On 11 Nov 2012, at 18:09, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>You said the Helsinki man will survive in two examples, in M AND
>This follows from the comp assumption.
I no longer know what "comp" means much less what "the comp
Comp is the same. You mean that you don't see how comp entails the
first person indterminacy. Comp is just the digital version of
Descartes mechanism. Some sums it by "no magical trick".
at one time I thought I did but you tell me over and over again that
I am only saying that in step 3 you confuse the 3-view on the 1-views
(yes, there are two people alive and believing being John Clark in W
and M), and the 1-views on the 1-view obtained. (each obtained John
Clark has to notice one result of self-localization; which can only be
W, or M.
and as the term is not in common usage and you invented it then you
are the final authority on that question.
I did not invent it. Come one. the version I give is more precise, as
it single out the choice of substitution level.
It is implied by all other forms in the literature. So its
consequences are very general.
If you say I don't understand "comp" then I believe you, however
that doesn't mean that I also believe that you understand "comp".
You understand comp, which is step 0, but you have a difficulty to
handle the 1p and 3p views.
>> and then ask if the Helsinki man will survive in M OR W; so who's
the one that's really confused around here?
> Read the precise sentence. I ask to the guy in Helsinki how he
evaluates the chance to feel to be the one in Moscow.
That's another reason your thought experiment is worthless, you ask
how "he" will evaluate "his" chances and that depends entirely on
the prejudices and whims of the individual involved, perhaps "he"
thinks "he" will enter oblivion or perhaps "he" thinks that "he"
will feel to be in heaven.
That's true also for any physical experience.
But the main problem is that you're striving to somehow get the
Helsinki man to remember the future,
To predict it.
Precisely to predict its personal memory of the past, in the future.
This is what we do already when we throw a coin.
Suppose I iterate the duplication, but actually I lied to you, and I
after anesthesy I use plane, and coin to decide between W and M. Would
you been able to tell the difference (without looking at the other
and there is just no way to do that.
But the helsinki guy is sure that it will be W or M. So he has partial
information at least, and P(W) = P(M) = 1/2, in that protocole is
justified by the numerical identity of the two person just before they
open the door.
What you can do is get the Washington and Moscow man to remember the
past, and BOTH of them remember being the Helsinki man.
Indeed. that is why both knows that the prediction W & M is wrong, as
both lived only W, or only M. Both understand that "W or M" was
correct, unless a copy comes back from Vienna, but that is impossible,
given the protocol.
And if by "Helsinki man" you mean the guy experiencing Helsinki with
a body in that city and you say "the body read in Helsinki is
annihilated" then the Helsinki man doesn't remember anything at all
after the experiment. If the Helsinki body is not destroyed and is
allowed to function after the duplication then the Helsinki man
remembers remaining to be the Helsinki man and remembers going about
his business as usual in Helsinki with nothing at all odd going on
and never having a single thought about either Washington or Moscow.
To be a valid you've got to observe things before and after the
experiment and ask the various parties involved after the experiment
what they remember, you just can't ask them before the experiment to
remember the future.
But I ask only to predict it, with some measure of chance for the
And in general thought experiments are worthwhile when they involve
questions like "what do you see?" or "what can you discriminate
between?" or "what do you remember?" NOT "what do you believe you
But this is needed to keep in mind that we don't ask for a body
localization, but for a first person experience, which is the key
object in cognitive science, especially in the mind-body problem.
or "what would you prefer?"
and certainly not "what do you remember about the future?".
This has never been asked.
We only ask to the Helsinki guy where he expect to feel after being
duplicated. A 12 years old can understand that he can only be
indeterminate, and say something like "W or M, but not both".
You are just confusing the 3-view on the 1-views, with the 1-views
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