On 16 Nov 2012, at 23:08, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Nov 16, 2012 at 11:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Yes, the question is about a prediction.

And my question is why is the question about prediction rather than remembering which would make far more sense. Using prediction to establish a chain of custody for your personal identity works about as well as pushing on a string. you've got to use memory and look from the present to the past, give it a try, try pulling that string.

>> And I know nothing for certain about the John Clark of tomorrow, I don't even know if he will exist.

> Keep in mind the theoretical protocol.

It is a theoretical and practical and empirical fact that I will never know as much about the future John Clark as the past John Clark, it's why the arrow of time has a direction.

> By asking them where they feel to be after opening the reconstitution box, after pushing the button in Helsinki.

And "them" will answer "I feel like I'm only in Washington" AND "I feel like I'm only in Moscow".

>> I've got to say that your comments like the above make me want to pull my hair out. Yes you say, I understand that I the Helsinki man am now the Moscow man AND the Washington man.

> No, from the 1p, after pushing the button and opening the box, you *feel*[...]

Who feels? Bruno Marchal admitted that both the Washington and the Moscow man are "you", so who is "you" in the above? it can't be someone experiencing Helsinki because nobody is anymore.

> to be only the M man, or the W man. This is not in contraidction with the fact that they both feel to have been the Hlsinki man.

But pronouns like "you" and "I" can't be tossed around and expect to be clear.

>> Yes you say, I understand that I have been duplicated. Yes you say I understand that now I was one but now I am TWO.

> Intellectually. In the 3p view, but you, whoever you can be after pushing the button

You being the Washington man AND the Moscow man.

> will feel to be only one of the copy.

Yes the Washington man will and yes the Moscow man will, in other words yes you will .

>> You say you understand all that, and then you ask "but which ONE am I?". AHRRRRR!

> Because it is simple to understand that you[...]

STOP HIDING BEHIND PRONOUNS! Who the hell is "you"??

There is no problem with the pronouns (a point made technically precise in the mathematical translation of the UDA).

"You" mean the Helsinki guy. There is one you before, and two you after. The you before must make a prediction on the result of the future self-localization, and the confirmation is asked to any of the obtained new you.

There is no need to dig on the personal identity issue, as the question pertains on a result of self-localization and it concerns all possible you (first person) accessible in the experiment. In that setting we can use the simple apporximation of the first person notion by the content of the directly accessible memory or diary (as opposed to some diary and memories appearing in a far away city).





>> he will not longer be singular, but both copies will still feel singular, and the question was about that feeling.

If Bruno doesn't like the answer then Bruno should ask the question without using pronouns and without peeing.

> I repeat the precise question, asked to the H man, when he is still in Helsinki, before pushing the button.

After he pushes that button the probability that the guy who is still experiencing Helsinki will see Washington or Moscow or Helsinki or anything else is zero because there is no longer a guy who is experiencing Helsinki.

To remain the Helsinki guy, you need only to remember having been the Helsinki guy. That's the case of both the W and M guy. If not, not only we would die at each instant, but this even in a strong sense making impossible to make any prediction, and so there would no more be any physical laws at all.





>>>  From the 1p view, he will never feel the presence of a split.

> I know.

> Good. you disagreed with this some times ago.

BULLSHIT!

Excellent. So now you agree that phenomenologically the comp indeterminacy is similar as the quantum indeterminacy in the Everett formulation of QM. Of course the reason of the indeterminacy is different (quantum superposition is different from classical duplication). Yet, after step 8, a point is made that the quantum superposition has to be a particular case of the global (arithmetical, UD-based) indeterminacy.

Comp generalizes Everett embedding of the subject into the object from QM to arithmetic, as arithmetic implements naturally all computations, and the UD Argument explains why we are intrinsically ignorant about which computations supports us. Indeed the physical laws themselves will have to be justified from the statistic pertaining on all computations (a notion which makes sense thanks to Church thesis).




>> In other words the environment causes a change in him and the two exact copies of the Helsinki man are not exact anymore and so become separate people

> You can put it that way,

I know.

> but the indeterminacy comes from the duplication, follow by the differentiation. This is used in all the steps.

I know, and that's exactly why its pointless of me to read all the steps.

Why? Still avoiding to put yourself in the place of the copies? Still predicting "W and M", when it is obvious that W and M are first person exclusive?

You don't even succeed in convincing anyone that you do have some rational problem with what I say. You just forget, (or fake to forget?), that with comp, whoever you can become will observe just a specific outcome of the self-localization procedure. You take some distance and argue that you will be both copies, but you have already betrayed many times that you know that this will be false from all their accessible 1p perspective, and the prediction question concerns exactly that 1p perspective. Try to move on step 4, because your resistance to it does not seem to be based on reason.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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