On 11/12/2012 11:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/10/2012 10:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)
COMP -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP
I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what really
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.
But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction. There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has not
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted. That's
why I brought up the location of consciousness. Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location and
not reason to be associated with a particular body.
I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.
But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from
COMP? Is it just an anthropic selection argument?
Hi Brent,
This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp
seems to only define a single conscious mind!
?
That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different conscious
mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M.
Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite different
conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and perhaps God.
You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian machine
common to them.
Dear Bruno,
I am trying to figure out how you differentiate "individual
persons" (which seem to be distinguished by their relative locations -
such as being in Moscow and being in Washington) from the abstract
Löbian machine common to them.
Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality of
numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto a
plurality of minds.
It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with
different experiences and minds.
What distiguishes the different machines? My question follows from
the way that Godel numbering makes the natural ordering of the Integers
vanish unless there is a way to keep the native identity of the integers
separated from the Godel numbers and from the universal numbers.
It seems to me that if we allow got Godel numbering schemes to code
propositions then we cause the uniqueness of number identity to
become degenerate. For example: 0123456789 can mean many things. It
can be a particular number, it can be a Godel code for some other
number, it can be a string of numbers...
A number support a person only relatively to a universal number. You
have the same problem with any notion of states description in
physics, or in any theory.
How are the universal numbers distinguished from each other at the
Platonic level?
--
Onward!
Stephen
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