On 11 Nov 2012, at 18:09, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>>You said the Helsinki man will survive in two examples, in M AND in W.

>This follows from the comp assumption.

I no longer know what "comp" means much less what "the comp assumption" is;


Comp is the same. You mean that you don't see how comp entails the first person indterminacy. Comp is just the digital version of Descartes mechanism. Some sums it by "no magical trick".




at one time I thought I did but you tell me over and over again that I don't,

I am only saying that in step 3 you confuse the 3-view on the 1-views (yes, there are two people alive and believing being John Clark in W and M), and the 1-views on the 1-view obtained. (each obtained John Clark has to notice one result of self-localization; which can only be W, or M.



and as the term is not in common usage and you invented it then you are the final authority on that question.

I did not invent it. Come one. the version I give is more precise, as it single out the choice of substitution level. It is implied by all other forms in the literature. So its consequences are very general.




If you say I don't understand "comp" then I believe you, however that doesn't mean that I also believe that you understand "comp".

You understand comp, which is step 0, but you have a difficulty to handle the 1p and 3p views.




>> and then ask if the Helsinki man will survive in M OR W; so who's the one that's really confused around here?

> Read the precise sentence. I ask to the guy in Helsinki how he evaluates the chance to feel to be the one in Moscow.

That's another reason your thought experiment is worthless, you ask how "he" will evaluate "his" chances and that depends entirely on the prejudices and whims of the individual involved, perhaps "he" thinks "he" will enter oblivion or perhaps "he" thinks that "he" will feel to be in heaven.

That's true also for any physical experience.




But the main problem is that you're striving to somehow get the Helsinki man to remember the future,

To predict it.
Precisely to predict its personal memory of the past, in the future. This is what we do already when we throw a coin.

Suppose I iterate the duplication, but actually I lied to you, and I after anesthesy I use plane, and coin to decide between W and M. Would you been able to tell the difference (without looking at the other city)?



and there is just no way to do that.

But the helsinki guy is sure that it will be W or M. So he has partial information at least, and P(W) = P(M) = 1/2, in that protocole is justified by the numerical identity of the two person just before they open the door.




What you can do is get the Washington and Moscow man to remember the past, and BOTH of them remember being the Helsinki man.

Indeed. that is why both knows that the prediction W & M is wrong, as both lived only W, or only M. Both understand that "W or M" was correct, unless a copy comes back from Vienna, but that is impossible, given the protocol.



And if by "Helsinki man" you mean the guy experiencing Helsinki with a body in that city and you say "the body read in Helsinki is annihilated" then the Helsinki man doesn't remember anything at all after the experiment. If the Helsinki body is not destroyed and is allowed to function after the duplication then the Helsinki man remembers remaining to be the Helsinki man and remembers going about his business as usual in Helsinki with nothing at all odd going on and never having a single thought about either Washington or Moscow.

To be a valid you've got to observe things before and after the experiment and ask the various parties involved after the experiment what they remember, you just can't ask them before the experiment to remember the future.

But I ask only to predict it, with some measure of chance for the outcomes.




And in general thought experiments are worthwhile when they involve questions like "what do you see?" or "what can you discriminate between?" or "what do you remember?" NOT "what do you believe you will feel?"

But this is needed to keep in mind that we don't ask for a body localization, but for a first person experience, which is the key object in cognitive science, especially in the mind-body problem.



or "what would you prefer?"

OK.



and certainly not  "what do you remember about the future?".

This has never been asked.

We only ask to the Helsinki guy where he expect to feel after being duplicated. A 12 years old can understand that he can only be indeterminate, and say something like "W or M, but not both".

You are just confusing the 3-view on the 1-views, with the 1-views themselves.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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