On 03 Dec 2012, at 17:10, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Dec 2, 2012  Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Did you mean "I saw "W or M", which is indeed confirmed by the two copies? Or I saw W or I saw M, which again is confirmed by the two copies?

I meant that a observer who did not want to play games and honestly wanted to convey the maximum amount of information would NOT say "from a first person view I saw W or M". And I meant that "me" would say "I saw M" AND "me" would say "I saw W".

This is not relevant. The question is about confirming a prediction made before the duplication. If the h-guy predict "I don't know but it has to be W or M, and certainly not both", then that prediction, which is contained in the memory of both the M guy and the W man, both confirmed the "W or M" prediction, and both refutes the "W and M " prediction.




> They are both me in the 3-view

And so obviously they are both "me" in the 1-view.

In the 3-view? Yes.
In each of the 1-views? No. Unless magic, telepathy, etc.




> and only one of them can be me in the 1-view.

"Me" disagrees with Bruno Marchal about that, Bruno Marchal should just ask "me" and that will prove that John Clark was correct.

?




>> and don't give me this first party third party crap, ANYBODY that exists after that button is pushed sees BOTH of them as Bruno Marchal from the first, second third or any other point of view you care to name.

> No

YES!!

OK. Both sees itself as "BM", but in an exclusive way, so that they could not have predicted in advance which particular city they would have find themselves in.




> the one in W does not see the one in M as being himself in the first person sense

If they are identical the one in W does not even know if he's in W or M, and the same is true of the one in M.

So when the W-man look around and see W, he does not know it is W?
Then when I look at a particle in x + z spin, in the {x, y} base, I cannnot know what I see, and physics stop to make any prediction.





> he just agree that the other is as much the H-man s himself

Yes.

 > but now they have differentiated.

Yes but not at the instant of duplication, at the instant one sees something the other does not.

?




> Only in the 3-sense [...]

Only in the 3-sense? ONLY?! I repeat my request yet again, without invoking the supernatural please give a example of 2 beings identical from the 3p but not from the 1p.

You keep asking me that. It is impossible, but the prediction is about what WILL happen, after the differentiation.





>> If 2 things are "me" in the 3p then unless there are mystical supernatural entities at work they are certainly identical in the 1p

> Not at all,

This gets to the very heart of the matter and I could not disagree with you more. If correct why can't a example be provided?

When you drink vodka in Moscow, and drink whisky in Washington. You are still the same H-man (we have agree on this) but yet have different 1p view, as vodka taste differently than whisky.

Other example I am the same guy now, as I was this morning when teaching math. But my 1p now is quite different than from this morning.

You should not conflate being the same person with being the same 3p body or same 1p mind. It is typical for the same person to change its mind.




> they are both me in the comp sense.

Then what are we arguing about?

About the different experience, and the evanuation to live that experience in some experiment.



> We have agree that both the W-man and the M-man can pretend rightly that they are the H-man,

Yes.

> but their first person view have differentiated

Only when one sees something the other does not, as long as they stay in those identical boxes they have not differentiated no matter how far apart the boxes are and there is only one conscious being.

We have agreed on this a tun of times. But the question asked to the H- man is about its chance to get M, the Moscow 1p experience.





> They feel different.

If they have different memories of what happened after the duplication then yes, otherwise no.

Sure.



> you can't use Leibniz rule for identity.

I duplicate you. You and your identical copy are in 2 identical sealed boxes. I instantaneously exchange the position of of you and the copy. A third person cannot tell that anything has happened. You can not tell that anything has happened. The copy can not tell that anything has happened. So unless you can find a difference that is neither objective nor subjective then there is no difference between you and the copy.

But we have agreed that even after opening the box, and differentiated they are the same man, obviously in different state. They got 3p difference, and the question, to the H-man, is about their 1p view after the differentiation.

You try hard to avoid the question asked.




>> and if Bruno Marchal can dream up some other pee they're identical from that viewpoint too.

> Then if I give a pinch to the M-man

Then the 2 are no longer identical and all bets are off.


Yes, indeed. And both can confirmed that the "W & M" prediction was correct and the other false.




> the W-man will get angry,

Only if you pinch the W-man too.

Confirming that they are in one city, and not both, despite being the same H-man, in the sense they can both say "me, the H-man" has survive. But the H-man could not have predicted before (in Helsinki) which city each of them is seeing right now in their current, post- duplication+opening the door, 1-view.




> showing that your view entails action at a distance, telepathy, or some magic of that kind.

Don't be ridiculous.

> you forget the point that the question is asked to the h-man, about his subjective future.

And you forget that the H-man's future bifurcates so to expect a single answer is nuts.

Not at all, because comp predict that you will survive and got a single answer for the self-localization.




And I don't see how predictions of a subjective future is of any value in a thought experiment.

This says a lot. To handle the mind-body, it is obvious that subjective future is a key concept.




I make predictions of what my subjective future will be like all the time and I turn out to be right about as often as I'm wrong.

In the every day life, perhaps, but here we have a special protocol and a clear cut hypothesis. You can replace humans in that step 3 protocol by inference inductive machines. It works as well. The special definition used for 1p (content of unqiue diary available) is pure 3p, so it is just a metter of understanding the definition and think a little bit to get the prediction which is always correct ("W or M, but not both").





>>> You have to take into account all copies, to get the statistics right

>>Well then take all the copies into account and get the statistics right and tell the world the definite unambiguous result the experiment is claimed to produce! Did "you" end up seeing Washington or did "you" end up seeing Moscow?

> The point is, for the H-man, assuming comp, that he will survive one and entire in both city, but feel to be one city, and that he cannot predict which one.

John Clark is not interested in predictions nor in theories, John Clark just wants a report on how a experiment turned out.

There will be two reports, but only one for each individual. You have been duplicated.




>> Under some interpretations of quantum mechanics the wave function collapses and in other interpretations it does not, but regardless of which philosophical interpretation is true quantum mechanics makes the same clear statistical prediction of what will be observed.

> But without collapse QM is entirely deterministic,

Yes.

> and the probabilities bears only on first person point of view

Yes, and until about 80 years ago people thought that all probabilities always bear only on the first person point of view; if Everett is proven correct then people will think that way again. And I have nothing against first person subjective probabilities as long as its clear who that first person is.

?
So here you agree that the QM indeterminacy is a special case of comp 1p-indeterminacy?




>> Bruno Marchal is unable to give a straight answer to the simple question "did "you" end up seeing Washington or did "you" end up seeing Moscow?".

> I did the experiment yesterday, and I saw Moscow.

But there is a man in Washington who yesterday also claims to be "I",

I recognize the right for him to say is "me", in some "personal indetity sense", but from my W-man perspectiven he is no more me, as I have developed a taste for vodka since I am in Moscow.

W-man = H-man
M-man = H-man

But this does not entail W-man = M-man.

The Leibniz rule cannot be used in modal context, and personal identity is a modal (indexical) notion. Leibniz knew already that.

It is better to write

W-man = H-man + memory of W
M-man = H-man + memory of M



and the evidence to back up that claim seems to be just as good as the Moscow claim, so why should I, a third party, put a check mark in the Moscow column but not the Washington column?

Because you test a subjective experience of one person. Of course only the W-man knows that he feels to the W-man and not the M-man. By proceeding as you do, you can only obtain the 3-view on all 1- views, but this fails to answer the qeustion addressed. You forget that the H-man, know with certainty, (with comp) that after pushing the button, he will feel in only one place.




And if a third party is left out of it and pencils are just handed out to both men then check marks will appear in both the W column AND the M column.

yes, but this concerns not the H-man feeling, as both confirms that the other guy is only a doppelganger.



>I suggest you use the prefix 1 and 3 for the pronouns.

Did the 1-I or the 3-I make that suggestion? I really want to know the answer to that question although I doesn't know if it's the 1-I or the 3-I that wants the answer.

Both. I am not currently duplicated, so by the definition provided, you can't even distinguish them. I have only one diary.




>> Without invoking the supernatural please give a example of 2 beings identical from the 3p but not from the 1p.

> Careful. The M-man and the W-man are not identical with the H-man

That is obvious because nobody is experiencing Helsinki anymore.

OK. But despite they are not "identical", they are still both the H- man, in the same sense that I am the same guy right now as the guy who taught math this morning. But of course I am not 100% identical with him. person remains rarely 100% identical with themselves, or they would die at each instant.




> but they are both still the H-man,

Yes, although they are not identical to each other.

Excellent. So you get the whole point.




> in the comp surivive sense.

They are the H-man in any sense, except perhaps the religious bullshit sense.

?



> You did agree that they have both thr right to say they are the H- man.

Yes.

> It is still John Clark, but in different, differentiating experience

Yes. And now that we've gotten all that out of the way I'm going to repeat my request yet again, without invoking the supernatural please give a example of 2 beings identical from the 3p but not from the 1p.

You just answered this by yourself. And see the many examples above. the M-man and the W-man, they are both the H-man, yet they have differentiated into exclusive person after the duplication. Or me now and me this morning.





> each duplication can give only exclusive, and clear, answer to the question.

That's why if I was doing a statistical analysis on the experiment when gathering data I'd put a check mark in BOTH the Washington and Moscow column, but you say I'm wrong and only one check mark can be used; so what exclusive and clear column do I put that check mark in?

The step 3 thought experience does not ask you to look at the experience, but to do it. If you do it, you will have to check M, or to check W, as you cannot feel to be in both city. The H-man will feel to be in one city, in all case. If you just look at the experience in the 3p, you will get the deterministic result "W and M", but fail to answer the question which bear on the 1p, of the one doing the experience. It is just obvious that the H-man can only predict "W or M", given that the possible, but exclusive 1-view accessible is either W or M.




> for the 1p we must interrogate all the copies, and make a statistic from that

And I have asked how exactly to go about doing that and you are unable to say what the correct statistical procedure would be.

Doing the experience yourself (in thought) and checking the result. You can iterate it, as it can appear more clear that you will get a random sequence of W and M in most case. The proportion of W and M in all experiences will be given by the coefficient of Newton binomial.





> when you say "if "me" sees Washington then "me" will see Washington

OK. But I don't need to know what the W-man see. I ask to the H-man the chance he will see W.



and if "me" sees Moscow then "me" will see Moscow", you forget that the question is asked to the H-man.

I haven't forgotten a thing and the above is all that the H-man can say about the matter, and it may not be deep but at least it's true.

You forget to put yourself at the place of the one doing the experience.

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.

Reply via email to