On 15 Nov 2012, at 16:27, John Clark wrote:

On Wed, Nov 14, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>> If he's a devout Muslim he believes he will go to heaven with 77 virgins when he pushes that button, but as I said I really don't care what he believes will happen, I care about what will happen.

> That was my point. What happen does not depend on the beliefs.

Then why in the name of all that's holy do you keep going on and on about what the man expects to happen? What the Helsinki man expects to happen depends entirely on the particular man involved. The Muslim will be very surprised after he pushes the button when he doesn't see 77 virgins that he was so certain he would see.

Not if he bet on comp, which is part of the protocol.




I would not be at all surprised to see what I see after I push the button. And even though you make the exact same predictions I do nevertheless you say you would be surprised to see what you see after you push the button, apparently you would be surprised to find out that you were correct.

You keep looking at this backward and trying to establish a chain of identity from the present to the future

Yes, the question is about a prediction.




but that's never going to work, you've got to look from the present to the past.

Yes, for confirming or infirming the prediction, or for having evidences for a next prediction.



I know for certain that I am the John Clark of yesterday because I remember being him;

Yes, and that is why "you" makes sense after the duplication, and why we have to interview the two copies.




if the Many Worlds theory is true then I'm not the only one who was John Clark of yesterday and some of them are now experiencing things that the John Clark of yesterday would say were astronomically (but not infinitely) unlikely,

So you agree there is a probability of some sort involved.




some are now experiencing vastly different things than I am now, but that doesn't make me or them any less the John Clark of yesterday. I am the John Clark of yesterday from my viewpoint, and the John Clark who was just elected Pope is the John Clark of yesterday from his viewpoint, and the John Clark who decided to become a rodeo clown is the John Clark of yesterday from his viewpoint. As for the John Clark of yesterday himself he has no voice in any of this because he is no longer around.

And I know nothing for certain about the John Clark of tomorrow, I don't even know if he will exist.

Keep in mind the theoretical protocol.




>> he is not the only Helsinki man because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED, and that means the 1P view has been duplicated too

> As seen from the 3-views on the 1-views. But not as seen by the 1- views.

Who's "1-views"? Find somebody after the experiment who complains "my view was not duplicated"! I dare you, show me!

Both, from their 1-views. Both feel to be in once city, never both, and the question is about what they will feel.





>> and that means the 1P view from the 1P view has been duplicated too, and that means the 1P view from the 1P view from the 1P view has been duplicated too....

>As seen each time from some 3-view, but that is not what is asked.

So even after a infinity of iterations you still think there has not been enough peeing and you can still factor out a p. Well where the hell is it?

Each copies gives rise to one.




>> There is nothing in those diaries, nothing about the bodies and no third party description that I failed to predict.

> Indeed, but you fail to predict the first party description

Using a word like "the" implies there is only one first party description and of course that is untrue because YOU HAVE BEEN DUPLICATED.

No, each 1-view remains one and integral. After an an iteration of the WM-duplication each have a precise history like WWWMWMMWWMMWMMMMWW. The majority, when they do a statistical study can predict P = 1/2. If they count themselves they will find that the proportion W/M gives the coefficient of Newton's binomial, etc.





And before you start peeing I should tell you that I don't know what a 3p of a 1p is, much less a future 3p of a 1p.

It is easy. We have many people, all pretending (rightly) to be John Clark, and all having a memory of a precise definite history like the one above. A 3p on the 1p is what happens when we ascribe a consciousness to others, and this poses no problems, as we assume comp and the correctness of the level, and no bugs, so all such questions are easy to answer.




> like if by some magic, you are all the copies at once, which would contradict comp.

I don't care if it contradicts "comp" or not, I'm not its advocate

Yes, you are. This is clear from your post to others.



and apparently know next to nothing about it. You keep telling me that "comp" implies all sorts of loony screwy things stuff that is clearly untrue,

Only for you. Try to convince some one else.



so I can only conclude that whatever "comp" means I don't believe a word of it.

We have agreed (at step zero) what is comp. Of course, now that you see the conequence, you can also decide to abandon comp, but then what is the other theory you would suggest.




And the Helsinki man being all the copies is only a contradiction if you look at things through the wrong end of the telescope, its perfectly logical if you look from the present into the past.

Nobody can be, from the 1p view, more than one people, assuming again comp and the fact that the duplication are done at the right level, and so does not produce altered state of consciousness with non standard feeling, like possibly feeling to be two people. Keep in mind that the reasoning go through with "robots" once you give them the diaries, self-localization tools, and minimal inductive inference ability.





> After the pushing on the button, nobody is in helsinki.

Correct.

> But the helsinki man survived in W and M,

Correct. And I note with pleasure that you said "and" not "or".

> where both copies agree they are in once city

Correct.

> and that they could not predict which one in advance.

That depends on who's doing the prediction,

The prediction has always been asked to the Helsinki man before he pushes on the button, and when he knows the protocol and bet on comp.




I could make the correct prediction while the Muslim could not and would be surprised when he doesn't find his 77 virgins; but of course a bad prediction will not destroy his identity. The Muslim Helsinki man may be surprise to find himself in Washington and the Muslim Helsinki man may be surprise to find himself in Moscow but both remember being the Muslim Helsinki man so both are him, and predictions, good or bad, have nothing to do with it.

The question is asked to anyone willing to assume comp.




Bad predictions are made all the time but that doesn't mean the thing making them ceases to exist, just look at Romney and the Republican party of the USA.

>> you are still confused by the fact that "I" is no longer singular because I HAS BEEN DUPLICATED AND SO HAS ALL OF I'S VIEWPOINTS.

> Obviosuly not from the 1p perspective.

Obviously?! If duplicating your body and your brain as perfectly as Mr. Heisenberg allows does not duplicate your consciousness FROM ANY PERSPECTIVE then there must be a way to distinguish between the two. How is that done?

By asking them where they feel to be after opening the reconstitution box, after pushing the button in Helsinki.




I've got to say that your comments like the above make me want to pull my hair out. Yes you say, I understand that I the Helsinki man am now the Moscow man AND the Washington man.

No, from the 1p, after pushing the button and opening the box, you *feel* to be only the M man, or the W man. This is not in contraidction with the fact that they both feel to have been the Hlsinki man. I have no clue which problem you have.




Yes you say, I understand that I have been duplicated. Yes you say I understand that now I was one but now I am TWO.

Intellectually. In the 3p view, but you, whoever you can be after pushing the button will feel to be only one of the copy.



You say you understand all that, and then you ask "but which ONE am I?". AHRRRRR!

Because it is simple to understand that you will feel to remain unique and in only one city, as you agree all the time, even above.






>> even if the Helsinki man was Bruno Marchal, even he made the correct prediction. Bruno Marchal predicted that 2 people will feel to be the Helsinki man and Bruno Marchal predicted that nobody will be experiencing Helsinki anymore because the body there has been destroyed, and Bruno Marchal predicted that both people who feel like the Helsinki man will be experiencing one and only one city

> I ask to evaluate the chance, for the Helsinki man, to find itself in W

100%

> or in M.

100%


So P(W) = 100% and P(M) = 100%.

Yet W and M, as first person self-localization are exclusive. So you are simply wrong, or just not answering the question asked.




> he knows that he will survive in the usual sense, and that he will feel to be in only once city

That's what he'll believe if he's free of superstition and thinks clearly, and he will also believe that "he" will no longer be singular because HE HAS BEEN DUPLICATED;

he will not longer be singular, but both copies will still feel singular, and the question was about that feeling.




if he doesn't think clearly he will expect other things to happen when he pushes that button. But we're talking about questions of identity and in that it doesn't matter a hill of beans how good or bad the Helsinki man is at predicting, all that matters is who remembers being the Helsinki man.

Yes, and we already know that both exemplars will correctly believe they were the H man. But they will also realize that for now they are each either the W OR the M man.





You keep looking through the wrong end of the telescope, you've got to look from the present to the past not to the future, there may not even be a future for you, but there was certainly a past you and you are him, the fact that there may be others who are also the past you, that is to say others who remember being you yesterday, in no way changes your identity, you are still Bruno Marchal.

>> The answer is that the Washington man goes to Washington and the Moscow man goes to Moscow. Where is the indeterminacy?

> In the mind of the helsinki man, before pushing on the button, concerning his chance to feel to be the one in W (or M).

You have said the Moscow man is the Helsinki man AND you have said that the Washington man is the Helsinki man and I agree with you 100%; so if the Helsinki man is confused about what will happen when he pushes that button he's not thinking clearly, but that's OK, it won't effect what actually does happen.

>> the answer to the Helsinki man's question is that he, the Helsinki man, will survive in both Moscow AND Washington from the Helsinki man's viewpoint.

> He might know that he will survive in both city,

He'll know that if he's smart, if he's not smart he won't know that but it doesn't matter, he'll still be fine because survival is a matter of remembering not predicting.

> but he knows that the question is asked about the future 1p-view,

The future 1p-view of the Washington man will be that he is the Helsinki man and the future 1p-view of the Moscow man will be that he is the Helsinki man and future the 1p-view of somebody experiencing Helsinki does not exist because nobody will be experiencing Helsinki in the future.

See above where I repeat the precise question, asked to the H man, when he is still in Helsinki, before pushing the button.




You wanted to know about the future 1p of the Helsinki man, and there are only 3 people involved in your thought experiment and I described the 1p of all of them FROM THEIR OWN 1P POINT OF VIEW, FOR ALL OF THEM. What more is there to do?

The prediction. The evaluation, before pushing the button, of the chance to feel in W or in M after the button has been pushed on.




> From the 1p view, he will never feel the presence of a split.

I know.

Good. you disagreed with this some times ago. You do progress.



> he pushes on a button, and then do a self-localization,

In other words the environment causes a change in him and the two exact copies of the Helsinki man are not exact anymore and so become separate people

You can put it that way, but the indeterminacy comes from the duplication, follow by the differentiation. This is used in all the steps.




although both retain a equal right to call themselves the Helsinki man, they have a equal right to claim to be the answer to the question asked yesterday "what will the future 1p of me the Helsinki man be?".

The question is asked before, and the confirmation is asked to all of them. And none can agree with W and M, as none live the experience of "being in Washington" (W) and "being in Moscow" (M). So P = 1/2 is, in that protocol the simplest most reasonable answer.

I see only hand-waving to evade the, rather simple, question asked. You might try to convince someone else, as I begin to feel you get the point since the start, and have only problem to assess it (why? I don't know).

Bruno





And I'm getting tired of peeing.

John K Clark




--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en .

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to