On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 9:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> a observer who did not want to play games and honestly wanted to convey >> the maximum amount of information would NOT say "from a first person view I >> saw W or M". And I meant that "me" would say "I saw M" AND "me" would say >> "I saw W". >> > > > This is not relevant. The question is about confirming a prediction made > before the duplication. > And Bruno's prediction was that somebody by the mane of "me" would say "I saw W or M", but nobody said that, certainly not "me". This entire problem is caused by the inability of some to realize that in a world that has working duplicating chambers and pronouns are still used with abandon just like they are in our world without duplicating chambers then the end result can only be tautologies or gibberish. >> If they are identical the one in W does not even know if he's in W or M, >> and the same is true of the one in M. >> > > > So when the W-man look around and see W, he does not know it is W? > If the W-man looks around and the M-man does not then they are no longer identical, and if nobody looks around then there is no W man or M man regardless of where they are, there is just one man, the Helsinki man in a box. >>> but now they have differentiated. >>> >> >> >> Yes but not at the instant of duplication, at the instant one sees >> something the other does not. >> > > > ? > Which word didn't you understand? >>> Only in the 3-sense [...] >>> >> >> >> Only in the 3-sense? ONLY?! I repeat my request yet again, without >> invoking the supernatural please give a example of 2 beings identical from >> the 3p but not from the 1p >> > > >You keep asking me that. It is impossible, > Then why do you keep complaining that I've answered the question "only in the 3-sense"?!?? > When you drink vodka in Moscow, and drink whisky in Washington. You are > still the same H-man > Yes. > but yet have different 1p view, as vodka taste differently than whisky. > Yes and now a third party would now find a difference between the two men too. > Other example I am the same guy now, as I was this morning when teaching > math. But my 1p now is quite different than from this morning. > In this case a conscious being is different in the 3 p and the 1p. I can think of examples where you and another are identical in the 3p and the 1p, and examples where you and another are identical in the 1p but not the 3 p, but I can't think of a example where you and another are identical in the 3p but not the 1p. Can you? > You should not conflate being the same person with being the same 3p body > or same 1p mind. > You admit that it's impossible to have 2 brains identical from the 3p but not from the 1p; and yet you confidently state the above. It does not compute. > It is typical for the same person to change its mind. > And if you've changed your mind then you've changed your brain too, you've changed the state of your brain because mind is what the brain does. >>> you can't use Leibniz rule for identity. >>> >> >> >> I duplicate you. You and your identical copy are in 2 identical sealed >> boxes. I instantaneously exchange the position of you and the copy. A third >> person cannot tell that anything has happened. You can not tell that >> anything has happened. The copy can not tell that anything has happened. So >> unless you can find a difference that is neither objective nor subjective >> then there is no difference between you and the copy. >> > > > But we have agreed that even after opening the box, and differentiated > they are the same man, > That is NOT what I agreed to! After opening that box and seeing different things they are no longer each other, they are separate people and different from each other from BOTH the 3p and the 1P view, and this in no way contradicts the fact that they both retain the right to be called the H-man because THE H-MAN HAS BEEN DUPLICATED. > You try hard to avoid the question asked. > I try hard to understand the question asked, but in the middle of a ambiguous pronoun blizzard it is very hard indeed. > But the H-man could not have predicted before (in Helsinki) which city > each of them is seeing right now > Each of them? In Helsinki there is no "each of them" for the Helsinki man to pick out, there is only one person. The Helsinki man can say the one that sees Moscow will be the Moscow man and becomes the Moscow man by seeing Moscow, and the one that sees Washington will be the Washington man and becomes the Washington man by seeing Washington. I don't understand what more you expect the poor Helsinki man to say. If Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle did not exist then the world would be different, I could measure both the position and velocity of a particle with infinite accuracy, and that's how I know it's talking about something real. Suppose, just suppose that this "1-P indeterminacy" stuff of yours did not exist, how would the world be different? Without "1-P indeterminacy" how would the Helsinki man respond to the question "what city will you see?" and even more important how could we confirm the prediction after the duplication? If this question can't be answered then "1-P indeterminacy" doesn't mean anything. > because comp predict that you will survive and got a single answer for > the self-localization. > I don't know what "comp" is and I don't know what "self-localization" is but I can predict that if I see Moscow then I will be the Moscow man and see Moscow. Not deep but very true. >> John Clark is not interested in predictions nor in theories, John Clark >> just wants a report on how a experiment turned out >> > > >There will be two reports, but only one for each individual. > If 2 experimenters of equal skill and reputation produce reports on a experiment that are 100% in conflict with each other than I, a third party, am no wiser about what is really true than I was before either experimenter did anything. >> until about 80 years ago people thought that all probabilities always >> bear only on the first person point of view; if Everett is proven correct >> then people will think that way again. And I have nothing against first >> person subjective probabilities as long as its clear who that first person >> is. >> > > > So here you agree that the QM indeterminacy is a special case of comp > 1p-indeterminacy? > If you put a gun to my head I couldn't say what you're talking about. > W-man = H-man > M-man = H-man But this does not entail W-man = M-man. > Yes, remind me again what we're arguing about. > It is better to write W-man = H-man + memory of W M-man = H-man + > memory of M > Yes, remind me again what we're arguing about. >>>I suggest you use the prefix 1 and 3 for the pronouns. >>> >> >> >> Did the 1-I or the 3-I make that suggestion? I really want to know the >> answer to that question although I doesn't know if it's the 1-I or the 3-I >> that wants the answer. >> > > > Both. I am not currently duplicated, > Is it the 1-I or the 3-I that am not currently duplicated? And how would "I" know if "I" was duplicated or not? > I have only one diary. > If "I" was duplicated then "I's" diary was too. > person remains rarely 100% identical with themselves, or they would die > at each instant. > Yes. >>> in the comp surivive sense. >>> >> >> >> They are the H-man in any sense, except perhaps the religious bullshit >> sense. >> > > >? > What word didn't you understand? >> And now that we've gotten all that out of the way I'm going to repeat my >> request yet again, without invoking the supernatural please give a example >> of 2 beings identical from the 3p but not from the 1p. >> > > > You just answered this by yourself. > I don't think so, I'm pretty sure I would have remembered that. > And see the many examples above. > I'll settle for just one example above, and I don't see it. > the M-man and the W-man, they are both the H-man, > Yes. > yet they have differentiated into exclusive person after the duplication. > Yes. And now that we've gotten all that out of the way I'm going to repeat my request yet again, without invoking the supernatural please give a example of 2 beings identical from the 3p but not from the 1p. > If you do it, you will have to check M, or to check W, as you cannot feel > to be in both city. > And should I shoot that other fellow before he can check the box for the other city? That's the only way to get a single unambiguous result from the experiment; but then again the experiment is symmetrical so if one has a gun the other does too. So either all the boxes in the Washington and Moscow column in the lab notebook get checked or none of them do. > Doing the experience yourself > Which one is "yourself" after duplication? > (in thought) and checking the result. You can iterate it, > Who can iterate it? > as it can appear more clear that you will get a random sequence of W and > M in most case. > The result will NOT be random at all, the result will be that every box that can be checked will be checked, and as a result nothing will be learned from the experiment. > You forget to put yourself at the place of the one doing the experience. > And Bruno forgot to explain who "you" is in a world with duplicating chambers. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.