On 31 Oct 2012, at 08:21, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 01:14:47PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
On 10/28/2012 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
How do you answer the person who get the 1-7 points, and concludes
(as he *believes* in a primary material world, and in comp) that
this proves that a physical universe, to procede consciousness,
has to be "little" (never run a big portion of the UD, so that it
maintain the brain-consciousness identity thesis).
I understand that a familiarity with digital machines and computer
science can make us feeling that this is really an had move,
almost inventing the physical universe, to prevent its possible
explanation and origin in dreams interferences.
But, still, logically, he is still consistent. he can say yes to
the doctor, and believes he is a "unique" owner of, perhaps in the
quantum weaker sense, primitively material machine/body.
The Movie-Graph is just a way to show more precisely that such a
move is *very* ad hoc, and will ask for non Turing emulable, nor
1-person comp-indeterminacy recoverable elements in the
computation. They can only been missed by the digitalist doctor,
and so it would contradict the "yes doctor" assumption.
I agree with all that. It just that I don't see how the small universe
enters into the UDA step 8 argument.
Do you agree that in step seven, a physicalist can still believe in
comp, yet disbelieved that the laws of physics emerge from the
computation, by assuming that we are in a primitive physical universe
which is too much little to sustain any reasonable part of the
universal dovetailing?
If you are OK with this, the movie-graph argument just show directly
that such a move will need to attach the conscious mind to non Turing
emulable, if not non-understandable, property of matter.
A
counterfactually used register will still be used by one of my
differentiated copies, and ISTM that these alternate differentiated
minds are essential to my consciousness,
What trans-world, or trans-terms of a superposition, interaction
would made this senseful?
I mean, is the consciousness of the one in Washington dependent of
the consciousness of the one in Moscow?
It *might* be the case, if the brain was a quantum computer. In
that case we could put ourselves in the W+M superposition state,
do some different task, get some result, and then operate a
Fourier rotation on our resulting W'+M' state and extract some
consciousness relevant information.
The brain is a quantum object. It doesn't do quantum computations
in the sense of existing in superpositions of what we regard as
different conscious classical propositions. But it does quantum
computations at the microscopic level that maintain it's identity as
an (approximately) classical object, i.e. it must be entangled with
the environment to maintain classicality. So the experience of being
in Washington may, because of the way the transporter is constructed
to send to both places, depend on the *possibility* of an experience
of being in Moscow.
Brent picked up on exactly what I was suggesting.
Read my answer to Brent, and may be comment it. With the quantum
duplication, or superposition, the *possibility* is realized, and it
is case of first person indeterminacy OR a case of not having chosen
the right level.
I was suggesting
that the possibility of ending up in either Washington or Moscow is
essential to the the operation of consciousness.
I can agree with this.
Once differentiation
has occurred, I do agree that the one in Washington is a different
mind to the one in Moscow.
That's all what we need for the reasoning to proceed.
But if this is what you mean, it would just mean that we need to
emulate the brain at a lower level. A simulation of that quantum
brain can be done classically, and we can reiterate the 323
question at that level.
But then I think your simulation needs to include the environment
with which the brain interacts to produce its quasi-classical
character.
Brent
I'm not sure that is quite true, but it would need to include both
branches (ie dovetail on them) in the calculation.
It depends on the level. Certainly so with the quantum brain. But this
already the case with comp. Consciousness is attached to the infinity
of instantiations of the sates in arithmetic.
In such a case, I
think this poses serious problems for the concept of supervenience on
the physical implementation of the classical computation, as I
described in the discussion earlier about supervenience of two minds
on the same physical structure of classroom + students.
I comment it, but I don't remember if you comment on my comment. I
don't think this was a threat for the validity of the step 8. May be
you can elaborate, or refer to the link.
Are you saying that if a classical computer, itself emulated by the
local quantum reality, emulate a human brain at the quantum level, he
would be like a zombie (no consciousness)?
Bruno
--
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Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au
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