On 07 Dec 2012, at 18:33, John Clark wrote:
On Thu, Dec 6, 2012 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
>>> Doing the experience yourself
>>Which one is "yourself" after duplication?
>One of them with P = 1/2.
That neatly sums up the entire problem,
Indeed.
the insistence that there is only one correct answer to the question
"what city will you see?" even though you have been duplicated;
Because with the CTM, you can't feel the split. You remain one and
unique from any or your first person b-view after the duplication, as
both copies can confirmed.
and the probability figure is worse than useless.
Not really, but you have to proceed in the reasoning to see this.
AFTER a good experiment has been performed nothing has a probability
of 1/2, everything has a probability of 1 or 0.
But evaluation of future result of an experiment is done before.
After the experiment both will claim to be "yourself"
Rightly so by CTM.
and a third party would agree with both of them because a third
party could not find any reason to accept one claim and reject the
other.
OK, but we were specifically NOT asking for the 3-view after
duplication, but for the 1-views. And both confirmed a specific city,
and no ability to have been able to predict which one.
And I have NOT forgotten that each will see one city and one city
only, and I have not forgotten that Bruno Marchal's question "which
one will see Moscow?" is a silly question.
The question is not "which one will see Moscow". that's a silly
question indeed. the question is asked before, to the H-man, and the
question is "how do you evaluate the chance of living the Moscow (or
Washington) experience.
Seeing Moscow is the one and only thing that turns the Helsinki man
into the man who sees Moscow, so the man who sees Moscow will be the
Moscow man and the Moscow man will be the man that sees Moscow. That
is not deep, tautologies seldom are, but you've built your
philosophy on top of it.
Trivially, but again you elude the question asked.
>> I can think of examples where you and another are identical in
the 3p and the 1p, and examples where you and another are identical
in the 1p but not the 3 p, but I can't think of a example where you
and another are identical in the 3p but not the 1p. Can you?
> Yes, with "identical" in the sense that I am identical with me in
the morning.
In other words in no sense whatsoever, you are different from what
you were this morning in the 3p view and thus obviously in the 1-p
view.
This contradicts the fact that you ahev agreed that both the M-man and
the W-man can identify themselves with the H-man, but not with their
respective doppelganger after the duplication.
You remember being Bruno Marchal this morning even though you're
different,
I am different, I feel different, but I am the same person.
and Moscow is different from what it was this morning too but it's
convenient to use the same word for both. People change over time
and the meaning of the pronoun associated with that changing person
will change over time too, and the meaning of the pronoun will
change even more suddenly if a duplicating chamber is used.
But both remember the protocol, and make sense of the P=1/2, and use
it correctly in future iterated experiences.
> You forget that a unique person can be in many different states.
And I hope I never remember it because that is nonsense, if there
are different versions of something then it's not unique.
Then you die at each instant, and CTM becomes meaningless. There is no
more sense at all for the word "survive". Even for a heart operation.
> he is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search
his (unique) diary, open the door, and write "I see both W and M".
He is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search his
(unique) diary, open the door, and write "I see W or M".
I meant "he will push on the button". I ill probably write only W, or
only M. This makes the "W or M" prediction correct, by definition of
"or".
>>> But the H-man could not have predicted before (in Helsinki)
which city each of them is seeing right now
>> Each of them? In Helsinki there is no "each of them" for the
Helsinki man to pick out, there is only one person.
>A person trying to evaluate the result of an experiment.
I don't understand what you're trying to say because that is not a
complete sentence. What about a person trying to evaluate the result
of an experiment?
It is the H-man, before the experience. He know s with certainty (by
CTM, right level, etc.) that he will survive one and entiore in a
unique city. Both can confirmed that after. None can confirm W and M.
>> The Helsinki man can say the one that sees Moscow will be the
Moscow man
> That does not help.
It does not help what? I admit it doesn't help picking the man who
will see Moscow
Again, the question is not in picking the man who will see Moscow. But
to evaluate the chance of seeing Moscow.
because in Helsinki there is nothing to pick from due to the fact
that the man who sees Moscow won't exist until there is a man who
sees Moscow, so I can't pick the man who sees Moscow in Helsinki.
Not deep but true.
That's nonsense. You can apply that reasoning with a coin. before it
is thrown, there is no head or tail having occured.
>> If Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle did not exist then the
world would be different, I could measure both the position and
velocity of a particle with infinite accuracy, and that's how I know
it's talking about something real. Suppose, just suppose that this
"1-P indeterminacy" stuff of yours did not exist, how would the
world be different?
>Computationalism would be false.
So if indeterminacy of the 1-P sort did not exist then
computationalism, a purely deterministic process, could not exist.
That does not compute.
Computationalism is not a process. It is a statement that we survive
classical digital teleportation. But then we survive duplication, and
this entails the 1p-indeterminacy. You are the only person who
remained stuck for so long on this. You just don't read the protocol,
nor the paper apparently.
You make me happy as this shows that after all it is not that trivial,
as I have heard so many times.
> hard to say how this can look.
Hard indeed, and you've hit the nail exactly on the head. It doesn't
matter if "1-P indeterminacy" exists or not because with or without
it even AFTER the experiment (forget about using it to make
predictions)
= forget the reasoning that you are doing.
On the contrary, the 1-indeterminacy is used to make prediction, and
only that.
things would look exactly the same.
Of course not. I guess you assume a physical primary universe,
physical laws, etc. You seem to be unable to enter in some other
theory. You can refute a deduction by adding hypotheses.
With or without it there would still be 2 people insisting that they
were "yourself" and a third party could still find no reason to
think that one claim was stronger than the other. And so 1-P
indeterminacy joins luminiferous aether as something that doesn't
exist or makes no difference if it does.
On the contrary: it leads to the discovery that if we assume CTM, then
physics HAS TO BE derivable from arithmetic only, and this
constructively so, making comp, CTM, empirically testable.
>> Without "1-P indeterminacy" how would the Helsinki man respond to
the question "what city will you see?"
> You tell me. You are the one assuming that such a thing is possible.
I'm not assuming anything, I'm showing that it makes no difference
if "1-P indeterminacy" exists or not, so busy men should do other
things with their time than obsess over it.
But it makes a giant difference. You have just to proceed to see why.
> So without 1-p indeterminacy, please tell me how you predict, and
how you confirm. More exactly how this is confirmed from the first
person points of view.
I will tell you as soon as you explain how WITH 1-p indeterminacy
how you predict, and how you confirm. More exactly how this is
confirmed from the first person points of view.
With the simple protocol, I put a uniform distribution on the copies.
I confirm it by interviewing the copies about their first person
experiences, or a sample of them if they are too much numerous.
> You are the one making sense of some 1p determinacy,
No, I am the one making nonsense of 1p determinacy and 1p
indeterminacy.
Then you make nonsense of 1p.
> you continue to avoid the task of putting yourself at the places
of the copies to listen to the confirmation or disconfirmation.
I refuse to put myself into one of the copies but not the other
because I can find no logical reason to do so,
OK. I see your problem.
their confirmations or dis-confirmations are always equally strong,
or equally weak as the case might be.
They are not. In the iterated case, CTM predicts white noise, and most
copies will confirm it.
>> Yes, remind me again what we're arguing about.
> That the H-man, who knows that he will remain the H-man
No argument, I agree with that.
Good (but contradicts what you say above, where he seems to just die
when pushing the button.
> yet differentiated into two mutually different M-H-man and W-H-man.
No argument, I agree with that.
> the H-man knows he will survive no matter what (by comp),
No argument, I agree with that.
> and that he will feel one and unique,
No argument, I agree with that.
> he is unsure if it will be W, or M, but he is sure he will not
feel both.
And now trouble is encountered and John Clark has become
increasingly convinced that the entire source of the trouble is due
to pronouns. Even in a world without duplicating chambers pronouns
can sometimes cause a little trouble because the meaning of pronouns
do not remain constant, for example "at breakfast I decided to turn
left but when I actually got to the intersection at lunchtime I
decided to turn right" so what one and only one thing did "I" decide
to do, did "I" decide to turn left or right?
No. the problem comes when you confuse the 3p and 1p use of the
pronouns, as I have made clear many times, but you continue to use the
pronouns with specifiying which points of view you are considering.
This is made utterly clear, in arithmetical or computer science
theoretical terms in the translation of the UDA is math. Most people
find UDA still more easy to grasp than the math part, by lack of
knowledge in logic.
Bruno
Most of us would say that is a silly question because we're
accustomed to the concept of time and the fact that "I" can change
over time. John Clark is convinced that the question "what city will
"you" see?" is just as silly and the only reason it is not as
obviously silly is that we're not accustomed to duplicating
chambers. Pronouns suck if not used carefully.
> I am the same person as me in the morning, but with different 3p.
And with a different 1p too, a consciousness that does not
constantly change its perspective is not conscious.
John K Clark
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