On 01 Dec 2012, at 19:40, John Clark wrote:
On Fri, Nov 30, 2012 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote:
> It is hard for me to see if you have a genuine misunderstanding,
or if you just play words. Frankly.
Words are used to think with and in a world with duplicating
chambers simple words that normally don't deserve a second thought,
words like I me he and you, need to be played with very very
carefully or the result is ambiguous nonsense or tautologies
masquerading as profundities.
And if I misunderstood what you're saying we wouldn't be having this
debate, the problem is I understand what you're saying better that
you do.
I don't like to do meta-comment, but this is just the worth
authoritative form of argument that we can imagine.
I told you that in case you are uneasy with thought experiment, with
some amount of study in theoretical computer science you should be
able to follow AUDA.
Also, I am the one, well with the others, to ask you to make precise
when you talk about 1 or 3 view, which gives the precision needed to
get the point, and that you seem to conflate repeatedly.
>> The prediction was not confirmed because after the experiment was
over nobody said "I saw W or M".
> ?
What word didn't you understand?
Did you mean "I saw "W or M", which is indeed confirmed by the two
copies? Or I saw W or I saw M, which again is confirmed by the two
copies?
I recall you that W and M refer to the subjective first person
experience, and that "p v q" is true when one of p and q is true.
>> And anyway only one of them is of interest because only one of
them is "you" according to Bruno Marchal,
> No. They are both me.
OK, then the theory made the wrong prediction because it predicted
50% would be "me" not 100%;
They are both me in the 3-view, and only one of them can be me in the
1-view. And the question is about that 1-view.
As long as you don't take into account that distinction, at each step
of the reasoning, you will fail to see the indeterminacy point.
and don't give me this first party third party crap, ANYBODY that
exists after that button is pushed sees BOTH of them as Bruno
Marchal from the first, second third or any other point of view you
care to name.
No, the one in W does not see the one in M as being himself in the
first person sense, he just agree that the other is as much the H-man
s himself, but now they have differentiated. Only in the 3-sense, when
he attribute consciousness (intellectually) to his doppelganger in the
other city, can he acknowledge the presence of the other. Not so in
the first person more direct self-localization.
> from the 1-person view, I can only experience being one of them.
Bruno Marchal can only experience being one of them, but there are
two Bruno Marchal's and "they are both me" so that's not a problem.
Sure, there is no problem. But they both feel like their consciousness
has selected a particular outcome, and that they were unable to
predict it.
In the iterated nth experience, you can predict you will see all 2^n
sequences, but you can also predict that from any of your future first
person point of view, as you survive one and unique, you will see only
one of them, like
WWMWMMMMWWMWMM, and that this particular outcome was not predictible
in advance.
> in the 3p view, they are both me
And if 2 things are "me" in the 3p then unless there are mystical
supernatural entities at work they are certainly identical in the 1p
Not at all, they are both me in the comp sense. We have agree that
both the W-man and the M-man can pretend rightly that they are the H-
man, but their first person view have differentiated now, and so,
although they are both the H-man, they have become different: one is
the H-man now in Washington, and the other is the H-man in Moscow.
They feel different.
In modal logic, you can't use Leibniz rule for identity. It is a
standrd knowledge in analytical philosophy, confirmed in the
arithmetical philosophy coming from comp, but very easy to grasp
intuitively when you keep distinct the 1-you and the 3-yous.
(although the reverse is not necessarily true), therefore even from
the 1p "me" can't tell them apart, so both are "me" so in the 1p
view they are both "me";
No. They are both the H-man, but now, they are different person living
a different life. They become sort of "cousins", but they have
independent mind.
and if Bruno Marchal can dream up some other pee they're identical
from that viewpoint too.
Then if I give a pinch to the M-man, the W-man will get angry, showing
that your view entails action at a distance, telepathy, or some magic
of that kind.
>> You predicted W or M but not both, so which did it turn out to be?
> W but for the "me" opening the door in W, and M for the "me"
opening the door in M.
How can Bruno Marchal do a statistical analysis on where "me" is
likely to end up out of a mess like that? How can it produce numbers?
See below, as this was answered in my post.
> Both confirms "W or M".
And yet NOBODY saw W or M!
? They both can confirmed that they are in W or in M. If you phone to
one of them, and ask where he is, then in the case he answered W or M,
he tells the truth as he is in W or in M.
Somebody saw W and somebody saw M and "me" saw W AND M, but nobody
saw W or M.
"me" in the 3-view, with "me" = the H-man. None of the W-man and the M-
man have seen both cities.
>> In the two slit experiment the definite result was the that
photon hit the photographic plate right there and not over there and
no probability or theory was used or needed, all that was needed was
a darkroom to develop the plate. So what was the definite result of
your experiment, W or M?
> W but for the "me" opening the door in W, and M for the "me"
opening the door in M.
In other words if "me" sees Washington then "me" will see Washington
and if "me" sees Moscow then "me" will see Moscow. True but not very
deep.
Because here you forget the point that the question is asked to the h-
man, about his subjective future.
In each of your answer you miss something in such a way that it looks
you make a point, but you always change the question or the protocol.
>> John Clark is not interested in "all the copies" John Clark is
only interested in "you", Bruno Marchal predicted that "you" will
only see ONE city so which ONE was "you"? Was "you" in W or was
"you" in M?
> You have to take into account all copies, to get the statistics
right
Well then take all the copies into account and get the statistics
right and tell the world the definite unambiguous result the
experiment is claimed to produce! Did "you" end up seeing
Washington or did "you" end up seeing Moscow?
The point is, for the H-man, assuming comp, that he will survive one
and entire in both city, but feel to be one city, and that he cannot
predict which one.
3-you survive in both cities. The 1-you survive in only one city. This
makes the future 1p-indeterminate for the H-man.
> exactly like in QM without collapse.
Without collapse is code for without experimentation.
What???
Without collapse means that the experimentation does not suddenly
become describe by non linear QM.
Under some interpretations of quantum mechanics the wave function
collapses and in other interpretations it does not, but regardless
of which philosophical interpretation is true quantum mechanics
makes the same clear statistical prediction of what will be observed.
But without collapse QM is entirely deterministic, and the
probabilities bears only on first person point of view? Everett called
them subjective, but this is misleading as subjective probability is
already used with another meaning.
And after the experiment is concluded there is no doubt about what
was observed.
Like with the comp duplication. None of the copies has any doubt of
the self-localization result. It is either M, or it is W, never both.
In contrast with the duplicating chamber thought experiment Bruno
Marchal is unable to give a straight answer to the simple question
"did "you" end up seeing Washington or did "you" end up seeing
Moscow?".
I did the experiment yesterday, and I saw Moscow.
Like I measure a spin in x + z state, and I saw it in the x state.
In both case, comp and QM-without collapse, the 3p description is
deterministic and describes me seeing both x and z.
That means its not "exactly like in QM " its not even sorta alike.
>the H-guy knows with certainty that he cannot predict where he
will find himself after pushing the button.
The H-guy knows with certainty that who cannot predict where who
will find who after pushing the button?
The H-guy. Given that he knows in advance that his first person view
will differentiate, in exclusion fashion, into the W-man or the M-man
(but certainly not both at once from his 1p view on which bear the
question).
>> so which one turned out to be "you", the one that saw W or the
one that saw M?
> In the 3-view they are both me.
Good, then unless you're prepared to invoke the supernatural that
should be the end of the matter.
You need to invoke telepathy to identify the two 1-views after they
did the self-localization.
>> You" can't be both because that's John Clark's position.
> It is my position, but I made clear that it is the 3-view.
Good, then unless you're prepared to invoke the supernatural that
should be the end of the matter.
>> John Clark understands that Bruno Marchal's theory can't predict
which one, but what was the experimental result?
> W but for the "me" opening the door in W, and M for the "me"
opening the door in M.
In other words if "me" sees Washington then "me" will see Washington
That's tautological. But the point is that "me" will see W, and "me"
will see M, yet none of "us" will see both W and M. There is no
mystery as we have been duplicated, and without telepathy the first
person view has been differentiated, with no means to access the
respective memory, except by using the phones.
and if "me" sees Moscow then "me" will see Moscow. True but not very
deep.
But avoiding the question asked to the H-man.
As I said words like I me he and you need to be played with very
very carefully or the result is ambiguous nonsense or tautologies
masquerading as profundities. In this case its tautologies
masquerading as profundities.
That is why I suggest you use the prefix 1 and 3 for the pronouns.
In AUDA your mistake is a confusion between Bp and Bp & p. true G*
shows them equivalent, but G does not, and they obey different laws.
>> From the first person point of view which Bruno Marchal likes so
very much which one turned out to be "you"?
> Both from the 3p view.
Good, then unless you're prepared to invoke the supernatural that
should be the end of the matter.
I invoke the trivial fact, for man and machine, that the memories have
been duplicated and that there is no telepathy.
> And I can't predict which one I will survive through from the 1p
Without invoking the supernatural please give a example of 2 beings
identical from the 3p but not from the 1p.
Careful. The M-man and the W-man are not identical with the H-man, but
they are both still the H-man, in the comp surivive sense. You did
agree that they have both thr right to say they are the H-man. It is
still John Clark, but in different, differentiating experience, and
the question was about the evaluation of the chance of living one or
the other, as the 1p-views become exclusive.
> for each point on the plate there is a John Clark observing that
the photon hit that particular spot and no other, so each time the 2
slit experiment is repeated a definite result is found,
> By each John Clark which have become numerous, in the 3p view
Yes.
> exactly like in the comp case.
Not even vaguely similar. Quantum Mechanics makes useful predictions
that can be checked by experiment, the predictions your theories
make are either gibberish or tautologies.
Because you confuse the 1 and 3 pronouns.
In the two slit experiment each time I run it I can always put a
check mark in the column saying the photon hit the left side of the
photographic plate or a check mark in the column saying the photon
hit the right side of the photographic plate; in the duplicating
chamber thought experiment even after it's all completed it's still
not known if the check mark should go in the Washington column or
the Moscow column. So unlike the 2 slit experiment this one produces
no results, so there is no point in running it.
You miss the point by avoiding the fact that the question is asked on
the 1-view. each duplication can give only exclusive, and clear,
answer to the question.
You just stop identifying with any of the next 1-views, like if the
duplication killed the H-man, but this contradicts comp..
>>the photon hit RIGHT THERE.
> For all John Clark.
Yes.
> The same with comp: the city I see is right there.
I just did the 2 slit experiment and the photon hit there on the
left (not the right) side of the photographic plate. Bruno Marchal
just did Bruno Marchal's experiment, what city did "I" see,
Washington or Moscow?
I told, you. Moscow.
And when you did that experience, the superposition has been
contagious up to me, so the other John Clark is in a parallel
universe, but he is still there telling to a bruno there that he saw
the photon elesewhere.
Sure, now there is a Bruno Marchal who saw washington, but it is not
me "here and now/1p" as I have seen definitely Moscow.
If you enter in the duplication box with me, I can make bet, and we
get the first person plural notion, which is closer to the QM without
collapse, as our 1p will be similarly correlated.
>> What definite outcome did your experiment produce, W or M?
> W but for the "me" opening the door in W, and M for the "me"
opening the door in M.
In other words if "me" sees Washington then "me" will see Washington
and if "me" sees Moscow then "me" will see Moscow. True but not very
deep.
> W but for the "me" opening the door in W, and M for the "me"
opening the door in M.
In other words if "me" sees Washington then "me" will see Washington
and if "me" sees Moscow then "me" will see Moscow. True but not very
deep.
You are avoiding the question asked.
> The only difference with QM, is that you can meet your doppel.
The difference is that QM makes a prediction that is not gibberish
and not tautological (in fact they are non-intuitive) and can be
proven experimentally to have made correct statistical predictions.
Your predictions are gibberish or tautological and there is no way
to get numbers out of your experiment to do statistics with because
you don't know where to put the check marks after each run of the
experiment.
>> So now you agree with me that in counting the outcome of each
iteration of the test you should put a mark next to W AND M.
> Of course not. The prediction is on the subjective experience, and
NONE confirms "W and M". None at all.
You're right of course. There is no way to get numbers out of your
experimental setup to see if the probability predictions you made in
Helsinki turn out to be right or not because there is no way to know
where to put the check marks. None at all.
You avoid the fact that for the 1p we must interrogate all the copies,
and make a statistic from that, as the future 1-view are mutually
exclusive.
To sum up, when you say "if "me" sees Washington then "me" will see
Washington and if "me" sees Moscow then "me" will see Moscow", you
forget that the question is asked to the H-man. And when you answer "W
and M", you forget that the answer bears on the first person
experience (what is written in the *unique* diary directly at
disposition from any of the copies.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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