On 17 Nov 2012, at 19:46, John Clark wrote:
On Sat, Nov 17, 2012 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> "You" mean the Helsinki guy.
OK, so if you are the Helsinki guy and the Helsinki guy is the guy
who is still experiencing Helsinki
?
We just agreed that the helsinki man is the one who remember Helsinki,
so that both the W and M man are still the Helsinki man.
then the answer to the question "what city will you see when you
push that button?" is no city at all.
> To remain the Helsinki guy, you need only to remember having been
the Helsinki guy.
OK, so if you are the Helsinki guy and the Helsinki guy is the guy
who remembers being the Helsinki guy and BOTH the Moscow man AND the
Washington man remember being the Helsinki guy then the answer to
the question "what city will you see when you push that button?" is
Washington only AND Moscow only,
But seeing W only and M only is a contradiction, from the 1p view.
None of the copies will write in their unique diary "I see W only and
I see M only".
because "you" HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. And no amount of peeing is going
to get you out of this mess.
> There is no problem with the pronouns
Far from being a problem pronouns, especially personal pronouns, are
absolutely essential for Bruno to communicate ideas, without them
and the ambiguity they invariably produce the logical absurdity that
Bruno's proof is based on would stand out in stark relief. Pronouns
are good hiding places from that pesky thing called logical analysis.
Read AUDA where the pronouns are handled with the recursion theoretic
tools, but this asks for more work. And you have problem only because
you confuse the 1)view and the 3-view, so it is still more simpler to
fix that misunderstanding.
> So now you agree that phenomenologically the comp indeterminacy is
similar as the quantum indeterminacy
I don't know perhaps I do agree, but before I know for sure I'll
first have to figure out what "comp" is,
We already agree. the meaning of comp is independent of what we derive
from it. Comp is just a "digital" version of Descrates mechanism
(roughly speaking the body functions like some machine)
and then figure out what phenomenological comp indeterminacy is;
fortunately I already know what quantum indeterminacy is.
In QM ithout collapse? Then this should help you as the QM
indeterminacy, in that case, can be seen as a particular case of comp
indeterminacy.
> Try to move on step 4,
In other words try to forget that step 4 and all the steps after it
are built on a foundation as sturdy as jello. Sorry I can't do that.
Well, then find a refutation of step 3, which does not confuse the 1
and 3 views, nor change the protocol.
I am all ears,
Bruno
John K Clark
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