On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 01:14:47PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: > On 10/28/2012 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >How do you answer the person who get the 1-7 points, and concludes > >(as he *believes* in a primary material world, and in comp) that > >this proves that a physical universe, to procede consciousness, > >has to be "little" (never run a big portion of the UD, so that it > >maintain the brain-consciousness identity thesis). > > > >I understand that a familiarity with digital machines and computer > >science can make us feeling that this is really an had move, > >almost inventing the physical universe, to prevent its possible > >explanation and origin in dreams interferences. > > > >But, still, logically, he is still consistent. he can say yes to > >the doctor, and believes he is a "unique" owner of, perhaps in the > >quantum weaker sense, primitively material machine/body. > > > >The Movie-Graph is just a way to show more precisely that such a > >move is *very* ad hoc, and will ask for non Turing emulable, nor > >1-person comp-indeterminacy recoverable elements in the > >computation. They can only been missed by the digitalist doctor, > >and so it would contradict the "yes doctor" assumption.
I agree with all that. It just that I don't see how the small universe enters into the UDA step 8 argument. > >>A > >>counterfactually used register will still be used by one of my > >>differentiated copies, and ISTM that these alternate differentiated > >>minds are essential to my consciousness, > > > >What trans-world, or trans-terms of a superposition, interaction would made > >this senseful? > >I mean, is the consciousness of the one in Washington dependent of > >the consciousness of the one in Moscow? > > > >It *might* be the case, if the brain was a quantum computer. In > >that case we could put ourselves in the W+M superposition state, > >do some different task, get some result, and then operate a > >Fourier rotation on our resulting W'+M' state and extract some > >consciousness relevant information. > > The brain is a quantum object. It doesn't do quantum computations > in the sense of existing in superpositions of what we regard as > different conscious classical propositions. But it does quantum > computations at the microscopic level that maintain it's identity as > an (approximately) classical object, i.e. it must be entangled with > the environment to maintain classicality. So the experience of being > in Washington may, because of the way the transporter is constructed > to send to both places, depend on the *possibility* of an experience > of being in Moscow. Brent picked up on exactly what I was suggesting. I was suggesting that the possibility of ending up in either Washington or Moscow is essential to the the operation of consciousness. Once differentiation has occurred, I do agree that the one in Washington is a different mind to the one in Moscow. > > >But if this is what you mean, it would just mean that we need to > >emulate the brain at a lower level. A simulation of that quantum > >brain can be done classically, and we can reiterate the 323 > >question at that level. > > But then I think your simulation needs to include the environment > with which the brain interacts to produce its quasi-classical > character. > > Brent I'm not sure that is quite true, but it would need to include both branches (ie dovetail on them) in the calculation. In such a case, I think this poses serious problems for the concept of supervenience on the physical implementation of the classical computation, as I described in the discussion earlier about supervenience of two minds on the same physical structure of classroom + students. -- ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Principal, High Performance Coders Visiting Professor of Mathematics [email protected] University of New South Wales http://www.hpcoders.com.au ---------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
