On 05 Dec 2012, at 16:32, John Clark wrote:
On Tue, Dec 4, 2012 at 9:24 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>
wrote:
>> a observer who did not want to play games and honestly wanted to
convey the maximum amount of information would NOT say "from a first
person view I saw W or M". And I meant that "me" would say "I saw M"
AND "me" would say "I saw W".
> This is not relevant. The question is about confirming a
prediction made before the duplication.
And Bruno's prediction was that somebody by the mane of "me" would
say "I saw W or M",
Wrong. See previous explanations.
but nobody said that, certainly not "me". This entire problem is
caused by the inability of some to realize that in a world that has
working duplicating chambers and pronouns are still used with
abandon just like they are in our world without duplicating chambers
then the end result can only be tautologies or gibberish.
>> If they are identical the one in W does not even know if he's in
W or M, and the same is true of the one in M.
> So when the W-man look around and see W, he does not know it is W?
If the W-man looks around and the M-man does not then they are no
longer identical, and if nobody looks around then there is no W man
or M man regardless of where they are, there is just one man, the
Helsinki man in a box.
Irrelevant.
>>> but now they have differentiated.
>> Yes but not at the instant of duplication, at the instant one
sees something the other does not.
> ?
Which word didn't you understand?
The "?" was for "Does John ever listen to what is asked to the guy in
Helsinki? he is asked to evaluate the chance to see W after pushing
the box *and* opening the box?"
He believes in comp so he agree he will survive. He knows in advance
that he can feel himself surviving only in one city, as it is the case
for all possible eventualities. One will write "only W" in the diary,
and the other will write "only M". And the question beared on that
accessible first person experience which concerns the result after
differentiation.
You continue to avoid the question. It looks like you fake to not
understand it.
> When you drink vodka in Moscow, and drink whisky in Washington.
You are still the same H-man
Yes.
> but yet have different 1p view, as vodka taste differently than
whisky.
Yes and now a third party would now find a difference between the
two men too.
OK.
> Other example I am the same guy now, as I was this morning when
teaching math. But my 1p now is quite different than from this
morning.
In this case a conscious being is different in the 3 p and the 1p. I
can think of examples where you and another are identical in the 3p
and the 1p, and examples where you and another are identical in the
1p but not the 3 p, but I can't think of a example where you and
another are identical in the 3p but not the 1p. Can you?
Yes, with "identical" in the sense that I am identical with me in the
morning. And the W-man and M-man are both not identical between
themselves, yet identical with the H-man. There is no paradox, the H-
man has been duplicated. But that is why he is indeterminated on its
future 1-views in such cases. he cannot predict "I will feel to be in
W" with certainty, as he knows (being computationalist) that the one
in Moscow will have to acknowlegde he was wrong.
> You should not conflate being the same person with being the same
3p body or same 1p mind.
You admit that it's impossible to have 2 brains identical from the
3p but not from the 1p; and yet you confidently state the above. It
does not compute.
You forget that a unique person can be in many different states.
> It is typical for the same person to change its mind.
And if you've changed your mind then you've changed your brain too,
you've changed the state of your brain because mind is what the
brain does.
>>> you can't use Leibniz rule for identity.
>> I duplicate you. You and your identical copy are in 2 identical
sealed boxes. I instantaneously exchange the position of you and the
copy. A third person cannot tell that anything has happened. You can
not tell that anything has happened. The copy can not tell that
anything has happened. So unless you can find a difference that is
neither objective nor subjective then there is no difference between
you and the copy.
> But we have agreed that even after opening the box, and
differentiated they are the same man,
That is NOT what I agreed to! After opening that box and seeing
different things they are no longer each other,
Yes. But they are still the same man as the H-guy.
they are separate people and different from each other from BOTH the
3p and the 1P view, and this in no way contradicts the fact that
they both retain the right to be called the H-man because THE H-MAN
HAS BEEN DUPLICATED.
So, how could the H-man be sure he will end up as the W-man?
he is certain of one thing, he will not push the button, search his
(unique) diary, open the door, and write "I see both W and M".
> But the H-man could not have predicted before (in Helsinki) which
city each of them is seeing right now
Each of them? In Helsinki there is no "each of them" for the
Helsinki man to pick out, there is only one person.
A person trying to evaluate the result of an experiment.
The Helsinki man can say the one that sees Moscow will be the Moscow
man
That does not help.
and becomes the Moscow man by seeing Moscow, and the one that sees
Washington will be the Washington man and becomes the Washington man
by seeing Washington. I don't understand what more you expect the
poor Helsinki man to say.
To make a choice between the two following experiment:
You are multiplied into 1000 in both.
But in
a) 1 copy is tortured, and the 999 other copies get each one a
different heavenly marvel.
b) you 1 copy get an heavenly marvel, and 999 get tortured in quite
distinct and horrible way.
I don't ask you to choose, but how you would evaluate the chance of
being tortured or not in "a)" and "b)"?
Again, you can predict with certainty that you will live a unique and
distinct experience, in bot a and b.
If Heisenberg's Uncertainty principle did not exist then the world
would be different, I could measure both the position and velocity
of a particle with infinite accuracy, and that's how I know it's
talking about something real. Suppose, just suppose that this "1-P
indeterminacy" stuff of yours did not exist, how would the world be
different?
Computationalism would be false. hard to say how this can look.
perhaps with "Newtonian worlds", or "Aristotelian Gods". How could I
know.
Without "1-P indeterminacy" how would the Helsinki man respond to
the question "what city will you see?"
You tell me. You are the one assuming that such a thing is possible.
and even more important how could we confirm the prediction after
the duplication?
Excellent question!
To you.
Perhaps "W and M"?
But with comp "W and M" is refuted by the two diaries. Unlike "W or
M", or P(W) = 1/2, etc.
If this question can't be answered then "1-P indeterminacy" doesn't
mean anything.
Sorry, but I have given the criteria of confirmation. It is just that
you fake listening to them.
So without 1-p indeterminacy, please tell me how you predict, and how
you confirm. More exactly how this is confirmed from the first person
points of view.
You are the one making sense of some 1p determinacy, but you give "W
and M" which is refuted by both copies.
> because comp predict that you will survive and got a single answer
for the self-localization.
I don't know what "comp" is and I don't know what "self-
localization" is but I can predict that if I see Moscow then I will
be the Moscow man and see Moscow. Not deep but very true.
And avoiding the question asked. I have given 3p (scientific)
definition of the 1p views, but you continue to avoid the task of
putting yourself at the places of the copies to listen to the
confirmation or disconfirmation.
>> John Clark is not interested in predictions nor in theories, John
Clark just wants a report on how a experiment turned out
>There will be two reports, but only one for each individual.
If 2 experimenters of equal skill and reputation produce reports on
a experiment that are 100% in conflict with each other than I, a
third party, am no wiser about what is really true than I was before
either experimenter did anything.
Not in the self-multiplication context when taking the 1-views into
account. They get genuine bits from observation.
>> until about 80 years ago people thought that all probabilities
always bear only on the first person point of view; if Everett is
proven correct then people will think that way again. And I have
nothing against first person subjective probabilities as long as its
clear who that first person is.
> So here you agree that the QM indeterminacy is a special case of
comp 1p-indeterminacy?
If you put a gun to my head I couldn't say what you're talking about.
> W-man = H-man
M-man = H-man But this does not entail W-man = M-man.
Yes, remind me again what we're arguing about.
That the H-man, who knows that he will remain the H-man, yet
differentiated into two mutually different M-H-man and W-H-man. As the
H-man knows he will survive no matter what (by comp), and that he will
feel one and unique, he is unsure if it will be W, or M, but he is
sure he will not feel both.
> It is better to write W-man = H-man + memory of W M-man = H-
man + memory of M
Yes, remind me again what we're arguing about.
the same thing since many post. The H-man cannot be sure if he will
survive in W or in M, from its perspective in the future.
The minimum needed to get the step 4.
>>>I suggest you use the prefix 1 and 3 for the pronouns.
>> Did the 1-I or the 3-I make that suggestion? I really want to
know the answer to that question although I doesn't know if it's the
1-I or the 3-I that wants the answer.
> Both. I am not currently duplicated,
Is it the 1-I or the 3-I that am not currently duplicated? And how
would "I" know if "I" was duplicated or not?
Reread the protocol and hypothesis.
> I have only one diary.
If "I" was duplicated then "I's" diary was too.
> person remains rarely 100% identical with themselves, or they
would die at each instant.
Yes.
>> And now that we've gotten all that out of the way I'm going to
repeat my request yet again, without invoking the supernatural
please give a example of 2 beings identical from the 3p but not from
the 1p.
> You just answered this by yourself.
I don't think so, I'm pretty sure I would have remembered that.
> And see the many examples above.
I'll settle for just one example above, and I don't see it.
See above. reread the post. I have given a lot. I am the same person
as me in the morning, but with different 3p. Or the H-man = W-man, and
H-man = M-man, yet W-man is no more the same as W-man, etc.
> the M-man and the W-man, they are both the H-man,
Yes.
> yet they have differentiated into exclusive person after the
duplication.
Yes. And now that we've gotten all that out of the way I'm going to
repeat my request yet again, without invoking the supernatural
please give a example of 2 beings identical from the 3p but not from
the 1p.
> If you do it, you will have to check M, or to check W, as you
cannot feel to be in both city.
And should I shoot that other fellow before he can check the box for
the other city? That's the only way to get a single unambiguous
result from the experiment;
What? To be sure you see W, the W-guy has to kill the M-guy?
To be sure you see M, the M-guy has to kill the W-guy?
This is pretty ridiculous!
but then again the experiment is symmetrical so if one has a gun the
other does too. So either all the boxes in the Washington and
Moscow column in the lab notebook get checked or none of them do.
The 1-views are the individual diary, not some conjunction of their
content, which are 1p-inconsistent. All diaries, is still 3p, and the
question is asked on the 1p.
> Doing the experience yourself
Which one is "yourself" after duplication?
One of them with P = 1/2.
> (in thought) and checking the result. You can iterate it,
Who can iterate it?
> as it can appear more clear that you will get a random sequence of
W and M in most case.
The result will NOT be random at all, the result will be that every
box that can be checked will be checked, and as a result nothing
will be learned from the experiment.
You miss the 1p. You don't put yourself at the place of some sample of
the population obtained, which is needed to get the most probable 1-
views.
> You forget to put yourself at the place of the one doing the
experience.
And Bruno forgot to explain who "you" is in a world with duplicating
chambers.
No. It is done once you agreed that you are the H-man, that you will
be the W-man, and the M-man, but not both at once.
So what's your prediction, in step 3 protocol?
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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