics or arithmetic? Any need for actual feelings and experiences,
>> for direct participation?
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