On 12 Nov 2012, at 17:08, Bruno Marchal wrote:
On 11 Nov 2012, at 21:16, Stephen P. King wrote:
On 11/10/2012 10:02 PM, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 5:44 PM, Russell Standish wrote:
On Sat, Nov 10, 2012 at 05:14:47PM -0800, meekerdb wrote:
On 11/10/2012 1:31 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No problem. UDA shows the equivalent propositions: (MAT is weak
materialism: the doctrine that there is a primitive physical
reality)
COMP -> NOT MAT
MAT -> NOT COMP
NOT MAT or NOT COMP
I keep COMP as a working hypothesis, as I have no clue what
really
MAT means or explains, and we don't find a contradiction, just a
weirdness close to quantum Everett.
But more accurately, we have not yet found a contradiction. There
may be a contradiction with empirical observation, but COMP has
not
made many definite predictions that could be contradicted. That's
why I brought up the location of consciousness. Empirically
consciousness is associated with a center body (an essential point
of the duplication experiment), yet so far as I can see COMP would
predict that a consciousness should have no particular location
and
not reason to be associated with a particular body.
I think the argument is that association with a body (or brain)
is required for intersubjectivity between minds. It is an
anti-solipsism requirement.
But how does the requirement for intersubjectivity follow from
COMP? Is it just an anthropic selection argument?
Hi Brent,
This is what I wish to know and understand as well! AFAIK, comp
seems to only define a single conscious mind!
?
That is contradicted by step 3, which features two different
conscious mind, one in Moscow, and the other in M.
Then after UDA we know that arithmetic is full of quite different
conscious entities, from machines to many Gods and perhaps God.
You might confuse individual persons and the abstract Löbian machine
common to them.
Bruno talks about plurality but never shows how the plurality of
numbers and their mutual exclusive identities transfers onto a
plurality of minds.
It seems obvious, as arithmetic allow different machines with
different experiences and minds.
Once I said that I am open to the idea that there is only one first
person.
That might also be confused with solipsism.
Again, this is truly even more at the opposite of solipsism. It is the
case where not only you attribute consciousness to others, but you
attribute to them your own identity, where solipsism denies them
consciousness and subjective identity (and thus consider them as
zombie). To say that there is only person is very natural in the
context of the WM duplication experience, where from the 3-view, you
are in both cities, and then you differentiate, but you can still
consider or understand that the doppelganger is "you", put in a
different context, and then you can generalize and get the idea that
we are all the same original amoeba, but put in a quite big set of
variate experiences and sensations, which deludes us about our
identity and we fail to recognize ourselves in the others.
Bruno
It seems to me that if we allow got Godel numbering schemes to code
propositions then we cause the uniqueness of number identity to
become degenerate. For example: 0123456789 can mean many things. It
can be a particular number, it can be a Godel code for some other
number, it can be a string of numbers...
A number support a person only relatively to a universal number. You
have the same problem with any notion of states description in
physics, or in any theory.
Bruno
Brent
Personally, I think the association is required for self-awareness,
leading me to the conclusion that self-awareness (aka Loebianity)
is
required for consciousness. I know that I disagree with Bruno on
this
matter, who sees consciousness everywhere, but Loebianity more
restricted.
Cheers
--
Onward!
Stephen
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