On 16 Nov 2012, at 23:08, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
> Yes, the question is about a prediction.
And my question is why is the question about prediction rather than
remembering which would make far more sense. Using prediction to
establish a chain of custody for your personal identity works about
as well as pushing on a string. you've got to use memory and look
from the present to the past, give it a try, try pulling that string.
>> And I know nothing for certain about the John Clark of tomorrow,
I don't even know if he will exist.
> Keep in mind the theoretical protocol.
It is a theoretical and practical and empirical fact that I will
never know as much about the future John Clark as the past John
Clark, it's why the arrow of time has a direction.
> By asking them where they feel to be after opening the
reconstitution box, after pushing the button in Helsinki.
And "them" will answer "I feel like I'm only in Washington" AND "I
feel like I'm only in Moscow".
>> I've got to say that your comments like the above make me want to
pull my hair out. Yes you say, I understand that I the Helsinki man
am now the Moscow man AND the Washington man.
> No, from the 1p, after pushing the button and opening the box, you
Who feels? Bruno Marchal admitted that both the Washington and the
Moscow man are "you", so who is "you" in the above? it can't be
someone experiencing Helsinki because nobody is anymore.
> to be only the M man, or the W man. This is not in contraidction
with the fact that they both feel to have been the Hlsinki man.
But pronouns like "you" and "I" can't be tossed around and expect
to be clear.
>> Yes you say, I understand that I have been duplicated. Yes you
say I understand that now I was one but now I am TWO.
> Intellectually. In the 3p view, but you, whoever you can be after
pushing the button
You being the Washington man AND the Moscow man.
> will feel to be only one of the copy.
Yes the Washington man will and yes the Moscow man will, in other
words yes you will .
>> You say you understand all that, and then you ask "but which ONE
am I?". AHRRRRR!
> Because it is simple to understand that you[...]
STOP HIDING BEHIND PRONOUNS! Who the hell is "you"??
There is no problem with the pronouns (a point made technically
precise in the mathematical translation of the UDA).
"You" mean the Helsinki guy. There is one you before, and two you
after. The you before must make a prediction on the result of the
future self-localization, and the confirmation is asked to any of the
obtained new you.
There is no need to dig on the personal identity issue, as the
question pertains on a result of self-localization and it concerns all
possible you (first person) accessible in the experiment. In that
setting we can use the simple apporximation of the first person notion
by the content of the directly accessible memory or diary (as opposed
to some diary and memories appearing in a far away city).
>> he will not longer be singular, but both copies will still feel
singular, and the question was about that feeling.
If Bruno doesn't like the answer then Bruno should ask the question
without using pronouns and without peeing.
> I repeat the precise question, asked to the H man, when he is
still in Helsinki, before pushing the button.
After he pushes that button the probability that the guy who is
still experiencing Helsinki will see Washington or Moscow or
Helsinki or anything else is zero because there is no longer a guy
who is experiencing Helsinki.
To remain the Helsinki guy, you need only to remember having been the
Helsinki guy. That's the case of both the W and M guy.
If not, not only we would die at each instant, but this even in a
strong sense making impossible to make any prediction, and so there
would no more be any physical laws at all.
>>> From the 1p view, he will never feel the presence of a split.
> I know.
> Good. you disagreed with this some times ago.
Excellent. So now you agree that phenomenologically the comp
indeterminacy is similar as the quantum indeterminacy in the Everett
formulation of QM. Of course the reason of the indeterminacy is
different (quantum superposition is different from classical
duplication). Yet, after step 8, a point is made that the quantum
superposition has to be a particular case of the global (arithmetical,
Comp generalizes Everett embedding of the subject into the object from
QM to arithmetic, as arithmetic implements naturally all computations,
and the UD Argument explains why we are intrinsically ignorant about
which computations supports us. Indeed the physical laws themselves
will have to be justified from the statistic pertaining on all
computations (a notion which makes sense thanks to Church thesis).
>> In other words the environment causes a change in him and the two
exact copies of the Helsinki man are not exact anymore and so become
> You can put it that way,
> but the indeterminacy comes from the duplication, follow by the
differentiation. This is used in all the steps.
I know, and that's exactly why its pointless of me to read all the
Why? Still avoiding to put yourself in the place of the copies? Still
predicting "W and M", when it is obvious that W and M are first person
You don't even succeed in convincing anyone that you do have some
rational problem with what I say. You just forget, (or fake to
forget?), that with comp, whoever you can become will observe just a
specific outcome of the self-localization procedure. You take some
distance and argue that you will be both copies, but you have already
betrayed many times that you know that this will be false from all
their accessible 1p perspective, and the prediction question concerns
exactly that 1p perspective. Try to move on step 4, because your
resistance to it does not seem to be based on reason.
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