On Sun, Dec 2, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Did you mean "I saw "W or M", which is indeed confirmed by the two
> copies? Or I saw W or I saw M, which again is confirmed by the two copies?
>

I meant that a observer who did not want to play games and honestly wanted
to convey the maximum amount of information would NOT say "from a first
person view I saw W or M". And I meant that "me" would say "I saw M" AND
"me" would say "I saw W".

> They are both me in the 3-view
>

And so obviously they are both "me" in the 1-view.

> and only one of them can be me in the 1-view.
>

"Me" disagrees with Bruno Marchal about that, Bruno Marchal should just ask
"me" and that will prove that John Clark was correct.

>> and don't give me this first party third party crap, ANYBODY that exists
>> after that button is pushed sees BOTH of them as Bruno Marchal from the
>> first, second third or any other point of view you care to name.
>>
>>
> > No
>

YES!!

> the one in W does not see the one in M as being himself in the first
> person sense
>

If they are identical the one in W does not even know if he's in W or M,
and the same is true of the one in M.

> he just agree that the other is as much the H-man s himself
>

Yes.

 > but now they have differentiated.
>

Yes but not at the instant of duplication, at the instant one sees
something the other does not.

> Only in the 3-sense [...]
>

Only in the 3-sense? ONLY?!  I repeat my request yet again, without
invoking the supernatural please give a example of 2 beings identical from
the 3p but not from the 1p.

>> If 2 things are "me" in the 3p then unless there are mystical
>> supernatural entities at work they are certainly identical in the 1p
>>
>
> > Not at all,
>

This gets to the very heart  of the matter and I could not disagree with
you more. If correct why can't a example be provided?

> they are both me in the comp sense.
>

Then what are we arguing about?

> We have agree that both the W-man and the M-man can pretend rightly that
> they are the H-man,
>

Yes.

> but their first person view have differentiated
>

Only when one sees something the other does not, as long as they stay in
those identical boxes they have not differentiated no matter how far apart
the boxes are and there is only one conscious being.

> They feel different.
>

If they have different memories of what happened after the duplication then
yes, otherwise no.

> you can't use Leibniz rule for identity.
>

I duplicate you. You and your identical copy are in 2 identical sealed
boxes. I instantaneously exchange the position of of you and the copy. A
third person cannot tell that anything has happened. You can not tell that
anything has happened. The copy can not tell that anything has happened. So
unless you can find a difference that is neither objective nor subjective
then there is no difference between you and the copy.

>> and if Bruno Marchal can dream up some other pee they're identical from
>> that viewpoint too.
>>
>
> > Then if I give a pinch to the M-man
>

Then the 2 are no longer identical and all bets are off.

> the W-man will get angry,
>

Only if you pinch the W-man too.

> showing that your view entails action at a distance, telepathy, or some
> magic of that kind.
>

Don't be ridiculous.

> you forget the point that the question is asked to the h-man, about his
> subjective future.
>

And you forget that the H-man's future bifurcates so to expect a single
answer is nuts. And I don't see how predictions of a subjective future is
of any value in a thought experiment. I make predictions of what my
subjective future will be like all the time and I turn out to be right
about as often as I'm wrong.

>>> You have to take into account all copies, to get the statistics right
>>>
>>
>> >>Well then take all the copies into account and get the statistics right
>> and tell the world the definite unambiguous result the experiment is
>> claimed to produce! Did "you" end up seeing Washington or did "you" end up
>> seeing Moscow?
>>
>
> > The point is, for the H-man, assuming comp, that he will survive one and
> entire in both city, but feel to be one city, and that he cannot predict
> which one.
>

John Clark is not interested in predictions nor in theories, John Clark
just wants a report on how a experiment turned out.

>> Under some interpretations of quantum mechanics the wave function
>> collapses and in other interpretations it does not, but regardless of which
>> philosophical interpretation is true quantum mechanics makes the same clear
>> statistical prediction of what will be observed.
>>
>
> > But without collapse QM is entirely deterministic,
>

Yes.

> and the probabilities bears only on first person point of view
>

Yes, and until about 80 years ago people thought that all probabilities
always bear only on the first person point of view; if Everett is proven
correct then people will think that way again. And I have nothing against
first person subjective probabilities as long as its clear who that first
person is.

>> Bruno Marchal is unable to give a straight answer to the simple question
>> "did "you" end up seeing Washington or did "you" end up seeing Moscow?".
>>
>
> > I did the experiment yesterday, and I saw Moscow.
>

But there is a man in Washington who yesterday also claims to be "I", and
the evidence to back up that claim seems to be just as good as the Moscow
claim, so why should I, a third party, put a check mark in the Moscow
column but not the Washington column? And if a third party is left out of
it and pencils are just handed out to both men then check marks will appear
in both the W column AND the M column.

>I suggest you use the prefix 1 and 3 for the pronouns.
>

Did the 1-I or the 3-I make that suggestion? I really want to know the
answer to that question although I doesn't know if it's the 1-I or the 3-I
that wants the answer.

 >> Without invoking the supernatural please give a example of 2 beings
>> identical from the 3p but not from the 1p.
>>
>
> > Careful. The M-man and the W-man are not identical with the H-man
>

That is obvious because nobody is experiencing Helsinki anymore.

> but they are both still the H-man,
>

Yes, although they are not identical to each other.

> in the comp surivive sense.
>

They are the H-man in any sense, except perhaps the religious bullshit
sense.

> You did agree that they have both thr right to say they are the H-man.
>

Yes.

> It is still John Clark, but in different, differentiating experience
>

Yes. And now that we've gotten all that out of the way I'm going to repeat
my request yet again, without invoking the supernatural please give a
example of 2 beings identical from the 3p but not from the 1p.

> each duplication can give only exclusive, and clear, answer to the
> question.
>

That's why if I was doing a statistical analysis on the experiment when
gathering data I'd put a check mark in BOTH the Washington and Moscow
column, but you say I'm wrong and only one check mark can be used; so what
exclusive and clear column do I put that check mark in?

> for the 1p we must interrogate all the copies, and make a statistic from
> that
>

And I have asked how exactly to go about doing that and you are unable to
say what the correct statistical procedure would be.

> when you say "if "me" sees Washington then "me" will see Washington and
if "me" sees Moscow then "me" will see Moscow", you forget that the
question is asked to the H-man.

I haven't forgotten a thing and the above is all that the H-man can say
about the matter, and it may not be deep but at least it's true.

John K Clark

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