On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 01:14:47PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> On 10/28/2012 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> >How do you answer the person who get the 1-7 points, and concludes
> >(as he *believes* in a primary material world, and in comp) that
> >this proves that a physical universe, to procede consciousness,
> >has to be "little" (never run a big portion of the UD, so that it
> >maintain the brain-consciousness identity thesis).
> >
> >I understand that a familiarity with digital machines and computer
> >science can make us feeling that this is really an had move,
> >almost inventing the physical universe, to prevent its possible
> >explanation and origin in dreams interferences.
> >
> >But, still, logically, he is still consistent. he can say yes to
> >the doctor, and believes he is a "unique" owner of, perhaps in the
> >quantum weaker sense, primitively material machine/body.
> >
> >The Movie-Graph is just a way to show more precisely that such a
> >move is *very* ad hoc, and will ask for non Turing emulable, nor
> >1-person comp-indeterminacy recoverable elements in the
> >computation. They can only been missed by the digitalist doctor,
> >and so it would contradict the "yes doctor" assumption.

I agree with all that. It just that I don't see how the small universe
enters into the UDA step 8 argument.

> >>A
> >>counterfactually used register will still be used by one of my
> >>differentiated copies, and ISTM that these alternate differentiated
> >>minds are essential to my consciousness,
> >
> >What trans-world, or trans-terms of a superposition, interaction would made 
> >this senseful?
> >I mean, is the consciousness of the one in Washington dependent of
> >the consciousness of the one in Moscow?
> >
> >It *might* be the case, if the brain was a quantum computer. In
> >that case we could put ourselves in the W+M superposition state,
> >do some different task, get some result, and then operate a
> >Fourier rotation on our resulting W'+M' state and extract some
> >consciousness relevant information.
> The brain is a quantum object.  It doesn't do quantum computations
> in the sense of existing in superpositions of what we regard as
> different conscious classical propositions.  But it does quantum
> computations at the microscopic level that maintain it's identity as
> an (approximately) classical object, i.e. it must be entangled with
> the environment to maintain classicality. So the experience of being
> in Washington may, because of the way the transporter is constructed
> to send to both places, depend on the *possibility* of an experience
> of being in Moscow.

Brent picked up on exactly what I was suggesting. I was suggesting
that the possibility of ending up in either Washington or Moscow is
essential to the the operation of consciousness. Once differentiation
has occurred, I do agree that the one in Washington is a different
mind to the one in Moscow. 

> >But if this is what you mean, it would just mean that we need to
> >emulate the brain at a lower level. A simulation of that quantum
> >brain can be done classically, and we can reiterate the 323
> >question at that level.
> But then I think your simulation needs to include the environment
> with which the brain interacts to produce its quasi-classical
> character.
> Brent

I'm not sure that is quite true, but it would need to include both
branches (ie dovetail on them) in the calculation. In such a case, I
think this poses serious problems for the concept of supervenience on
the physical implementation of the classical computation, as I
described in the discussion earlier about supervenience of two minds
on the same physical structure of classroom + students.


Prof Russell Standish                  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics      hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales          http://www.hpcoders.com.au

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