On 07 Dec 2012, at 18:33, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Dec 6, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

>>> Doing the experience yourself

>>Which one is "yourself" after duplication?

>One of them with P = 1/2.

That neatly sums up the entire problem,


the insistence that there is only one correct answer to the question "what city will you see?" even though you have been duplicated;

Because with the CTM, you can't feel the split. You remain one and unique from any or your first person b-view after the duplication, as both copies can confirmed.

and the probability figure is worse than useless.

Not really, but you have to proceed in the reasoning to see this.

AFTER a good experiment has been performed nothing has a probability of 1/2, everything has a probability of 1 or 0.

But evaluation of future result of an experiment is done before.

After the experiment both will claim to be "yourself"

Rightly so by CTM.

and a third party would agree with both of them because a third party could not find any reason to accept one claim and reject the other.

OK, but we were specifically NOT asking for the 3-view after duplication, but for the 1-views. And both confirmed a specific city, and no ability to have been able to predict which one.

And I have NOT forgotten that each will see one city and one city only, and I have not forgotten that Bruno Marchal's question "which one will see Moscow?" is a silly question.

The question is not "which one will see Moscow". that's a silly question indeed. the question is asked before, to the H-man, and the question is "how do you evaluate the chance of living the Moscow (or Washington) experience.

Seeing Moscow is the one and only thing that turns the Helsinki man into the man who sees Moscow, so the man who sees Moscow will be the Moscow man and the Moscow man will be the man that sees Moscow. That is not deep, tautologies seldom are, but you've built your philosophy on top of it.

Trivially, but again you elude the question asked.

>> I can think of examples where you and another are identical in the 3p and the 1p, and examples where you and another are identical in the 1p but not the 3 p, but I can't think of a example where you and another are identical in the 3p but not the 1p. Can you?

> Yes, with "identical" in the sense that I am identical with me in the morning.

In other words in no sense whatsoever, you are different from what you were this morning in the 3p view and thus obviously in the 1-p view.

This contradicts the fact that you ahev agreed that both the M-man and the W-man can identify themselves with the H-man, but not with their respective doppelganger after the duplication.

You remember being Bruno Marchal this morning even though you're different,

I am different, I feel different, but I am the same person.

and Moscow is different from what it was this morning too but it's convenient to use the same word for both. People change over time and the meaning of the pronoun associated with that changing person will change over time too, and the meaning of the pronoun will change even more suddenly if a duplicating chamber is used.

But both remember the protocol, and make sense of the P=1/2, and use it correctly in future iterated experiences.

> You forget that a unique person can be in many different states.

And I hope I never remember it because that is nonsense, if there are different versions of something then it's not unique.

Then you die at each instant, and CTM becomes meaningless. There is no more sense at all for the word "survive". Even for a heart operation.

> he is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search his (unique) diary, open the door, and write "I see both W and M".

He is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search his (unique) diary, open the door, and write "I see W or M".

I meant "he will push on the button". I ill probably write only W, or only M. This makes the "W or M" prediction correct, by definition of "or".

>>> But the H-man could not have predicted before (in Helsinki) which city each of them is seeing right now

>> Each of them? In Helsinki there is no "each of them" for the Helsinki man to pick out, there is only one person.

>A person trying to evaluate the result of an experiment.

I don't understand what you're trying to say because that is not a complete sentence. What about a person trying to evaluate the result of an experiment?

It is the H-man, before the experience. He know s with certainty (by CTM, right level, etc.) that he will survive one and entiore in a unique city. Both can confirmed that after. None can confirm W and M.

>> The Helsinki man can say the one that sees Moscow will be the Moscow man

> That does not help.

It does not help what? I admit it doesn't help picking the man who will see Moscow

Again, the question is not in picking the man who will see Moscow. But to evaluate the chance of seeing Moscow.

because in Helsinki there is nothing to pick from due to the fact that the man who sees Moscow won't exist until there is a man who sees Moscow, so I can't pick the man who sees Moscow in Helsinki. Not deep but true.

That's nonsense. You can apply that reasoning with a coin. before it is thrown, there is no head or tail having occured.

>> If Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle did not exist then the world would be different, I could measure both the position and velocity of a particle with infinite accuracy, and that's how I know it's talking about something real. Suppose, just suppose that this "1-P indeterminacy" stuff of yours did not exist, how would the world be different?

>Computationalism would be false.

So if indeterminacy of the 1-P sort did not exist then computationalism, a purely deterministic process, could not exist. That does not compute.

Computationalism is not a process. It is a statement that we survive classical digital teleportation. But then we survive duplication, and this entails the 1p-indeterminacy. You are the only person who remained stuck for so long on this. You just don't read the protocol, nor the paper apparently.

You make me happy as this shows that after all it is not that trivial, as I have heard so many times.

> hard to say how this can look.

Hard indeed, and you've hit the nail exactly on the head. It doesn't matter if "1-P indeterminacy" exists or not because with or without it even AFTER the experiment (forget about using it to make predictions)

= forget the reasoning that you are doing.

On the contrary, the 1-indeterminacy is used to make prediction, and only that.

things would look exactly the same.

Of course not. I guess you assume a physical primary universe, physical laws, etc. You seem to be unable to enter in some other theory. You can refute a deduction by adding hypotheses.

With or without it there would still be 2 people insisting that they were "yourself" and a third party could still find no reason to think that one claim was stronger than the other. And so 1-P indeterminacy joins luminiferous aether as something that doesn't exist or makes no difference if it does.

On the contrary: it leads to the discovery that if we assume CTM, then physics HAS TO BE derivable from arithmetic only, and this constructively so, making comp, CTM, empirically testable.

>> Without "1-P indeterminacy" how would the Helsinki man respond to the question "what city will you see?"

> You tell me. You are the one assuming that such a thing is possible.

I'm not assuming anything, I'm showing that it makes no difference if "1-P indeterminacy" exists or not, so busy men should do other things with their time than obsess over it.

But it makes a giant difference. You have just to proceed to see why.

> So without 1-p indeterminacy, please tell me how you predict, and how you confirm. More exactly how this is confirmed from the first person points of view.

I will tell you as soon as you explain how WITH 1-p indeterminacy how you predict, and how you confirm. More exactly how this is confirmed from the first person points of view.

With the simple protocol, I put a uniform distribution on the copies. I confirm it by interviewing the copies about their first person experiences, or a sample of them if they are too much numerous.

> You are the one making sense of some 1p determinacy,

No, I am the one making nonsense of 1p determinacy and 1p indeterminacy.

Then you make nonsense of 1p.

> you continue to avoid the task of putting yourself at the places of the copies to listen to the confirmation or disconfirmation.

I refuse to put myself into one of the copies but not the other because I can find no logical reason to do so,

OK. I see your problem.

their confirmations or dis-confirmations are always equally strong, or equally weak as the case might be.

They are not. In the iterated case, CTM predicts white noise, and most copies will confirm it.

 >> Yes, remind me again what we're arguing about.

> That the H-man, who knows that he will remain the H-man

No argument, I agree with that.

Good (but contradicts what you say above, where he seems to just die when pushing the button.

> yet differentiated into two mutually different M-H-man and W-H-man.

 No argument, I agree with that.

 > the H-man knows he will survive no matter what (by comp),

No argument, I agree with that.

> and that he will feel one and unique,

No argument, I agree with that.

> he is unsure if it will be W, or M, but he is sure he will not feel both.

And now trouble is encountered and John Clark has become increasingly convinced that the entire source of the trouble is due to pronouns. Even in a world without duplicating chambers pronouns can sometimes cause a little trouble because the meaning of pronouns do not remain constant, for example "at breakfast I decided to turn left but when I actually got to the intersection at lunchtime I decided to turn right" so what one and only one thing did "I" decide to do, did "I" decide to turn left or right?

No. the problem comes when you confuse the 3p and 1p use of the pronouns, as I have made clear many times, but you continue to use the pronouns with specifiying which points of view you are considering. This is made utterly clear, in arithmetical or computer science theoretical terms in the translation of the UDA is math. Most people find UDA still more easy to grasp than the math part, by lack of knowledge in logic.


Most of us would say that is a silly question because we're accustomed to the concept of time and the fact that "I" can change over time. John Clark is convinced that the question "what city will "you" see?" is just as silly and the only reason it is not as obviously silly is that we're not accustomed to duplicating chambers. Pronouns suck if not used carefully.

> I am the same person as me in the morning, but with different 3p.

And with a different 1p too, a consciousness that does not constantly change its perspective is not conscious.

  John K Clark

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