On 15 Nov 2012, at 16:27, John Clark wrote:
On Wed, Nov 14, 2012 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>> If he's a devout Muslim he believes he will go to heaven with 77
virgins when he pushes that button, but as I said I really don't
care what he believes will happen, I care about what will happen.
> That was my point. What happen does not depend on the beliefs.
Then why in the name of all that's holy do you keep going on and on
about what the man expects to happen? What the Helsinki man expects
to happen depends entirely on the particular man involved. The
Muslim will be very surprised after he pushes the button when he
doesn't see 77 virgins that he was so certain he would see.
Not if he bet on comp, which is part of the protocol.
I would not be at all surprised to see what I see after I push the
button. And even though you make the exact same predictions I do
nevertheless you say you would be surprised to see what you see
after you push the button, apparently you would be surprised to find
out that you were correct.
You keep looking at this backward and trying to establish a chain of
identity from the present to the future
Yes, the question is about a prediction.
but that's never going to work, you've got to look from the present
to the past.
Yes, for confirming or infirming the prediction, or for having
evidences for a next prediction.
I know for certain that I am the John Clark of yesterday because I
remember being him;
Yes, and that is why "you" makes sense after the duplication, and why
we have to interview the two copies.
if the Many Worlds theory is true then I'm not the only one who was
John Clark of yesterday and some of them are now experiencing things
that the John Clark of yesterday would say were astronomically (but
not infinitely) unlikely,
So you agree there is a probability of some sort involved.
some are now experiencing vastly different things than I am now, but
that doesn't make me or them any less the John Clark of yesterday.
I am the John Clark of yesterday from my viewpoint, and the John
Clark who was just elected Pope is the John Clark of yesterday from
his viewpoint, and the John Clark who decided to become a rodeo
clown is the John Clark of yesterday from his viewpoint. As for the
John Clark of yesterday himself he has no voice in any of this
because he is no longer around.
And I know nothing for certain about the John Clark of tomorrow, I
don't even know if he will exist.
Keep in mind the theoretical protocol.
>> he is not the only Helsinki man because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED,
and that means the 1P view has been duplicated too
> As seen from the 3-views on the 1-views. But not as seen by the 1-
views.
Who's "1-views"? Find somebody after the experiment who complains
"my view was not duplicated"! I dare you, show me!
Both, from their 1-views. Both feel to be in once city, never both,
and the question is about what they will feel.
>> and that means the 1P view from the 1P view has been duplicated
too, and that means the 1P view from the 1P view from the 1P view
has been duplicated too....
>As seen each time from some 3-view, but that is not what is asked.
So even after a infinity of iterations you still think there has not
been enough peeing and you can still factor out a p. Well where the
hell is it?
Each copies gives rise to one.
>> There is nothing in those diaries, nothing about the bodies and
no third party description that I failed to predict.
> Indeed, but you fail to predict the first party description
Using a word like "the" implies there is only one first party
description and of course that is untrue because YOU HAVE BEEN
DUPLICATED.
No, each 1-view remains one and integral. After an an iteration of the
WM-duplication each have a precise history like WWWMWMMWWMMWMMMMWW.
The majority, when they do a statistical study can predict P = 1/2. If
they count themselves they will find that the proportion W/M gives the
coefficient of Newton's binomial, etc.
And before you start peeing I should tell you that I don't know what
a 3p of a 1p is, much less a future 3p of a 1p.
It is easy. We have many people, all pretending (rightly) to be John
Clark, and all having a memory of a precise definite history like the
one above. A 3p on the 1p is what happens when we ascribe a
consciousness to others, and this poses no problems, as we assume comp
and the correctness of the level, and no bugs, so all such questions
are easy to answer.
> like if by some magic, you are all the copies at once, which would
contradict comp.
I don't care if it contradicts "comp" or not, I'm not its advocate
Yes, you are. This is clear from your post to others.
and apparently know next to nothing about it. You keep telling me
that "comp" implies all sorts of loony screwy things stuff that is
clearly untrue,
Only for you. Try to convince some one else.
so I can only conclude that whatever "comp" means I don't believe a
word of it.
We have agreed (at step zero) what is comp. Of course, now that you
see the conequence, you can also decide to abandon comp, but then what
is the other theory you would suggest.
And the Helsinki man being all the copies is only a contradiction if
you look at things through the wrong end of the telescope, its
perfectly logical if you look from the present into the past.
Nobody can be, from the 1p view, more than one people, assuming again
comp and the fact that the duplication are done at the right level,
and so does not produce altered state of consciousness with non
standard feeling, like possibly feeling to be two people. Keep in mind
that the reasoning go through with "robots" once you give them the
diaries, self-localization tools, and minimal inductive inference
ability.
> After the pushing on the button, nobody is in helsinki.
Correct.
> But the helsinki man survived in W and M,
Correct. And I note with pleasure that you said "and" not "or".
> where both copies agree they are in once city
Correct.
> and that they could not predict which one in advance.
That depends on who's doing the prediction,
The prediction has always been asked to the Helsinki man before he
pushes on the button, and when he knows the protocol and bet on comp.
I could make the correct prediction while the Muslim could not and
would be surprised when he doesn't find his 77 virgins; but of
course a bad prediction will not destroy his identity. The Muslim
Helsinki man may be surprise to find himself in Washington and the
Muslim Helsinki man may be surprise to find himself in Moscow but
both remember being the Muslim Helsinki man so both are him, and
predictions, good or bad, have nothing to do with it.
The question is asked to anyone willing to assume comp.
Bad predictions are made all the time but that doesn't mean the
thing making them ceases to exist, just look at Romney and the
Republican party of the USA.
>> you are still confused by the fact that "I" is no longer singular
because I HAS BEEN DUPLICATED AND SO HAS ALL OF I'S VIEWPOINTS.
> Obviosuly not from the 1p perspective.
Obviously?! If duplicating your body and your brain as perfectly as
Mr. Heisenberg allows does not duplicate your consciousness FROM ANY
PERSPECTIVE then there must be a way to distinguish between the two.
How is that done?
By asking them where they feel to be after opening the reconstitution
box, after pushing the button in Helsinki.
I've got to say that your comments like the above make me want to
pull my hair out. Yes you say, I understand that I the Helsinki man
am now the Moscow man AND the Washington man.
No, from the 1p, after pushing the button and opening the box, you
*feel* to be only the M man, or the W man. This is not in
contraidction with the fact that they both feel to have been the
Hlsinki man. I have no clue which problem you have.
Yes you say, I understand that I have been duplicated. Yes you say I
understand that now I was one but now I am TWO.
Intellectually. In the 3p view, but you, whoever you can be after
pushing the button will feel to be only one of the copy.
You say you understand all that, and then you ask "but which ONE am
I?". AHRRRRR!
Because it is simple to understand that you will feel to remain unique
and in only one city, as you agree all the time, even above.
>> even if the Helsinki man was Bruno Marchal, even he made the
correct prediction. Bruno Marchal predicted that 2 people will feel
to be the Helsinki man and Bruno Marchal predicted that nobody will
be experiencing Helsinki anymore because the body there has been
destroyed, and Bruno Marchal predicted that both people who feel
like the Helsinki man will be experiencing one and only one city
> I ask to evaluate the chance, for the Helsinki man, to find itself
in W
100%
> or in M.
100%
So P(W) = 100% and P(M) = 100%.
Yet W and M, as first person self-localization are exclusive. So you
are simply wrong, or just not answering the question asked.
> he knows that he will survive in the usual sense, and that he will
feel to be in only once city
That's what he'll believe if he's free of superstition and thinks
clearly, and he will also believe that "he" will no longer be
singular because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED;
he will not longer be singular, but both copies will still feel
singular, and the question was about that feeling.
if he doesn't think clearly he will expect other things to happen
when he pushes that button. But we're talking about questions of
identity and in that it doesn't matter a hill of beans how good or
bad the Helsinki man is at predicting, all that matters is who
remembers being the Helsinki man.
Yes, and we already know that both exemplars will correctly believe
they were the H man. But they will also realize that for now they are
each either the W OR the M man.
You keep looking through the wrong end of the telescope, you've got
to look from the present to the past not to the future, there may
not even be a future for you, but there was certainly a past you and
you are him, the fact that there may be others who are also the past
you, that is to say others who remember being you yesterday, in no
way changes your identity, you are still Bruno Marchal.
>> The answer is that the Washington man goes to Washington and the
Moscow man goes to Moscow. Where is the indeterminacy?
> In the mind of the helsinki man, before pushing on the button,
concerning his chance to feel to be the one in W (or M).
You have said the Moscow man is the Helsinki man AND you have said
that the Washington man is the Helsinki man and I agree with you
100%; so if the Helsinki man is confused about what will happen when
he pushes that button he's not thinking clearly, but that's OK, it
won't effect what actually does happen.
>> the answer to the Helsinki man's question is that he, the
Helsinki man, will survive in both Moscow AND Washington from the
Helsinki man's viewpoint.
> He might know that he will survive in both city,
He'll know that if he's smart, if he's not smart he won't know that
but it doesn't matter, he'll still be fine because survival is a
matter of remembering not predicting.
> but he knows that the question is asked about the future 1p-view,
The future 1p-view of the Washington man will be that he is the
Helsinki man and the future 1p-view of the Moscow man will be that
he is the Helsinki man and future the 1p-view of somebody
experiencing Helsinki does not exist because nobody will be
experiencing Helsinki in the future.
See above where I repeat the precise question, asked to the H man,
when he is still in Helsinki, before pushing the button.
You wanted to know about the future 1p of the Helsinki man, and
there are only 3 people involved in your thought experiment and I
described the 1p of all of them FROM THEIR OWN 1P POINT OF VIEW,
FOR ALL OF THEM. What more is there to do?
The prediction. The evaluation, before pushing the button, of the
chance to feel in W or in M after the button has been pushed on.
> From the 1p view, he will never feel the presence of a split.
I know.
Good. you disagreed with this some times ago. You do progress.
> he pushes on a button, and then do a self-localization,
In other words the environment causes a change in him and the two
exact copies of the Helsinki man are not exact anymore and so become
separate people
You can put it that way, but the indeterminacy comes from the
duplication, follow by the differentiation. This is used in all the
steps.
although both retain a equal right to call themselves the Helsinki
man, they have a equal right to claim to be the answer to the
question asked yesterday "what will the future 1p of me the Helsinki
man be?".
The question is asked before, and the confirmation is asked to all of
them. And none can agree with W and M, as none live the experience of
"being in Washington" (W) and "being in Moscow" (M). So P = 1/2 is, in
that protocol the simplest most reasonable answer.
I see only hand-waving to evade the, rather simple, question asked.
You might try to convince someone else, as I begin to feel you get the
point since the start, and have only problem to assess it (why? I
don't know).
Bruno
And I'm getting tired of peeing.
John K Clark
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